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THE BATTLES OF THE LYS






he Battles of the Lys, which lasted from the 9 to 29 April 1918, were the second
German attempt to break the British line in the spring of that year.  As with the
first German attack in Picardy on 21 March, using their new tactics of a hurricane
bombardment and storm-troops, the British line was broken; but the BEF survived
suffering no strategic loss, even though the Germans gained much ground.
During the winter of 1917/18 the BEF had turned to captured manuals in an
attempt to copy German defensive doctrine; the Germans having become experts in the
defensive battle by using the analytical expertise of a small group of staff officers.
However, lack of experience led to faulty tactics, mainly having too many troops in the
front line.  Also, a shortage of drafts meant that there were few reserves to provide the
counter-attack, an essential part of the German doctrine.
The German failure after their meticulous preparations creates a paradox.  The
answer is that the Germans were unable to exploit their spectacular initial success due to
a failure of logistics; they could not bring material across the front-line area quickly
enough, which meant that they were unable to keep the battle fluid.  Also, by attacking
towards Arras on the 28 March they delayed the attack in Flanders, which allowed GHQ
sufficient time to re-form the shattered divisions which had been transferred north from
Picardy.  For a few days the situation looked serious for the BEF.  Gaps appeared in the
line which took the last of the reserves to fill, but the British held on tenaciously, this
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
BEF British Expeditionary Force, in 1918 officially ‘The British 
Armies in France and Flanders’.
BGGS Brigadier-General General Staff, the senior staff officer of a corps
BGRA Brigadier-General Royal Artillery, the artillery commander of a 
division or corps.
CEP Portuguese Expeditionary Force.
CO Commanding Officer, usually a lieut.-colonel commanding a 
battalion.
CRE Commander Royal Engineers, senior engineer in a division.
MGGS Major-General General Staff, the senior staff officer of an army.
GHQ General Headquarters, situated at Montrieul-sur-Mer.
GOC General Officer Commanding, officer commanding a corps or 
division.
GQG Grand Quartier Général, French General Headquarters.
GSO General Staff Officer.
HE High Explosive shell.
HQ Headquarters.
RFA Royal Field Artillery.
OC Officer Commanding, usually a company or platoon.
OHL Obersten Heeresleitung, German General Headquarters.
SAA Small arms ammunition.
SWC Supreme War Council.
The ranks and titles used in this thesis are those held during the battle.  In the
army a rank goes with a position; for example, a division is always commanded by a
major-general.  During the war officers were often temporarily promoted two or three
levels above their normal or substantive rank to an ‘acting’ rank.  Thus, a battalion
might be commanded by a captain or major, but while in that post he held the rank of
acting lieut.-colonel.  Except in official publications, such as medal citations, the
‘acting’ was omitted.  This convention has been followed in this thesis, the ranks which
go with each position have been assumed.
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INTRODUCTION
here are few opportunities to study the British Army in defence during the Great
War after the initial mobile phase.  In fact, except for Second Ypres in 1915 and
Verdun in 1916, the Germans mounted no major offensives in the West, until the
Kaiserschlacht opened on the 21 March 1918.  By the beginning of April, when the
offensive in Picardy petered out, the Germans had created a huge salient in the British
and French lines and almost captured Amiens, the railhead that fed the British Third and
Fifth Armies.  On the 9 and 10 April they attacked again north and south of Armentières
and so began the Battles of the Lys.1
Since the cessation of hostilities hundreds of memoirs, diaries and histories,
popular, learned and regimental, have been written about the Great War.  These are not,
however, evenly spread; the first three years, especially the Somme, have had far more
written about them than 1917 and 1918, the latter being very much a ‘poor relation’,
which is strange considering it was the year of victory.  The few books that have been
written on 1918, while covering the German offensives, tend to concentrate on the
March battle on the Somme, which is understandable given its larger scale; but there has
been to date no detailed study of the Lys.  One reason for this lack of study of the
German offensives may be the sheer complexity of the battle; following the two
volumes of the Official History that cover the period requires a major effort of
concentration by the reader.
It is perhaps difficult to do justice to a battle lasting twenty days in just a few
pages and so authors have picked out the most interesting points.  The failure of the
Portuguese to hold the line and their rescue by the King Edward’s Horse and the XI
Corps Cyclists appears in every account.  It is, after all an exciting story.  But what of
the defence of the Messines ridge, Ploegsteert wood or the Nieppe forest?  This thesis
will try to go some way to redress this balance.  However, the detailed narrative of what
happened is already contained in the Official History and so this thesis will concentrate
                                                
1 These attacks are known variously as the ‘Spring Offensives’, ‘Ludendorff Offensives’ or ‘Peace
Offensives’; the former will be used in this thesis.
T
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on two aspects of the battle:  how well the British (and Belgian) defences withstood the
German attacks and what stopped their advance.
Anyone writing on a Great War battle would be foolish not to refer to the
Official History.  Its compiler, as he termed himself, Brigadier-General Sir James
Edmonds, served at GHQ throughout the war and thus was in an ideal situation to know
what happened.  Unfortunately being a soldier and writing about his colleagues has laid
him open to the charge of distorting the narrative in favour of the army - others may
wish to express it stronger than this.2  Edmonds admitted to this in his correspondence
with Liddell Hart when the latter accused him of ‘Trade Unionism’ in his volumes on
the Spring Offensives.  He replied that he could ‘not give away people he had lived and
worked with all his life’.3  Even keeping Edmonds’ prejudices in mind the Official
History is still the most accurate and detailed account of the battle.  Where he shows his
hand is in his treatment of the ‘political’ aspect of the battles, the preparations taking up
considerable space in 1918 Volume I.  By emphasising the manpower shortage, the
extension of the Fifth Army line by twenty-five miles and the diversion of troops to
other theatres, he tried to lay the blame for the BEF’s failure to hold the line on Lloyd
George.
Edmonds’ narrative success was due to his method, which had been perfected by
the thirties when the 1918 Volumes I and II were produced.  A first draft was prepared
from war diaries, after battle reports and regimental histories when they were available.
This was then sent for comment to officers of all ranks who were there - over 1500 in
this case - although how they were chosen is unclear, it was obvious that he was looking
for confirmation rather than facts.4  Many of the replies to Edmonds’ draft have survived
and in general show how accurate he was.5  These replies follow a pattern.  After
thanking him, sometimes rather obsequiously for allowing them to contribute, they
agree with his version of events or perhaps questioning exactly which unit did what.
Many contributors complained about Edmonds’ rather formal style, suggesting the
inclusion of some ‘human interest’ element that they were, of course, able to supply.
Many of these anecdotes have to do with the liberation of livestock or poultry to feed the
troops.  Edmonds’ trawl for veterans was not confined to the UK, he corresponded with
                                                
2 For much of the war he was Deputy Engineer-in-Chief.  See French D, ‘“Official but not History”?, Sir
James Edmonds and the Official History of the Great War’, RUSI Journal, Vol. 131, No. 1 (March 1986),
p. 58.
3 LHCMA, Liddell Hart MSS, 11/1933/24: Edmonds to Liddell Hart, June 1933.
4 Official History, 1918, Vol. I, p. vi.  Even so, this was only a small sample of the total involved.
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all corners of the Empire.  A check to see how much notice Edmonds took of his
correspondents’ corrections produces inconclusive results.  The problem is that we do
not have the first draft to check against the final.  Often, he was asking people to check
his version against their memories over ten years after the events; regimental histories,
which are discussed below, generally agree with the Official History.
Not all of Edmonds’ correspondents were so congenial.  The drafts of 1918
Volume I caused a ruffling of feathers within the old Fifth Army command, or to be
more specific, with Gough6 and Maxse.7  In September 1934 Gough informed Maxse
that he had been reading the proofs for March 1918 and that ‘there are some comments
and strictures at the end, summing up the first two days fighting, which seem to me
rather severe on you and me.  I would much like to have your views.’8  There then
ensued an acrimonious exchange of letters between Maxse and Edmonds.  The difficulty
was that Maxse had already received copies of the first and second drafts and, as
Edmonds pointed out, ‘now, at zero minus five minutes you express yourself
dissatisfied’.9  Maxse could see himself taking the blame for the failure to hold the
Somme line in the first days of the battle.  He wrote to his brother Leo in May 1918
expressing his concern that ‘the lawyers and politicians will try to save their dirty skins
at the expense of us soldiers, as usual’.10  Later, he wrote to Edmonds: ‘Their eagle eyes
did not detect me.11  But those of the Official Historian did.’12  Edmonds had the last
word though: ‘but there was no getting over the fact that XVIII Corps [Maxse’s] did
make a “long bound” back to the Somme and then failed to hold the line.’13
After the Great War most regiments of the British Army commissioned a history
relating their part in the battles, often written by a former officer of the regiment.
Generally, the book was produced by taking the unit war diaries, reports and private
papers and fleshing these out into a continuous narrative.  It is interesting to compare the
text of a history and the war diary or a report, in which the same phrases are often used.
The authors were also able to contact survivors for clarification when documents were
scarce; for example, diaries for units involved in the March 1918 fighting often do not
                                                                                                                                  
5 PRO CAB 45 Series.
6 General Sir Hubert Gough, GOC Fifth Army.
7 Lieut.-General Sir Ivor Maxse, GOC XVIII Corps.
8 WSRO, Maxse MSS, 387: Gough to Maxse, 13 Sept. 1934.
9 WSRO, Maxse MSS: Edmonds to Maxse, 7 Oct. 1934.
10 WSRO, Maxse MSS, T248: Ivor Maxse to Leo Maxse, 11 May 1918.
11 Lloyd George, Henry Wilson and Foch, referred to earlier in the letter.
12 WSRO, Maxse MSS: Maxse to Edmonds, 5 July 1935.
13 WSRO, Maxse MSS: Edmonds to Maxse, 8 July 1935.
10
exist, or when they do they are very sketchy.  Some divisions, especially Regular or
Territorial ones, also wrote histories.  The method of preparation was the same, but the
personalities are often missing.  Armies and corps, which were continuously changing
their constituent formations, generally did not write  histories.
The regimental histories of the three Guards regiments that made up the 4th
Guards Brigade, whose defence of Hazebrouck is used as an example of a unit action,
are interesting examples of the type.  The Grenadier history reads very much like an
extended report,14 listing officers who were present at each action and the subsequent
officer casualties; whereas, the Coldstream’s historian,15 tried to write a history of the
war.  In the middle of the description of this action he describes ‘recent actions in Italy’,
which have little relevance.   The Irish Guards were the only regiment to have their
history written by a Nobel Prize winner.16  Rudyard Kipling wrote it in memory of his
son John, who was killed at the Battle of Loos while serving with the regiment.  As one
would expect from so eminent an author the book is full of wonderful descriptive
passages and examples of his music-hall cockney dialogue, although for some reason
there is no Irish brogue.  Of the three authors Kipling mentions the men as much as the
officers, although the accuracy of his narrative leaves much to be desired.  As one would
expect the Guards Division has a history, written by Colonel Cuthbert Headlam, who
later edited the Army Quarterly.17  It is one of the most readable of those written by
professional soldiers.  Regimental histories rarely made comment on the conduct of the
war, tactics or strategy; being very much ‘How our regiment won the war’, or perhaps
more exactly ‘How the war could not have been won without us’!
The other major published sources used in the preparation of this thesis are
biographies, including edited diaries.  Again, we have to be circumspect in their use as
diarists are unlikely to admit their errors.  Another problem is accuracy, as
autobiographies are often written many years after the events, and facts often become
mixed.  A good example of this is The Memoirs of Lord Chandos,18 who was brigade
major of the 4th Guards Brigade whose defence of Hazebrouck is used as an example of
a unit action.  While he gives a wonderful account of what it was like to be there, many
small details are at variance with the facts.  Chandos was not lying, but since the book
                                                
14 Ponsonby, F, The Grenadier Guards in the Great War 1914-18, 3 vols., (London: Macmillan, 1920).
15 Ross-of-Bladensberg, Sir J, The Coldstream Guards 1914-18, 2 vols., (London: OUP, 1928).
16 Kipling, R, The Irish Guards in the Great War, 2 vols., (London: Macmillan, 1923).
17 Headlam, C, The Guards Division in the Great War, 2 vols., (London: Murray, 1924).
18 Chandos, Lord, The Memoirs of Lord Chandos (London: Bodley Head, 1962).
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was written forty years later, his memory was probably faulty.
The search of personal papers can give very mixed results.  General Horne’s
papers yield virtually nothing.  He is one of the few senior generals of that era without a
biography.  General Rawlinson disciplined himself to write one page in his diary each
day, which gives useful detail about his staff’s efforts to build the defences around
Ypres.  One of the best sources has been the papers of Rawlinson’s MGGS, Major-
General AA Montgomery (later Montgomery-Massingberd), which contain many orders
and manuals not in the Public Record Office.
Only English language sources have been used in the preparation of this thesis
which restricts the German version to those works - mainly biographical - that have
been translated.  While, if only for the sake of completeness, it might have been useful
to have the German thoughts on the battle, this lack of information has not impeded any
of the narrative.  Similarly, as this thesis is about a British battle a detailed comparison
with French tactical doctrine, while it would make an interesting study, has been
omitted.
During the Great War the Germans became the experts in the defensive battle.  This skill
makes a useful benchmark with which to test the ability of the BEF during early 1918,
and to look for reasons why they did not do as well as they might.  In doing this one has
to be careful not to become enmeshed in the idea that everything the Germans did was
correct.  There is a great myth surrounding German efficiency; in many cases the British
were just as good.  For instance, the German interception of British front-line telephone
traffic is well-known, but the fact that the British did the same thing is rarely quoted.
The study of German defensive doctrine started with the publication of a series
of articles in the Army Quarterly by Captain G C Wynne which were later combined
into a book.19  In his book Wynne proposed that the German success was due to the
work of one officer - Colonel Fritz von Lossberg.  A later study by Captain Timothy
Lupfer leant more to the German Army system.20  Whether ‘evil genius’ or the system,
the Germans had to both introduce new concepts and change existing ideas.  It will be
shown that what today we would call the management of change was the key to the
                                                
19 Wynne, GC, If Germany Attacks: The Battle in Depth in the West  (London: Faber & Faber, 1940). This
odd title may have something to do with the date of publication, a time when the prospect of an attack in
the West was a reality.
20 Lupfer, TT, The Dynamics of Doctrine, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: US Army Combat Studies Institute,
1981).
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German success.  When developing their offensive doctrine the Germans introduced no
new major innovations, instead relying on refining existing techniques.  Even after
studying Allied offensive methods they failed to appreciate the potential of perhaps the
greatest technical innovation of the war - the tank.
The deteriorating internal situation in Germany and Austria coupled with the
failure of the 1917 submarine campaign meant that the Germans had to win the war in
1918.21  The German victories in the East which knocked Russia out of the war, meant
that they had the opportunity to take the offensive in the West.  The arrival of the
Americans in large numbers gave a sense of urgency to the Germans’ deliberations.
They knew they had to defeat the French and British before the summer, otherwise their
manpower superiority would be lost.  But, where should this great war-winning
offensive take place?  Every part of the line from Verdun to the North Sea had its pros
and cons, but presumably the area from Verdun to the Swiss border was considered
unsuitable due to the mountainous terrain and the lack of any strategic objectives.  The
appreciation written by Colonel Wetzell, head of operations at OHL, outlined the
German thinking and at first glance looks very sensible.  It will be shown that there were
serious flaws in the German thinking.
On the other side of no-man’s-land the British had concentrated their efforts on
building a European style army and using it in offensive operations, giving little thought
to the defence.  Thus in December 1917, when they realised that a German attack was
likely the next spring, they had to start from scratch as the Germans had done three years
before.  Rejecting the views of a committee formed to look into defensive doctrine,
GHQ in an endeavour to follow the German doctrine in captured German manuals,
issued orders for the construction of a defensive system in December 1917, based on
zones rather than lines.  It has been argued that one reason for the British failure to hold
the front line in March and April 1918, was their use of an outdated manual.  It will be
shown that which manual was used is largely irrelevant, because what GHQ failed to do
was change the BEF’s fundamental ideas in key areas as the Germans had done: for
example, reducing the density of troops in the front line, the use of reverse slopes, and
giving up ground of no tactical value.  It will be argued that there was insufficient time
to make all these changes, and that it required actual experience of the defensive battle
to show the need for change.
                                                
21 See Herwig, HH, The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary 1914-1918 (London & New
York: Arnold, 1997), pp. 351-387.
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The construction of the defensive system was a major undertaking by the BEF,
requiring the devising of defensive plans for each divisional sector which were then
collated into corps and army plans.  The infantry, pioneer and labour battalions
constructed the new works required by the plans and much new wire was laid.  It can be
shown that while the doctrine was suspect the ‘works’ were professionally carried out.
On the 21 March these defences were put to the test, when the Germans attacked
the southern sector of the BEF on a forty mile front with seventy-six divisions, under the
cover of a morning mist.  The German success was immediate and within a week the
Fifth Army had been pushed back forty miles until a combination of Anglo-French
troops and extended German supply lines forced the advance to stop.  After an abortive
attempt to capture Amiens the Germans attacked towards Arras at the junction of the
Third and First Armies.  Here the new storm-troop tactics had their first failure, the
result of the actions of XIII Corps commander, Lieut.-General De Lisle.  Meanwhile
tired British divisions were being sent north, in exchange for fresh ones, to rest and refit.
During April many of these divisions would incur casualties for the second time in a
month.  However, this does give us the opportunity to see if they learned anything.
One major difference between the Lys and the battle in Picardy was the lack of
German progress after they had breached the British line.  The failure of the Portuguese,
and the 40th Division on their left, meant that the Germans were able to make over three
14
miles on the first day, a feat they never repeated.  Instead of collapsing, the BEF
conducted a fighting retreat, disputing every inch of ground until the German advance
stalled.  We shall not look at this retreat in detail but concentrate on how the German
advance was stopped.  The Germans had three primary objectives, Hazebrouck, Bailleul
and the Flanders Hills with a subsidiary one southwards towards Béthune.  It will be
shown that there were two main reasons for the British success: the bravery of the
regimental officers and men, and the advantage gained when the artillery and infantry
were able to combine.
Many sacrifices were made as the British troops tried to halt the German
advance.  One example was the stand by the 4th Guards Brigade before Hazebrouck.
For two days these three battalions blocked the German advance, while the British 5th
and Australian 1st Divisions formed up behind them.  So fierce was the fighting that the
brigade suffered eighty percent casualties, high by even Great War standards.  While
none of the participants are still alive at the time of writing,22 many of the messages
carried by battalion and brigade runners have survived, these will be used to explain
what happened.  In addition, an assessment will be made of how ready the brigade was
for mobile warfare.
Any study of the winter and spring of 1918 soon produces a paradox:  if the
German preparations were so meticulous, and the British so inept, why did the Germans
fail in their bid to destroy the BEF?  Many authors have put forward reasons and these
will be discussed in an endeavour to answer the question:  German failure or British
success.
At the military/political level it took the threat of a German success, and perhaps
a war-winning one, to bring the British and French Armies together under a single
commander, General Ferdinand Foch.  After a faltering start at Doullens on the 26
March, Foch was confirmed as Generalissimo on the 3 April at the Beauvais
Conference.  Thus, the Lys was the first battle fought under this unified command.  Just
because Foch was given the job did not mean that national sentiments disappeared
overnight.  Haig’s reason for pushing for the creation of this post was to gain access to
the French reserves, his own being almost non-existent.  This chapter will show how
Haig, by dogged persistence, overcame French reluctance to assist the BEF.
Any major German success in the spring of 1918 might have produced defeatism
on the British Home Front.  It is amazing how the British civilian morale held up during
15
four years of indecisive battles and seemingly endless casualties. Before the advent of
radio and television, newspapers were the main medium for reporting any event.  It has
been shown that the full horror of the war was kept from the public at home by the
authorities, concerned that if the truth be known then there would be a clamour to stop
the fighting.23  Offensives were reported as going according to plan, while retreats in the
face of counter-attacks were strategic withdrawals.  This conspiracy worked during the
offensives of 1916 and 1917, because the public had no way of comparing the planned
with the actual advance.  However, the huge gains in territory made by the Germans
during March and April 1918 brought a different problem: how to present it while still
maintaining civilian morale and confidence in the army.  The final chapter will look at
how the German advances of March and April were depicted in the national Press and
whether the truth was told.
                                                                                                                                  
22 According to the regimental offices
23 See for instance: Knightley, P, The First Casualty (London: Deutch, 1975), p. 109.
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Chapter 1
THE DEVELOPMENT OF GERMAN DOCTRINE AND THE
PREPARATIONS FOR THE SPRING OFFENSIVES
uring the early months of 1918 the BEF endeavoured to copy the German
defensive doctrine in their preparations for the expected German offensive.  The
concepts of defence in depth and elastic defence were the result of a continuous
evolution by the Germans, and an understanding of them is required to appreciate the
task that confronted the British and their allies.  Also, the Germans’ successful defence
of their line during three years of war, may then be used as a benchmark to judge the
performance of the BEF.
The development of German doctrine started in the early days of the war.  Their
failure to defeat the French in 1914 resulted in the armies of both sides facing each other
in a continuous line from the Belgian coast to the Swiss border.  Such was the fire-
power of modern weapons, especially artillery, that the soldiers had only one recourse -
to dig the trenches that have become synonymous with the Great War.  Lines of trenches
were not new; the most recent example, the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, had been
witnessed by observers from all the major European powers.  However, two new factors
had entered the equation.  The sheer length of the line which would require a large
garrison to hold it; and, more important, there was no way of outflanking the enemy,
which meant that any breach of the line would have to be by direct assault.
The Germans had insufficient troops for offensives on two fronts, so their war
strategy was to defeat the French before turning on the Russians, who would be slower
to mobilise owing to the large distances involved and poor communications.  The
stalemate in the West meant that the Germans would have to hold the line while
transferring troops to the East.  It was not until the end of 1917, after the Bolshevik
government withdrew Russia from the war and signed the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, that
Germany could finally transfer troops to the Western Front and look for victory in the
West.
The study of this defensive stance was started by Captain GC Wynne, one of
Edmonds collaborators on the Official History, in a series of articles in the Army
D
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Quarterly in 1937-39;1 his purpose was to show that the army was still using the
defensive tactics it chose in 1918 in the current edition of Field Service Regulations.  He
used much of this material for a book.2  In his writings, which may be considered the
standard work on the subject, Wynne showed how the Germans developed their
defensive tactics by continuously looking in detail at all the major battles.  Other
authors, Lupfer,3 Gudmundsson4 and Samuels5 have written on the subject, all relying
heavily on Wynne.
One crucial factor in the development of the German defensive doctrine was the
Operations Section of their General Staff (OHL).  Under the German system, in the
event of war the whole of the General Staff moved to the front, instead of forming a
specific one for a particular campaign as the British did.  War on two fronts meant that
the staff would have to be split.  Therefore, in early 1915 the Operations Section was
divided, its head, Colonel Tappen, moving to command the eastern part leaving his
deputy, Colonel Fritz von Lossberg, to lead the western branch based at Mézières. The
name of this department may have given a false impression of its function.  The small
group of about twelve officers acted as both originators and a clearing house for new
ideas and plans, i.e. research into how battles should be fought rather than the actual
planning.6  Today we would call this operational research.  Wynne makes the claim that
the German success in defence was due to Colonel von Lossberg, while Lupfer felt it
was ‘a corporate effort using the talent of several great soldiers.’7  At first von Lossberg
was a supporter of ‘rigid defence’ and the fight for the front line.  He became so irritated
by the discussions in the mess on a more flexible approach that he forbade any mention
of the subject.  It was able to restart after he moved to take up a field command.8  The
Operations Section was responsible for the writing of the two manuals for the defensive
doctrine: The Principles of Field Construction and The Principles of Command in the
Defensive Battle in Position Warfare, first published in November and December 1916
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respectively.  The Germans were both pro-active and reactive in the development of
their doctrine and so the two documents were continuously revised in the light of
experience or to communicate new ideas.  The BEF used translations of captured copies
of these manuals as the basis for their defences in 1918.
Both sides started the war with no doctrine to meet the situation in which they found
themselves, and so had to start from scratch.  The German defences went through a
number of stages of development each increasing in complexity culminating in ‘elastic
defence’ in 1917.  Most of the pre-war tactical training of all the armies had been in the
offensive, any thought of defence or retreat being considered bad for morale. In the
Official History, Edmonds states: ‘It has been held by authority that there are dangers in
training troops in retreat, as it disposes them to retire’.9  With no experience to guide
them, the Germans’ first efforts were quite simple.  In early 1915 General Falkenhayn,
the German commander, ordered the construction of two lines of trenches some 200
yards apart with a reserve line 2000 yards to the rear.  These proved effective against the
unsophisticated Allied tactics of that stage of the war.  By July 1916 on the Somme, this
had increased to three lines and a depth of up to 6000 yards i.e. defence in depth.  The
battle would be fought in the front line and commanders who lost it were sacked, but the
cost of this policy was high casualties.  Although there may be some controversy over
the method of counting, German losses on the Somme were comparable to those
suffered by Britain and France.10
In late 1916 the Germans decided to build a series of reserve lines behind the
front, for use in the event of an Allied break-through; the first to be tackled was the
Hindenburg line behind the Somme battlefield.11  The original plans for the Hindenburg
line were to incorporate all that the Germans had learned to date.  The front trench
system was to be built on a reverse slope with belts of wire in front up to 100 yards
deep, combined with concrete machine-gun positions and the artillery observation well
back.  The two officers responsible for tracing the line, General Lauter and Colonel
Kraemer, did not pay much heed to this instruction and sited the trench lines according
to the old system - on a crest or forward slope with the artillery observation in the front
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line.  At the time von Lossberg was chief-of-staff of the German First Army (von
Below) in whose area the line was being built.  When von Lossberg noticed the faults he
requested that the Army Group commander, Crown Prince Rupprecht, order the line to
be reshaped by adding a new system some 2 - 3000 yards in front of the existing one
which became the artillery protection line.12  After an inspection of the situation by
Rupprecht he sanctioned the change.  The Somme battles left the Germans in such a
poor defensive position that they decided to move back to the Hindenburg line in early
1917, completely devastating the area they vacated.  As Wynne points out this was not
so much a line as a position; when it was completed there were three sets of trench
systems protected by wire up to 100 feet in depth.
The Germans gradually moved to the concept of defensive zones rather than
lines of trenches.  The Somme battles had showed that considerable depth of the
defences was required; it was always possible for the enemy to capture a section of
trench by the concentration of men and fire-power, but he would then be contained by
the other defences.  The enormous increase in Allied artillery meant that spreading out
the defenders would reduce casualties and give greater freedom of movement and
tactical flexibility.  Trench lines became borders of the defensive zones and a place for
the garrison to live in during quiet times.  During a battle continuous pressure on the
attacker came from the defended localities in each zone.  It was this idea that was to
give the British so much trouble during the winter of 1917/18.
The development of doctrine did not stop there.  Since 1915, the Operations
Section had been considering an alternative to the rigid defence described above.  In
mid-1915 the Germans captured a document issued by the French Fifth Army
(d’Esperey) which proposed a defensive scheme of three lines.13  The front line was to
house sentry groups only, supporting a line of listening posts in no-man’s-land.  Behind
this was the main line of defence comprising a trench line with small forts designed for
all round fire.  In the event of a German breakthrough these strong-points were to hold
out until they could be relieved by a ‘victorious counter-attack’.  The third or support
line housed the reserves in shell-proof shelters.  Switch lines between the three lines
were to be used to harass the advancing enemy.  The Germans developed this idea into a
more mobile doctrine.  If the enemy accepted the ‘invitation to walk right in’,14 they
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would be harassed by the troops in the battle zone using counter-attacks and machine-
gun fire.  Deeper penetration would result in counter-attacks by the rear echelons.  This
concept was called elastic defence, the name coming from the idea of the front line
being the elastic which when deformed by the force of the attack was sprung back by the
counter-attack.  This analogy, an unusual example of Newton’s Third Law,15 may be
taken a stage further.  The force required to deform the elastic increases with depth of
penetration into the battle zone, and consequently the stronger the counter-attack
required to remove the attacker.  It was this concept that was originally rejected by von
Lossberg, who could not contemplate any loss of territory.
Elastic defence was first used on the Scarpe in April 1917.  The Germans were
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unable to counter-attack after the Canadians had captured Vimy ridge because their
reserves were held too far back, by the time they were ready it was too late.16  Again,
von Lossberg was sent to the scene and became chief-of-staff of the Sixth Army (von
Falkenhausen).17  He immediately saw that the good observation from the ridge made
the front line untenable, thus the idea of holding it at all costs was impractical.  He
informed Ludendorff that he proposed a new front line about 3000 yards in front of the
Wotan line - the equivalent of the Hindenburg line in this area - and proposed to fight an
elastic defence within it.  Thus, the man who vigorously opposed the idea, and would
not even listen to the phrase ‘elastic defence’, was the first to put it into practice.  This
example was typical of the ‘fireman of the Western Front’ in action.18
Later in the year, when it became obvious that an attack in Flanders was
imminent, von Lossberg became the chief-of-staff to the Fourth Army (von Arnim).19
The flatness of the terrain meant that trenches on reverse slopes and artillery observation
on the next ridge were not possible; so, he decided to rely on a more rigid defence in
depth rather than the purely elastic defence.  The counter-attack would now be even
more important and the Germans could try out the new storm-troops, which were
becoming available.
The counter-attack was a central feature of all the versions of the German
doctrine.  During an enemy offensive the attackers were to be continuously harassed by
small arms fire from prepared positions supported by counter-attacks by the local
supports.  The timing of the counter-attack was important.  If the enemy penetrated into
the battle zone, a point was reached when the attackers no longer had the support of
their creeping barrage and become disorientated by their unfamiliar surroundings and
the continuous German fire.  The attack would then begin to falter and this was the ideal
time to launch a major counter-attack, before the enemy could dig in and consolidate
their gains.  As with most other human endeavours, the reality did not always match the
plan; the Germans soon found that continuously throwing in more and more troops only
increased the casualty figures for little gain, so the concept of the ‘counter-attack after
preparation’ was developed.  They were willing to allow the enemy to hold onto their
gains, until the artillery and infantry plans were made, and perhaps more reserves
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brought up.  One example of this was the counter-attack after the British advance at
Cambrai in November 1917 when, using massed tanks for the first time, they breached
the Hindenburg line.20  The Germans, having no local reserves, took eight days to get
their artillery and infantry into position, re-taking most of the British gains.
The Germans used many innovations in their defensive doctrine, some being
adaptations of existing ideas, others new.  While no new technology was developed for
the defensive, existing arms were used in different ways as the doctrine progressed.  In
some cases, they reversed the traditional thinking, which required changes to existing
methods and training.  Change in any large organisation, especially when existing
doctrine is involved, is difficult.  This was one of the Germans’ great achievements, so it
is worth looking at a number of examples.
In positional warfare high ground is all important; since it gives good
observation, trenches drain well and enemy attacks have to be made up hill, both sides
conducted local offensives to gain such positions.  The Second Battle of Ypres was an
example of the Germans mounting an offensive with limited objectives to gain the
Pilckem ridge, which commands an excellent view over the Flanders plain.  The first
line of trenches was usually placed on the forward slope, facing the enemy.  This gave a
wide field of fire and continuous observation of the enemy, but the increase in Allied
firepower made this position untenable.  Colonel von Lossberg, after some experience
against the French in Champagne, proposed placing the front line on the reverse slope
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with a sentry line on the crest to give warning of an enemy attack.  It was found that
placing the forward trenches 200 yards from the crest gave a sufficient field of fire to
halt any enemy advance.  Situated out of sight of the opposing artillery, any
bombardment would have to rely on aircraft for observation, usually a slow process.
Although first used in 1915, this concept took a long time to be accepted; it has already
been pointed out that the original layout of the Hindenburg line placed the front trenches
on a forward slope until the intervention of von Lossberg.
Many different permutations of the positions for the various arms making up a
defensive scheme were tried.  The front-line garrison was decreased, the infantry being
moved further back to decrease the casualties from the enemy artillery.  These troops
were then available for use in counter-attacks and could live in relative comfort.  The
idea of rigid lines was superseded by zones - outpost, battle and rear.  The front line
became an area of joined up fortified shell holes which, by increasing the area the
enemy artillery had to bombard, gave some relief to the foremost troops.  As the
defensive battle became more a fight for the battle zone, the machine-guns moved from
the front line into the battle zone and then to the rear lines in front of the artillery.  At
the same time the artillery observation was moved out of the front line, since it had been
found that contact between the Forward Observation Officer (FOO) and his battery was
often lost when the front line was bombarded, he became a casualty or his telephone
lines cut.  It was found that this rear location, especially when used with a reverse slope
position, gave better observation, away from the smoke of the battle.  The artillery
became more important as a defensive weapon as the war progressed; the Germans
began to position the artillery line first, then those for the infantry; and battery sites
became defended areas in themselves, rather than lines of guns in the open.  The
positioning of reserves was experimented with; the further forward they were deployed,
the quicker they could come into action.  However, this could mean casualties and poor
living conditions.
The pre-war German Army laid great store in the discipline and commitment of
its soldiers, thus the order to hold the front line at all costs fitted into the culture.  This
idea was translated into slogans such as ‘Hold on to whatever can be held’.21  The loss
of ground was considered a propaganda gift to the enemy and often magnified beyond
its worth.  The problem with such ideals is that they can become expensive to maintain,
as the Germans found on the Somme.  Gradually they formed the concept of holding
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ground for its tactical, rather than propaganda value.  For instance, when evaluating the
situation at the end of 1916, there was little hesitation in moving back to the Hindenburg
position.  Although the BEF may have had something to crow about when the Germans
withdrew, they ended up facing an almost impregnable position for the gain of the
devastated area.
In his article The Chain of Command22 Wynne pointed to the difficulty of
passing orders quickly from corps to battalion.  The figure of six hours is often
mentioned, there were a number of instances of British troops waiting for orders when
the Germans had retreated.  All the belligerents has this problem, which is not surprising
since their armies had similar structures, but the Germans made an effort to solve it.
The function of some formations and units was changed during a battle.  Battalions
reported directly to divisions and divisions to the army thus bypassing brigade and
corps.  These latter two became suppliers of reinforcements and supplies.23  At the end
of the battle the command structure reverted to normal; today we would call this process
‘delayering’.  The role of the battalion commander became more important, as he was
given responsibility for his section of the front as well as his men and might remain in
position even if his unit was relieved.  During the Battle of Passchendaele the Germans
tried combining two divisions, one positioned immediately behind the other, but with
one commander responsible for the front.  The troops in the line could be rotated every
four or five days to relieve the strain of battle, while reinforcements were immediately
available in the event of an attack.
By the end of 1917, the German Army on the Western Front had had three years
experience of the defensive battle, including the hard lessons learned from a number of
mistakes.  In developing their doctrine, they were able to call upon the analytical skill of
a relatively few junior officers in the Operations Section, and the high command had
Colonel von Lossberg.  This development was not without friction; von Lossberg had
first to be persuaded to accept the concept of elastic defence, and selling this idea within
the army was a long job.  However, it was this ability to innovate, either changing old
ideas or introducing new ones, that gave the Germans their success in defence.
Changes to methods of working and responsibilities in any organisation are not
made without conflict; the reasons for this can be complex, and many words have been
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written on the management of change.  For the Germans, as with any army, there was an
extra dimension: if they managed the introduction of new doctrine badly they could lose
the war.  There seem to have been two schools, the die-hards who favoured rigid
defence and the progressives who were looking for new ideas to counteract the
increasing tactical ability of the Allies.  Wynne gives the impression that the German
defensive doctrine developed with only a few objections or ‘discussions’ along the way.
To anyone with experience of a large organisation trying to improve itself this is
nonsense; as Lupfer has pointed out, ‘there was still a universal distrust of higher
headquarters and, in particular, of staff members, by German front-line officers and
men’.24  The contrary views started immediately Falkenhayn issued his instructions for
the defensive in early 1915.  His proposal for a rear line, that would be used if the front
was breached, brought the opinion from Crown Prince Rupprecht that its presence
would lessen the resolve of the defenders.  Experience showed that this view was
completely unfounded.  The introduction of Ludendorff’s textbook required his personal
intervention:  ‘The controversy raged furiously on my staff; I myself had to take part and
I advocated the new tactics.’25  Even so, it took seven months to introduce.26  Generals
rarely give direct orders, but make suggestions or give instructions through their staff,
who then see that these are carried out.  On this occasion his rank and position were
required to push the ideas through.  As the Germans developed elastic defence the
influence of the ‘die-hards’ did not diminish.  The battle of Passchendaele is
remembered by the British for its mud and failure to achieve its objective.  Wynne’s
second article shows that the Germans had to revise their doctrine continuously during
this battle as the British changed their tactics, relying more on limited objective
offensives.27  To counter this the Germans reverted to the doctrine of a much more
heavily defended forward zone, which was a failure as it just provided more fodder for
the British cannon.28
There were a number of occasions when changes in BEF tactics, or mistakes by
the Germans, gave the British an advantage.  The most consistently successful tactic
against the German defences was surprise; days of preliminary bombardment made the
British intention obvious, enabling the Germans to move reserves into place and get
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ready for a set piece defence.  The attack on the Hindenburg position at Cambrai in
November 1917 combined the use of massed tanks to breach the wire with a short
artillery bombardment.  As has already been mentioned, the Germans were unable to
counter-attack immediately as there were no troops in position ready to be the spring in
the elastic.  However, the counter-attack after preparation eight days later regained most
of their losses.  It is interesting that Wynne hardly mentions this failure in his book.  On
another occasion, during the Battle of Arras in the spring of 1917, the Germans held
their reserves too far back which enabled the British to make progress and consolidate
their gains.
The use by the British of the German concept of defended localities was
Wynne’s main criticism of the BEF’s defensive tactics, which will be discussed in the
next chapter.  The purpose of the troops in forward zone was to slow the advance of an
attacker who broke through the front line.  To achieve this the Germans placed sections
or platoons in pill-boxes or machine-gun nests from where they could harass the enemy
by fire.  The defenders of these points of resistance were to hold out at all costs until
relieved by the counter-attack; during the battle they would also act as rallying points for
the front-line troops falling back.  These small garrisons would be sacrificed if the
counter-attack was not successful.  One of the earliest forms of this part of the defences
was a line of pillboxes a few hundred yards behind the foremost trenches.  An example
still exists on Aubers ridge opposite the line held by the Portuguese in April 1918.
Situated about 100 yards from the crest of the ridge they could fire on any attacker who
made it to the top.  The rolling countryside of the Somme allowed these positions to be
more easily disguised and thus hidden from aerial observation.  In Flanders the Germans
built concrete pill-boxes disguised with turf; during the latter stages of the Battle of
Passchendaele, when the British used the limited objective offensives already
mentioned, their garrisons were often sacrificed.  The forward zone was captured, and
the position consolidated by the British, before the German counter-attack could be
launched.  Thus the garrison was lost, and any strongpoints in the battle zone not used.
However, the Germans continued to use this concept, and during the latter months of the
war, many Allied attacks were against ‘field positions consisting of fortified localities
and trenches’.29  In addition, the Germans often placed forward guns in these localities
for use against tanks.
The German command structure gained considerable experience in defence
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during the course of the war; this learning process, including the study of their mistakes,
enabled them to increase the sophistication of their doctrine.  We might consider that
codifying their experience in a textbook was sufficient, since all commanders had to do
was study it and make their dispositions accordingly.  There was more to it than that.
The textbook was a set of guidelines, more general than specific; it was for the user to
apply it according to the ground and tactical situation in question, and to do this
experience of the defensive battle was required.
The trench fortifications of the Western Front gave as many problems to the attacker as
the defender; in particular, machine-guns and artillery had made the offensive almost
impossible by the direct assault of massed infantry.  The three main difficulties to be
overcome during an attack were: suppression of the defender by accurate artillery fire in
order to cross no-man’s-land; the lack of artillery support once in the enemy defences
and the creeping barrage had gone; and keeping the offensive moving so that the enemy
had no opportunity to consolidate a new line.  The Allied answer to this was the tank,
while the Germans concentrated on infiltration techniques, which we know under the
evocative name of storm-troop tactics, part of an offensive doctrine that embraced both
the infantry and artillery.
The tactics used by the Germans in 1918, which partly solved the problems
mentioned above, had their origin in the thoughts of a French infantry officer, André
Laffargue.  He published the results of his deliberations in a pamphlet The Attack in
Trench Warfare,30 a copy of which the Germans captured in the early summer of 1916.
Lupfer summarised Laffargue’s ideas as:
... a sudden attack to achieve deep penetration.  His attack resembled a
gulp, not a nibble.  The momentum of the in-depth attack would disrupt
the enemy, keep him off balance, and prevent him from organising an
effective response.  To capitalise on disruption, the assault had to advance
as fast as possible.  The first wave would identify - not reduce - defensive
strongpoints and subsequent attack waves would destroy them.  An
artillery bombardment applied suddenly in depth throughout the enemy
area would precede the infantry assault.  Disruption of enemy artillery
batteries was particularly important to protect the infantry advance.31
This is immediately recognisable as ‘storm-troop tactics’ as practised on the 21 March
1918.  The refined ideas were published in a manual The Attack in Position Warfare on
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1 January 1918.
The long artillery barrages used to soften up the defences often fell short of the
desired effect.  Shrapnel and high-explosive were poor cutters of wire; while the latter
might destroy the enemy earthworks a devastated area was created that made the
progress of both men and vehicles difficult.  Surprise in the form of an accurate short
bombardment, followed up by infantry under the protection of a ‘creeper’, gave much
better results and had been proved by the Germans in the East.  The traditional method
of ranging an artillery piece was by registration, i.e. firing at the enemy and observing
the fall of shot.  However, the firing in this manner of the large number of guns required
for a major offensive soon gave warning of an attack to the enemy.  An artilleryman,
Captain Pulkowsky, developed a method of accurate firing without registration by
calibrating each gun away from the front and tabulating the data including the effects of
external factors such the weather.  Again, the idea had to be proved before it was
accepted.  Lupfer quotes the experiences of a German gunner at Pulkowsky’s school,
where over six thousand officers and men were trained in this method.  His initial
scepticism gave way to acclaim, but only after he had seen the result of the new tactic.32
This scientific artillery was not new, it had been the basis of all naval gunnery since the
end of the last century.  It is strange that writers often seem reluctant to credit the BEF
with a similar development.33
The prelude to any offensive on the Western Front was the artillery
bombardment, often lasting for several days, which was supposed to destroy the enemy
defences in order to pave the way for the infantry advance.  The main disadvantage of
this was that any element of surprise was lost.  The enemy was given time to mass
resources behind the front, out of range of the field artillery, ready to counter-attack as
soon as the barrage lifted.  At Riga, in late 1917, the Germans had experimented with a
short hurricane bombardment developed by von Hutier’s artillery adviser, Lieut.-Colonel
Bruchmüller, who was transferred with von Hutier to the Western Front.  The first
period of two hours was directed against the enemy artillery and command structure in
the rear.  The ratio of 4.5:1 in favour of gas shell shows that the emphasis was on the
personnel rather than buildings or defence lines.  For the next three hours, the
concentration was against the defences in the front area and their garrison, the ratio of
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gas to high explosive shell being 1:1.  For the last five minutes, most fire was
concentrated against the forward zone.  At zero hour the attacking infantry, who had
meanwhile crept forward into no-man’s-land, would rush the forward defences,
hopefully overcoming the dazed defenders.  At the same time, a creeping barrage would
move forward to a pre-set timetable.  The field artillery, which provided most of this
‘creeper’, was to be as far forward as possible to give the maximum depth of protection
to the infantry.  Experience had shown that it was very easy for the leading troops to lose
the barrage if they were held up by one of the multitude of things that could go wrong.
To counter this flares were issued to the storm-troops so that the artillery observers
might judge their positions.
There are many instances in the Great War of advances being held up by a few
strategically placed enemy machine-gun nests that had survived the bombardment and
which could only be overcome by direct assault, resulting in considerable loss of life.
The infantry had only rifles and grenades to use in such situations, while what was
required was a heavier weapon that could suppress the defenders’ fire until the infantry
could get close.  The Germans first tried a 37mm cannon which was not successful and
was replaced by captured Russian 76.2mm field guns which were stripped down to
make them lighter and mounted on a skid.34  Similar arrangements were made for trench
mortars and machine-guns, and together these weapons gave the German infantry their
own mobile firepower.
It is strange that the Germans did not develop an efficient light machine-gun
similar to the Lewis gun used very effectively by the British infantry.  Throughout the
war they relied on captured equipment or an adaptation of their existing Maxim heavy
machine-gun.  Their first effort, the Bergman, introduced in 1915, had a tendency to
jam.  In mid-1916 they started to use Madsens which were of Danish manufacture, that
had been captured from the Russians and re-chambered to take the standard 7.62mm
rifle round; captured Lewis guns suffered a similar fate.35  Since the German Maxim
was difficult to move about due to its heavy tripod mounting and water container, a
version was made with a wooden stock and bipod mount after some troops had been
slow to evacuate their bunkers during the Somme campaign, but this was hardly a
mobile weapon, although it was used until the end of the war.36  Given the lack of
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German offensives on the Western Front, the captured guns and the lightened Maxim
may have been sufficient in defence and thus a better weapon considered unnecessary.
The storm-troop idea was developed by a Captain Reddmann, a pioneer officer,
from the pre-war concept of Jaeger battalions who were recruited mainly from
mountainous regions.  Initially a flame-thrower section, an early solution to the problem
of taking extra fire-power across no-man’s-land, they were used first against the French
at Malancourt north of Verdun in February 1916 with great success.  This gave the
impetus for expansion into the rest of the army and the existing Jaeger units were
converted into assault battalions at a school set up at Beauville east of Verdun.  The
school’s commander, Captain Rohr, developed specific assault tactics for use by these
troops.  Gone were the waves of infantry trying to cross no-man’s-land before the
machine-guns got them.  Instead small groups were to crawl to as near the enemy as
possible before making the final rush.  Once in the enemy trenches they were to keep the
attack moving by avoiding any centres of resistance, which were to be left for the
orthodox infantry to deal with, and exploit the weak spots signalling these with flares.
The mountains of equipment that the infantry of those days were expected to carry into
battle were dispensed with and replaced with a sack of grenades, a few days hard rations
and a carbine.  Lace-up boots were found to be better than jack-boots and leather
patches were sewn onto the uniform knees and elbows to facilitate crawling.  Body
armour was experimented with but found to be too cumbersome and was soon
discarded, although steel helmets were retained.37  These troops were first used in the
West for the German counter-attack at Cambrai and their success gave their
commanders the confidence to use specially trained assault troops during the Spring
Offensives in 1918.
Ludendorff conceived the idea that all infantry should be modelled on this
pattern, but the quality of replacements reaching the army in 1917 did not allow this,
and not all the men were mentally suitable for the tough training.  Instead about one
quarter of his troops were converted into assault divisions and spent the winter of
1917/18 training, while the remainder were designated trench divisions and were left to
garrison the front.
The armistice on the Eastern Front meant that the Germans, by transferring troops to the
West, would have a numerical advantage during the first half of 1918.  After then, the
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arrival of the Americans would swing the manpower pendulum in the Allies favour.
Thus, the spring of 1918 would be the one chance the Germans had for a war-winning
offensive.  There were three choices for the initial attack: Flanders, Picardy or Verdun,
each with its advantages and disadvantages.  After much deliberation, they chose
Picardy as the place where the new combination of an intense artillery barrage followed
by infantry infiltration would be tried against the Allies on a large scale.
The German planning for the Spring Offensives started on the 11 November
1917, when a conference was held at Crown Prince Rupprecht’s headquarters in Mons.
It was attended by Ludendorff, the chiefs-of-staff of the two northern Army Groups
General von Kuhl and Colonel von der Schulenberg, together with various officers of
the General Staff including Colonel Wetzell, head of the Operations Section.  The object
of the conference was to decide which of the Allies to attack and where, should the
situation in Italy and particular Russia be decided to their advantage.  Russia was
causing Ludendorff considerable concern at this time; while its gradual collapse during
1917 would allow divisions to be released for service in the West, the unstable political
situation meant that hostilities could easily break out again.  However, these fears were
proved groundless, when the Bolsheviks sued for peace in December 1917 and the
Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in the following March took Russia out of the war and released
even more troops than had previously been anticipated.38  By 21 March 1918, the
Germans increased their strength in the West from 150 divisions in November 1917 by
an aggregate of 42 divisions39 - some divisions were sent from west to east.  By the end
of April this had risen to 206 divisions.40
The result of the conference was a choice of three places for the offensive:
Verdun against the French and St. Quentin or Hazebrouck against the British.  Although
various plans were already in existence for such offensives, no final decision was made,
Ludendorff preferring to wait and see how the overall situation developed.  At this time
the resources available to the Germans allowed for only one offensive with which to win
the war, but the Russian bonus was to give Ludendorff greater strategic flexibility.  This
new situation was reflected in a paper prepared by Colonel Wetzell entitled The
                                                                                                                                  
37 The Germans were slower than the British to adopt protective headgear.
38 Although the negotiations dragged on, the armistice allowed the Germans to reduce manpower on this
front.
39 Official History, 1918, Vol. I, p. 142.
40 Official History, 1918, Vol. II, p. 438.
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Offensive in the West and its Prospect of Success41 which summarised the ideas of the
various staffs and set out the courses open to the Germans.  Wetzell concluded that an
attack against the British gave the greatest chance of success, although he did not fully
explain why he rejected the French option.  At some time, these offensive plans were
given ‘heroic’ code names.  Wetzell’s views on the strengths and weaknesses of the
French and British probably played a large part in his decision making.  He felt that
although the British had ‘suffered very severely’ in Flanders they had enough trained
replacements to continue the offensive in 1918.  Tied to Flanders the British were a
‘strategically clumsy, tactically rigid, but tough enemy’.  The French Army on the other
hand was ‘rested, tactically more skilful and strategically free’.  This is perhaps why he
preferred the British option.
The main tactical theme of Wetzell’s argument was that one blow was not
sufficient to give victory; rather a series of attacks would have to be made, each drawing
in the enemy reserves until finally the line would break.  He was concerned that if
Germany attacked one of the Allies, the other would start an offensive to relieve the
pressure.  To counter this he suggested an attack on Verdun which could be made in
February when the British sector of the front, especially Flanders, would be unsuitable
for a counter-offensive.  He considered that the French would not recover, either
politically or militarily, from such a battle.  Against the British he preferred an attack on
Hazebrouck, an important railway centre, which would threaten the Channel Ports.
However, realising that good road and rail communications behind the Allied front
would enable them to easily move reinforcements, he concluded that it was better to
strike at both enemies at once in the St. Quentin area, where the French and British
sectors joined, followed by an attack in Flanders towards Hazebrouck. The former battle
had the disadvantage that it would have to be fought over the devastated area, vacated
by the Germans on their move back to the Hindenburg Line.
                                                
41 Reproduced in the appendix volume to the Official History, 1918, Vol. I, pp, 130-5.
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Even though this would probably be more advantageous to the defender, and could bring
any breakthrough to a halt, they decided to adopt this compromise option.  The
objectives of the St. Quentin attack were to cut off the British forces in the Flesquières
salient42 and weaken the armies in Flanders by forcing them to send reserves south.  The
battle was to be closed down once the front Bapaume - Combles - Peronne - Ham - La
Fère had been reached.  The Hazebrouck attack, a pincer movement around Armentières
was to ‘set the whole British front tottering and then roll it up from the north.’43
Broadly speaking this was the strategy adopted by the Germans, although it took many
more conferences to refine the detail.  However, the above shows that there was no
                                                
42 Known to the Germans as the Cambrai Salient.
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perfect option.
This assessment shows that the Germans had no appreciation of the real state of
the Allied armies: the British manpower crisis and the questionable state of the morale
of the French Army, perhaps one of the best kept secrets of the war.  Wetzell missed
another factor concerning the French - the psychological importance of Paris - only sixty
miles from the front line.  Although there was a vast area for manoeuvre behind their
front any attack on the left flank of the French line would immediately threaten the
capital, rekindling memories of 1870.  As they swung their left flank to protect Paris,
touch would be lost with the British Fifth Army and a gap inviting exploitation created.
While the Germans might inflict a heavy defeat on the BEF and force them to retire
south, or form a box around the Channel Ports, the Royal Naval blockade would remain
while there was a political will to continue the war.  Of course, the permutations are
endless, but Wetzell does seem to have taken a rather simplistic view of what might
happen.
Over the winter months as the political situation in the East released more and
more troops for the western offensives.  The Germans were able to refine their plans
until they had a strategy that they considered had every chance of success.  The first
great blow would be the St. Michael attack in the south, followed by St. George in
Flanders towards Hazebrouck, against a weakened northern sector that would separate
the British from the Channel Ports, thus bringing the whole front crashing down like a
house of cards.44  The Michael attack would be by three armies, each with a specific
task.  The Eighteenth Army (von Hutier) was to separate the British from the French and
then stop along the Somme - Crozat Canal and act as a bastion against any interference
from the rest of the French Army.45  The Second Army (von der Marwitz) was to drive
on Albert, then swing north; while the southern part of the Seventeenth Army (von
Below) advanced to Bapaume and likewise turned north.  At this point the remainder of
the Seventeenth Army would undertake the Mars South scheme and attack towards
Arras.
The Germans had a number of schemes prepared for the northern sector with the
overall code-name George.  George I was an attack between the La Bassée canal and
                                                                                                                                  
43 Official History, 1918, Vol. I Appendix, p. 134.
44 The ‘Saint’ seems to have been optional, it will now be omitted for the sake of clarity.  St. Michael is
the patron saint of Germany and the warrior archangel, while St. George, besides his English connections
is the patron saint of soldiers.
45 The extension of the British line meant that the whole attack would be against the Gough’s Fifth Army.
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Armentières towards Hazebrouck, while George II was divided into three. ‘Hare Drive’
or ‘Coursing’ against Messines ridge and ‘Woodfeast’ north of Ypres which would pinch
out the town and the Salient; and ‘Flanders 3’ against the Belgians on the Channel coast.
The original plan was to launch all these attacks simultaneously a few days after the
start of Michael.  However, in the event this was not possible.
Meanwhile, British GHQ at Montreuil had been trying to work out the German
intentions, and to keep them guessing the Germans undertook a series of deceptions
during the winter of 1917/18.  The great advantage of this strategy was that it was bound
to have some success, as whatever interpretation was put on information received from
the Germans, seeds of doubt could always be sewn.
At the Army level supply dumps were created by the Germans, both real and
false, and light railways and roads constructed.  Artillery activity flared up and died
down and individual guns conducted ranging shoots all along the front.  Up and down
the front batteries would fire a few ranging shots at night and then move back, leaving
behind a poorly camouflaged dummy.46  The Allied spotter plane sent over the next day
would report this and the artillery would fire on the area, only for a new ‘battery’ to
appear nearby a few days later.  All these preparations were reported to GHQ in Army
Intelligence Summaries which showed that in March 1918 each army considered an
attack imminent on their front!
Perhaps the greatest coup in this disinformation campaign was the release of a
captive balloon over the French lines on 20 March containing papers that pointed to an
attack near Reims on the 26th.47  The French were completely deceived by this ploy to
the extent that they were unwilling to send troops to the BEF’s aid as they expected to
be attacked themselves.  To give the deception even more credibility the Germans
increased their artillery activity, and conducted a number of heavy raids against the
French during the night of 20-21st and the following day.  Another rumour that fooled
the French was the possibility of a German attack through Switzerland, on which
Colonel Hankey, the Cabinet Secretary, commented: ‘GHQ considered this ‘inherently
improbable’.’48  He went on to claim that the French moved thirty-two divisions to
cover these eventualities - seventeen for the former and fifteen for the latter.  Perhaps
the most fanciful of all the schemes floated by the Germans was the raid on the East
                                                
46 Westman, S, Surgeon with the Kaiser’s Army (London: Kimber, 1968), p. 154.  It is unclear whether
this was hearsay or personal knowledge.
47 Official History, 1918, Vol. I, p. 154 fn.
48 Hankey, Lord, The Supreme Command 1914-18 (London: Allen & Unwin, 1961), Vol. II, p. 807.
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Coast of England which forced the British to keep troops at home.
The new science of wireless was also involved.  By the use of dummy wireless
traffic ‘a whole German Army was impersonated successfully on the French Front.’49
By 1918, both sides were using wireless extensively in the forward areas as artillery fire
easily interrupted wired communications.  This traffic could easily be interrupted by the
generation of interference, ‘it is not too much to say that the German wireless sets in the
1918 offensive put down what can only be described as a wireless barrage.’50
Phrases such as ‘Teutonic thoroughness’ have been rather overworked in the description
of all things German, but the history of their development of doctrine during the Great
War shows why such plaudits exist.  They successfully defended their position against
an increasingly tactically sophisticated BEF, and developed a system of attack that
would break through the British defences and capture the largest area of territory of the
whole war.  There were a number of reasons for the German success.  According to
Lupfer, the it was German Army system, especially the feeding back of ideas to the
Operations Section which exposed its members to the experience of the front line
commanders.  Wynne favoured the ‘evil genius’ in the form of Colonel von Lossberg
who became Ludendorff’s peripatetic defence expert.  Both views have some substance,
doctrine does not disseminate by itself, for no matter how august the author may be,
someone is required who can put the words into practice and clear away the objections.
Also, the German Army placed great reliance on devolved battlefield leadership, which
allowed their assault troops to operate in small squad sized groups which gave a high
degree of motivation and tactical flexibility.
Meanwhile, the British had not been idle; the next chapter will look at their
preparations for the coming battle.
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ntil 1918 the BEF had never experienced a major assault by the Germans.  All the
previous attacks had limited objectives; for example, the use of the
‘ungentlemanly novelty’1 of gas at Second Ypres in April 1915, was to enable
Pilckem ridge in front of Ypres to be taken, thus improving the German observation of
the Salient.  Similarly, large trench raids had the objective of enhancing the position of
the line, or recapturing ground lost during a British attack.
The change in emphasis, from offence to defence by the BEF at the end of 1917
was quite sudden.  This chapter will concentrate on the northern two Armies as they
were the ones involved in the battle.  The First and Fourth Armies settled in for the
winter expecting a resumption of the offensive in the spring of 1918.2  The winter being
a time for consolidation; trench raids were to be continued to maintain the offensive
spirit of the troops.  By early December the talk was all of defence and training.  For
example, the Second Army Organisation of the Army Front during Winter 1917-18,3
dated 24 October 1917, looked forward to a resumption of the Flanders offensive in the
spring; whereas Basis for the Second Army Defences,4 dated 18 December, sets out the
defensive preparations to be made during the next three months.  Any further offensives
on the part of the Allies would have to wait until 1919, when there would be sufficient
trained Americans in France to tip the manpower balance.
Previous studies have looked at the British use of captured German manuals in
an endeavour to develop a doctrine.  It has been shown that the exercise was bungled as
GHQ did not interpret these manuals correctly.5  There has also been a concentration on
the role of the infantry in these defensive schemes.  While this was obviously important,
                                                
1 Liddell Hart, B, History of the First World War (London: Papermac Edition, 1992), p. 186.
2 The Second Army staff went with General Plumer to the Italian Front during the winter of 1917/18 and
were replaced by the Fourth Army staff under General Rawlinson.  The actual dates were: 9-11-17 Second
Army front taken over by GOC and staff of Fourth Army, 20-12-17 Second Army designated Fourth
Army, 13-3-18 All units under Fourth Army became Second Army, 17-3-18 Fourth Army renamed
Second Army.
3 LHCMA, Montgomery-Massingberd MSS, Folder 59, Appendix 28.
4 LHCMA, Montgomery-Massingberd MSS, Folder 60, Appendix 82.
5 For example: Samuels, Doctrine and Dogma.
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it has been shown in the last chapter that the artillery and lines of communications also
had important parts to play.  While many of the criticisms are valid, any judgement has
to take into account the situation the BEF found itself in at the end of 1917.  The task
was a daunting one; within under three months, the BEF had to work out and implement
defence schemes that would defeat a numerically superior enemy, whose offensive
tactics were at least on a par with their own.  The BEF’s level of knowledge of defence
may be compared with the Germans’ in 1915; there was three years of experience to
catch up on, so their only recourse was to turn to captured documents.
The main difficulty facing the BEF in the winter of 1917/18 was a shortage of
manpower, more specifically Class A men for the infantry and artillery.  Also, the British
Army suffered from a shortage of trained officers and NCOs throughout the whole war.
Whatever the BEF decided to do, this problem would always be with them. This chapter
will look at the problems facing the BEF, and the way in which they were tackled, and
assess their performance against this broader canvas.
The BEF always had some sort of manpower crisis.  At the beginning of the war it was a
shortage of skilled men, expanding the army ten-fold in two years created a lack of
experienced men in every branch of the service.  As the war went on, there was a
shortage of drafts to replace the casualties of 1916 and 17.  The employment of women
in industry and commerce did not wholly fill the gaps created by the men who went to
the war, so we may say that the manpower crisis started when it was not over by
Christmas 1914.  It is easy to criticise the politicians for not doing something earlier, but
they, like the military, were unprepared for total war.  The idea of controlling or
directing the working population was quite foreign, even anathema, to British culture, so
they had to learn the lessons the hard way, by experience, in the same way as the army.
Although by mid-1917 the country’s manpower resources were under control of the
Ministry of National Service, headed by Sir Auckland Geddes, there were just not
enough men to fulfil all the nation’s requirements of industry and the services, so the
BEF had to accept a smaller slice of a shrinking cake.  There were in fact two cakes, the
total manpower available and that within the army.  The infantry was not the only arm
requiring men; the artillery, machine-gun companies, tanks and the RFC all had a call on
the army’s pool of manpower.
There is a myth, still often quoted, that Lloyd George kept an army at home to
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the detriment of the BEF.6  Professor David Woodward has deconstructed the legend and
shown that it was the Army Council who kept these men at home rather than the
politicians.7  There were a number of reasons, not all military, for this decision:
concealing them from the enemy, civilian morale, their ability to spend their money at
home rather than abroad, and the fear of an invasion, a result of the German deception
campaign mentioned in the previous chapter.  An attack on the East Coast was
considered a real threat at the time, although it would have been a risky venture for the
Germans.  Invasion scare books, a genre of ‘ripping yarn’ that does not exist today, were
popular reading before the war and may have coloured the planners’ thinking.8
The lack of reinforcements meant that, at the end of 1917, most infantry and
artillery units were under establishment, which impaired their fighting efficiency.  This
also had an impact on the construction of defences, as the divisions did most of the work
at the front.  The only answer was a re-organisation that would bring the units up to
strength.  Haig suggested reducing the number of divisions and redistributing the men,
which was politically unacceptable as, divisions being the currency of any army, it
would appear to be a reduction in the British commitment to the war effort.  Instead, it
was decided to reduce the number of infantry battalions per brigade from four to three,
bring the infantry remaining battalions up to strength, and use the surplus as entrenching
battalions.  The Empire divisions, by breaking up holding battalions in the UK, were
able to keep their twelve infantry battalions per division.  No Guards battalions were
disbanded and the three surplus were formed into the 4th Guards Brigade, which was
sent to the 31st Division.  In all, 141 battalions were broken up, a move which does not
seem to have been popular with anyone.  There are many accounts of mock funerals, and
the poor welcome received by both the officers and men in their new units.9
Similar re-organisations had been made in the French and German Armies, but
extra divisional artillery had been provided to compensate for the reduction in infantry
fire power.  Also, the change had been easier to accomplish as their brigades comprised
three battalion regiments, so all that was required was the removal of one regiment.
However, Army commanders had many batteries of field guns and heavier pieces which
                                                
6 Middlebrook, M, The Kaiser’s Battle. 21 March 1918: The First Day of the German Spring Offensive
(London: Penguin Edition, 1983), p. 25 for instance
7 Woodward, DR, ‘Did Lloyd George Starve the British Army of men prior to the German Offensive of
21st March 1918?’, The Historical Journal, Vol. 27, No. 1, (1984), pp. 241-252.
8 For example, in ‘The Riddle of the Sands’ by Erskine Childers, published in 1903, two Englishmen
discover the Germans practising for an invasion behind the cover of the Fresian Islands.
9 Middlebrook, The Kaiser’s Battle, p. 87.
40
they could allot to divisions as and when required, which was a better use of resources.
At the same time, the organisation of the Vickers machine-guns within a division was
changed.  Previously, each infantry brigade had its own machine-gun company, and
these were now combined into a battalion, with one extra company added from reserves
in the UK, at the disposal of the divisional commander.10  Although this increased the
number of machine-guns in a division by twenty-five percent, it was not a popular move
with brigade commanders.  There may have been a certain amount of pique in this -
brigadier-generals could see their establishment decreasing.  In reality the machine-gun
companies were allocated by division to brigades with one held in reserve.  The Lewis
gun remained an infantry weapon within the battalions.
In comparison with their French allies, the BEF did very badly when it came to
home leave.  In the Official History, Edmonds quotes the figures of 80,00011 British,
against 350,000 French12 being on leave during March.  We might question why so
many men were allowed to be away from their units at this critical time.  The BEF had
taken a risk, which given the build-up of leave allowance, and the hard work done by the
troops, was a reasonable one.  The German offensive was not expected until April, when
the ground would be dry enough to support the heavy transport, and home leave was
important for the maintenance of morale.
In January 1918 Haig’s manpower problems were increased when he was
instructed to extend his line a further twenty-five miles to the south to fulfil a promise
made to the French by Lloyd George the previous year.  At the same time only three
extra divisions were allocated to the Fifth Army.  At a meeting of the Supreme War
Council in early February a further extension as far as the River Ailette was proposed,
but it was left to Haig and Pétain to agree the time and method of the transfer.13  No
action was ever taken as Pétain had already informed Haig that he ‘would not worry him
further, the matter being rather political - raised by Clemenceau in the hope of extorting
more men from England - than purely military.’14  Although Haig may have kept more
divisions in the north to protect his lines of communication and left Gough to be
reinforced by the French, his apparent parsimony towards the Fifth Army had more to
do with his confidence in the BEF’s defences.  He wrote in his diary on 2 March:
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12 Official History, 1918, Vol. I, p. 39 fn.
13 This body is discussed in a later chapter.
14 Official History, 1918, Vol. I, pp. 78-9.
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I also told Army Commanders that I was very pleased at all I had seen on
the fronts of the three Armies which I had recently visited.  Plans were
sound and thorough, and much work had already been done.  I was only
afraid that the enemy would find our front so very strong that he will
hesitate to commit his Army to the attack with the almost certainty of
losing very heavily.15
Even so, this still left Gough in a weak position, for the other three Armies had
approximately one division for every two miles of front, whereas his had to cover three.
Although Gough was allocated three cavalry divisions to act as a reserve, when fighting
dismounted, they were each only equivalent to one infantry brigade.  There were eight
divisions in GHQ reserve evenly distributed behind the Armies.  Haig considered that
the BEF could hold out for eighteen days.16  So there was ample time to bring over the
Mobile Reserve from Britain, or move up French reserves as the ‘General Reserve’ plan
was dead.17  This apparent complacency may have been the result of Haig’s experience
of the offensive during 1916-17.
To compound the problem for the BEF Haig had lost the confidence of the
Cabinet.  His lack of a war-winning victory in 1916 and more especially in 1917
coupled with the high level of casualties made the Western Front look a poor bet for
victory in 1918.  Lloyd George would dearly have liked to dismiss Haig, but his own
weak position, Haig’s influential body of friends including the king, plus the lack of an
obvious replacement, meant that Haig kept his job.  The Government was faced with a
problem to which there was no solution that satisfied everyone.  Unfortunately for the
politicians, and especially Lloyd George, the BEF was able to use the fact that they did
not receive the reinforcements it demanded to excuse their poor performance in the
Spring Offensives.  Thus grew the legend that Lloyd George had starved Haig of men.
The army and their supporters having fired the first salvoes, who would believe the
denials of a politician during the ‘war of the memoirs’ in the inter-war years?
The manpower problem existed at two levels:  political and within the army.
The BEF, and particularly Haig, lost the battle for more men because their masters
lacked confidence in them.  At the operational level the BEF made the best of what they
had and completed the building of their defences probably at the expense of training and
leave.
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The BEF had given no thought to a defensive doctrine, so as a first step GHQ adopted
what might be considered a typically British method - they formed a committee.  This
was mentioned by both Wynne in his fifth article,18 and Edmonds in the Official
History,19 without naming the members.  However, in 1947 Edmonds felt able to admit
in the 1918 Volume V that they were: himself, Major-General Jeudwine (GOC 55th
Division) and Brigadier-General MacMullen (BGGS XIX Corps).20  How this choice
was made was not recorded, but it does show that there was no one at GHQ whose
responsibility this was.  The committee proposed a thinly held outpost line which, in the
event of a heavy attack, would fall back on the main line of resistance, situated out of
range of the German field artillery, where the main battle would be fought.  This does
sound remarkably like the French Fifth Army proposal used as a basis for the German
doctrine.  This is not the last we shall hear of this idea.  In his final article Wynne, who
may have had sight of the generals’ report,21 states:  ‘This committee considered that
there was insufficient time for the half-trained British troops to learn the details of the
German doctrine.’22  While this may be so, there is more to it than that.  The troops were
not the only ones with no training; formation and unit commanders had no experience
either.  Elastic defence requires the independent action by unit commanders, a concept
that was foreign to the British Army’s culture, in which it was normal to wait for orders
from above.  Thus the whole army was not prepared for such a doctrine. This linear
defence was modified by GHQ to the zonal system finally adopted, to conform with the
German doctrine.
On the 7 December 1917 Haig took the opportunity at an army commanders
conference at Doullens to ‘give a dissertation on defence’,23 together with an assessment
of the situation.  On this occasion Rawlinson and Byng were the only army commanders
present, although representatives of the other two commanders were there.  They were
given an advanced copy of OAD 291/29, GHQ Memorandum on Defensive Measures
and asked for their comments.24
In Rawlinson’s reply dated the 10 December, he pointed out that the proposals in
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the memo ‘materially affects the winter policy of the Second Army’,25 as he had
assumed that the offensive would be continued in 1918, when the divisions had been
brought up to strength.  His main concerns were the lack of manpower for the infantry
and for constructing defences, which amounts to the same thing, and the vulnerability of
the Ypres salient.  The artillery in that area was well forward protecting the infantry and
any attack in force would mean that ‘the loss in men and guns will be considerable,
material must outweigh sentimental considerations.’26  In fact, Rawlinson seems to have
already anticipated the doctrine outlined in the GHQ Memorandum.  In Organisation of
the Army Front during Winter 1917-18,27 dated 24 November, Second Army GHQ
outlined in Item 11 a General System of Defence.  It described a system very like that
eventually proposed in OAD 291/29, with defence zones and defended localities.  The
wording and ideas are so similar to the translations of German documents that
Rawlinson may have had an advanced copy.
Horne’s main concern was the Portuguese Corps holding the line south of
Armentières.  Both its divisions were under strength, and morale was poor.  There were
proposals to relieve it, but this would require two British divisions which were just not
available.
After the Army commanders conference a meeting was held for the Army staff
and corps commanders of Fourth Army, where Rawlinson gave an overview of the
situation following the collapse of Russia.  The BEF’s policy would be defensive rather
than offensive, and the Flanders campaign would not be continued in the spring,
although the winter organisation memorandum mentioned above said that it would.
Thus, formally at least, the BEF policy had turned a complete volte face within the space
of a few weeks.
After all this deliberation GHQ produced the Memorandum on Defence
Measures dated the 14 December 1917, which must have been presented to army
commanders on that day, as First Army held a corps commanders conference to discuss
it on the 15th.  Besides giving an overview of the new defensive doctrine, the
memorandum introduced to the BEF the concept of defence in depth utilising zones, and
the application of ideas taken from the German manuals on positional warfare.  The
Armies had much work to do; as compared with the Germans’, the British trench system
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was very rudimentary.28  To the BEF the front was a place from which to start
offensives, so two lines of trenches sufficed - front and support with a few saps out into
no-man’s-land.
GHQ had decided that the main resistance would be on ground favourable to the
BEF and this battle zone was marked on the maps presented with the memorandum.
Anything in front of this was considered to be the outpost zone, later called the forward
zone.29  Where the front position was strong these two zones often coincided.  Behind
the battle zone was the rearward zone for use if things did not go well in the battle zone.
The battle zone was to be the back-bone of the defensive system.  Usually 2-3,000 yards
deep it was to consist of successive lines of defences, with switch lines between to stop
the enemy exploiting any success.  The outpost zone was designed to slow down the
attack and break it up.  The machine-gun was to be the main defensive weapon ‘in
combination with wire entanglements’.30  There was no idea of the troops in this zone
falling back in the event of a strong attack.  Rather they were to ‘hold their defences at
all costs’,31 even though the battle was expected to be fought in the battle zone.  In other
words, these troops were expendable.  The rearward zone seems to have been there just
to give an appearance of depth to the defences, as GHQ certainly had no intention of
doing any work on it until more labour became available.
Not only were the physical defences to be in depth, but the troops were to be
positioned throughout the front two zones.  This concept needed to be continuously
reinforced; for example, OAD 291/31 issued by GHQ on the 13 February states:
‘Defence in Depth is not generally understood by the troops.  Construction of defences
in depth must be coupled with the disposition of troops in depth.’32  The BEF was
discovering the problem of making changes quickly in a large organisation, in this case
nearly two million officers and men.  The number of senior officers was correspondingly
large.  Over seventy-five army, corps and divisional commanders plus their staffs,
together with brigadier-generals almost without number, had to be persuaded to accept
the new doctrine.  These were powerful men; for example, divisional commanders were
left to run their formations as they saw fit, being judged on results.  Against this
background we might question whether the BEF had set itself an almost impossible task
                                                
28 On trench maps there was always much more red (German) than blue (British).
29 Official History, 1918, Vol. II, p. 42.  It was considered that the original name might cause the garrison
to retire without offering any resistance.
30 Official History, 1918, Vol. I, Appendices, p. 23.
31 Ibid., p. 24.
45
in the time available, it took the Germans seven months to introduce the Ludendorff
textbook.
Under section 13 - General instructions for Defence,  OAD 291/29 lists two
German manuals SS 561 - The Principles of Command in the Defensive Battle in
Position Warfare - and SS 621 - General Principles of the Construction of Field
Positions.  In these the Germans were said to have ‘embodied two years experience in
defence and the principles laid down by him are thoroughly sound and should be
carefully studied’.33  The dates of these two documents have assumed great importance,
as a case can be made for their obsolescence and hence a wrong choice by GHQ.
The Principles of Command (SS 561) was dated the 1 March 1917.  A copy must
have been quickly captured as it was translated and issued by GHQ in May 1917 and as
has been pointed out by Wynne and Samuels, predates Arras and Third Ypres.  Samuels
states that a new edition was published on the 1 September 1917, which would have
embodied the experience of these two battles, and presumes that a copy was captured
and translated.  Third Ypres was at its height during the preparation of this edition - say
August/September 1917 - so it is questionable how much of the German experience of
that battle it contained.  A set of amendments were issued by GHQ on the 20 November
1917, which expand the original but do not change it.  This could possibly be the ‘new
edition’ as the preamble refers to the 1 March version.  However, the British were fully
aware of elastic defence by January 1918 as the GHQ Intelligence Summary Ia/44122,
dated the 20th, had an annex entitled German Principles of Elastic Defence which was
the translation of an order signed by Ludendorff and issued on 30th August 1917.34  In it
he reinforces the principles of SS561, adding that the forward zone was an integral part
of the whole defensive system and ‘must be held until orders to evacuate the whole zone
are given by the Higher Command’.  It is interesting that the BEF has been criticised for
this centralised control, and considering the front-line troops to be expendable.35  The
Principles of Construction might be considered to be the latest.  Issued by the Germans
on the 15th August 1917, the British edition is dated the 12 December 1917, two days
before OAD 291/29.  A pre-publication copy must have been used by GHQ in their
deliberations.
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As their names suggest, these manuals were not instruction books on the
defensive battle.  The terrain and tactical situations on the Western Front were so varied
that this would have been impractical.  Assuming a knowledge of the subject in the
reader, they outline the theory, gained through experience, that should be applied.  The
writer of this type of manual is often in a dilemma.  On one hand the principles have to
be clearly stated, but on the other it has to be sufficiently general to be relevant to as
many situations as possible.  Thus to apply the manual requires a practical knowledge of
the subject.  This was the BEF’s difficulty, while they understood the manuals, they
lacked the experience of the defensive battle to use them properly.
Wynne claimed that the committee chose the wrong manual in their
deliberations.36  According to him they should have used the 1 March 1917 version of
Principles of Command in the Defensive Battle in Positional Warfare (SS561) instead of
the 15 August version of  Principles of Construction of Field Positions (SS621).  At
first this seems a curious statement as both manuals were issued with OAD 291/29, but
Edmonds states that SS621 was used and makes no mention of SS561.  Wynne then
went on to point out that not only did they choose the wrong manual, but they
misinterpreted it as well.  According to him ‘they mistook the protective infantry in the
dugouts between the machine-gun nests to be the key centres of resistance and believed
the machine-gun nests to be supporting weapons.’
According to Samuels there is no evidence of analysis by the BEF of either the
German defensive or offensive doctrines in order to create their own defensive
proposals.37  This was certainly true of GHQ in the early stages, Section 3 of OAD
291/29 gave no help. After explaining that there would be little warning it stated ‘we
must expect an attack by masses of infantry, offering a very vulnerable target, but
preceded by an intense bombardment which may be either of long or short duration
according to whether the enemy aims at success by surprise or not.’  The impression left
by Samuels is that GHQ did not give any thought to the form of the German offensive.
This is not entirely correct, the Intelligence branch at GHQ issued at least two reports
that gave in some detail the form of the new German offensive doctrine.  The first,
Ia/4483538 - Deductions from the study of the German Orders relating to the capture of
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Riga, was quickly followed by Ia/4563739 German methods in attack and indications of
an offensive, dated 16 February.  This accurately predicted the surprise attack preceded
by a heavy bombardment, including the copious use of gas shell against artillery
positions and trench mortars for wire cutting.  All that GHQ could comment was that
‘There is no reason to believe that the method of breaking through which was effective
on the Riga and Isonzo fronts will succeed in the face of a determined resistance’, which
showed that they had no appreciation of what was in store for them.  General Horne
drew the latter document to the attention of his corps commanders at a conference on 25
February,40 but it was by now too late, the defensive works were being completed and
training was well under way.  There is no evidence that any notice was taken of this
warning.  There is, however, evidence that the French had made an analysis of the new
German tactics as General Gough was given a pamphlet prepared by the French staff ‘on
the German organisation and preparations for the battles of Riga and Caporetto’.41
It may be thought that GHQ’s pre-occupation with massed German infantry, and
what a good target they would make, was wishful thinking, as the modern literature on
German offensive tactics is concerned mainly with the development of storm-troops.
However, a Second Army Intelligence Summary for April contained the text of a
captured German document signed by Ludendorff, dated 6 April 1918.42  In this he gives
the preferred method of taking out machine-guns not destroyed by the artillery
bombardment - single guns under the orders of the infantry.  The artillery was to be used
to suppress the fire from the machine-guns, while the infantry was to advance in small
bounds in small groups.  He went on to say: ‘the idea of forcing success by the
employment of masses must absolutely be abolished.  The effective use of weapons, and
not numbers, gives the decision’.  Thus, even in March 1918 the infantry following the
storm-troops had not learned to spread out, as will be seen in the next three chapters.
Much of the argument about the BEF’s interpretation of the German manuals
centres round the concept of ‘defended localities’.  SS621 states in section 11 that ‘an
infantry position will be constructed as a trench system of several continuous lines’ and
goes on; ‘Between the various lines and between and behind the trench systems, every
sort of defence must be prepared and utilised.  For this purpose, supporting points (large,
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often closed, works, utilising villages, copses, etc.) and holding on points (small
trenches, shell holes, ruins of houses, copses, hedges and such like) will be useful.’  In
many areas the British ‘combined sectors of the front and support trenches, about 200
yards apart, into centres of resistance and grouping 150 - 300 men into each with one or
more machine-guns as support weapons.  The second row was made by treating the
reserve trench, 2500 yards behind in the same way.’43  Thus the BEF moved to
defending a position rather than a line.  This was not a new idea, according to Major-
General ED Swinton, he gave a lecture on this ‘blob’ system to the Royal Artillery
Institute in 1908.44  According to Edmonds this move was not popular, he quotes an old
soldier as saying ‘It don’t suit us.  The British Army fights in line and won’t do any
good in these birdcages.’45  The divisions then filled these redoubts with too many men.
British commanders had yet to learn to thin the front line, which led to their being too
few troops left over to form an effective counter-attack force.  This meant that another
of the components of the German doctrine was missing.
In the German doctrine one task of the infantry in the forward and battle zones
was to force the enemy out by counter-attack.  While this was well understood by the
British,46 it was the counter-attack divisions in the rear that they lacked.  The
preparatory bombardment and the concentration of men and material had usually shown
the Germans where the next offensive was to be; and so there was time for them to
move reserves into position.  Until March the BEF had little idea where the Germans
were going to strike, so divisions had to be spread evenly along the front.  Also, the
shortage of reserves meant that there would be few, if any, divisions available for
counter-attacking.
Two other points that were given some thought were gas and tanks.  In an article
on the coming offensive the Daily Mail reported comments in the neutral press
‘threatening the most terrible battle of the war with an entirely new and original gas and
tanks which are to surpass ours in deadly effects.’47  The respirator issued to the BEF,
although crude, was quite effective so long as it was worn, and anti-gas drills were
extensively practised.  In early February there was concern that this new gas would force
the wearer to take the mask off ‘and so render the troops liable to the effect of a lethal
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gas’,48 presumably some sort of lacrimatory gas and phosgene.  Three weeks later a
Second Army memorandum to corps commanders stated; ‘Respirators which give
complete protection against all gasses used by the enemy must be carried.’49  This was a
very bold statement given the known expertise of German chemists.  To the BEF the use
of the tank by the Germans would not have been an unreasonable assumption.
Numerous examples of British manufacture had been captured, so a similar and perhaps
improved machine might have been built.  The main defence against tanks were
‘forward’ or ‘roving’ guns firing over open sights.  These guns were to be sited at the
rear of the forward zone to engage any tanks that broke through.  Other proposed
defences were high explosive shells used as land-mines and craters blown to block a
tank’s route and steer them towards the artillery.50
The BEF considered using tanks in defence.  In January 1918 the army
commanders, except the Fourth in the Salient, were instructed by GHQ to study the use
of tanks in defence, either in a holding attack or with infantry in a counter-attack.51
Nothing seems to have come of this, the problems of command were probably too great.
To be of any use the tanks would have to have been in the right place at the right time,
to cover the whole front would have required an enormous number.
While the infantry were busy building fortifications, the artillery were not idle.
The disposition of the guns was also zoned.  A X Corps (GOC Lieut.-General Sir T
Morland) instruction gives some insight into the Fourth Army’s preparations.52  Single
guns were placed in the forward zone for anti-tank fire and sniping, while the bulk of the
field artillery was 2500 - 5500 yards back, behind these were the heavies up to 8000
yards from the front.  Much stress was laid on the provision of secure observation posts
proof against 8 inch shells, with buried telephone cables and the construction of reserve
positions.  Each infantry brigade sector was to be covered by a group of field artillery,
with at least one observation post per group.  Divisional sectors were to have two
observation posts for the heavy artillery, which were to be positioned no nearer the front
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than was necessary (up to 1000 yards back), the importance of a good view being
emphasised.  It would seem that the BGRA of X Corps, Brigadier-General AR Cameron,
had seen the benefit of  keeping the observers out of the front line.  The importance of
annihilating fire on the Germans the moment they left their trenches was also stressed,
while making the point that large scale British attacks had not been stopped by German
gunfire.  This shows that the army was capable of learning from their experience.
We should not forget the transport arrangements, or what was called
‘administrative matters’ in the defensive schemes.  By the end of 1917 the BEF had an
extensive road and rail system behind the front, that had built up over the years.
However, a review of the situation was undertaken which concluded that:
The BEF already possessed practically all the transport facilities that it
needed, that new construction ought in fact to be limited to works of real
necessity, and that the time had come for a review of what more, if
anything , it was necessary to provide to meet existing or possible future
requirements.53
According to Henniker, the Second Army, which we might consider typical, estimated
using 12000 tons per day of artillery shell and 19 trains per day of small arms
ammunition.54
The two most important things that the BEF wanted to know were where and
when the expected German attack would be launched.  It could be mounted against any
portion of the Allied line, although it was more likely from Verdun to the Belgian coast,
which meant that the troops had to be spread evenly over the whole front.  Allied
intelligence was kept busy throughout the first three months of 1918, trying to ascertain
the most likely spot using a variety of sources.  Throughout the war much information
was gained by both sides from prisoner interrogations.  One of the reasons for trench-
raids was the capture of prisoners for such  purposes, and in the latter part of the war
there was also a steady trickle of German deserters who seem to have been quite
garrulous.55  The problem was, how much credence could be placed on this
information?  In the Second Army Intelligence Summary for 1-15 March there was a
note that there were ‘several instances of prisoners being instructed to give misleading
and false answers [to the enemy] prior to going on patrol or on a raid.’56  News of the
arrival of General von Hutier - the victor of Riga - in front of the Fifth Army was
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obtained from prisoners.  The new German offensive doctrine was known for a while as
Hutier Tactics, after the erroneous belief that he had originated them; and so the arrival
of this one general was enough for Gough to warn his subordinate commanders to be
ready for a surprise attack.  Identification obtained during trench raids enabled an Order
of  Battle to be built up.  To conceal their preparations for St. Michael the Germans held
their assault divisions in back areas, and marched them through the garrison troops,
manning the front line, straight into the battle.  Much information was gained from air
reconnaissance; this had hardly existed at the beginning of the Great War, and aerial
photography not at all.  By 1918 information from the RFC in the form of reports and
photographs were an accepted part of the Intelligence Officer’s armoury.  Although the
Germans took great pains to disguise their preparations ‘the close examination of
aeroplane photographs showed such things as tracks of troops, trench mortar
emplacements, little piles of shells near guns - sure signs of the mounting of an
attack.’57   Behind the German lines, the Secret Service had networks of spies watching
the trains in occupied Belgium.  One such group, codenamed ‘La Dame Blanche’,
reported in February that the assault divisions and the extra artillery for the initial
bombardment had massed in their area.  In March they reported the movement of these
troops nearer to the front.58  Despite the German subterfuges, intelligence at GHQ under
Brigadier-General Cox, who replaced Lawrence in early 1918, was able to predict the
time and place of the expected offensive.  This was done using a combination of all the
factors mentioned above and enabled Cox to predict that the first German offensive
would be in the south, contrary to British expectations, and so some divisions were
moved to strengthen the Fifth Army.
The failure by GHQ to produce an effective defensive doctrine creates a paradox,
as this is the army that had learned the doctrine of an all-arms force, was to withstand
the German onslaught during the Spring Offensives and then went on to the Advance to
Victory.  It is perhaps the learning process that gives us a clue to the answer. The BEF
had no equivalent of the German Operations Section, thus when such a problem as this
presented itself there was no-one to whom it could be passed as a matter of course.  The
development of new ideas within the BEF seems to have been on a very ad-hoc basis,
relying heavily on the efforts of individual field commanders, who then tried them out
on their formations.  In Paddy Griffith’s book on the development of British battle
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tactics,59 there is no evidence of any central authority co-ordinating all the considerable
striving for improvement.  Normally learning is a downward process, well established
‘best practice’ being taught to newcomers by the old hands, but in the Great War the
staff had little to offer, all the experience was gained at the divisional level, fed up the
organisation and formalised in the SS series of manuals.  In the case of defensive
doctrine, there was no relevant experience within the BEF, and anyway GHQ also had
little time for ideas gathering and discussion. In chapter 1 it has been shown that this
process was similar in the German Army, but they had three years to develop a doctrine.
One success that the BEF had was in the construction of the defences during January
and February 1918.
Memorandum OAD 291/29 gives instructions on what has to be done rather than
how.  The task of the Armies and corps was to translate this document into defensive
schemes for their area. The Western Front was one of the great civil engineering works
of all time and constructed without any mechanised assistance.  Besides the lines of
trenches there were newly constructed roads and light railways to move men and
materiel up to the front, while in the rear huge encampments contained stores, hospitals
and barracks.  Once built these works had to be maintained, another labour intensive
task.   To all this was added the building of new defences.
Although we have no ‘Bill of Quantities’60 for the work undertaken, it is
possible to make a rough calculation of the number of men required to dig a trench the
120 mile length of the British front.  The Royal Engineers worked on a figure of 1 cubic
yard per day per man.  To make a trench 8 feet deep by 8 feet at the top and 4 feet at the
bottom would take about 22,500 men the 50 working days that were available up to the
end of February when all the defences were expected to be ready.  This may not sound
very many, given the two million British soldiers serving in France, but we also have to
take into account the weather, it being a very hard winter, and German artillery which
did not allow the construction of the defences to go unimpeded.  Also, men would be
required to move the spoil and shore up the trench.   This figure is comparable with the
65,000 men who took four months to build the 90 miles of the Hindenburg Line, in
autumn weather and out of Allied artillery range.61
The Fourth Army documents that have survived give an idea of how the
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construction of the defences was organised.  Upon receipt of OAD 291/29 army
commanders called a conference of corps commanders and their chiefs-of-staff.  Once
work had started fortnightly meetings were held first by army commanders and then
corps.  As one would expect the reports that survive are fairly formal and only give the
army commanders instructions and a very brief outline of points raised by corps
commanders.
While this reporting mechanism works, it suffers from two disadvantages.
Subordinates tend to report what their superiors want to hear, and problems are glossed
over.  To ensure progress was on schedule GHQ could have appointed a senior officer to
co-ordinate the defensive plans; although, according to Edmonds  ‘Special Officers’
were sent by GHQ ‘to ensure the co-ordination of the defence systems of the different
Armies.’62  What made them special or who they were is not recorded.  The Fourth
Army did have a co-ordinator: Lieut.-General Morland and the staff of X Corps, who
were spare and located in the area.  Morland recorded his visits in his diary, but makes
little comment about what he found.  For example, the entry for 17 January reads: ‘To
Watts XIX Corps to discuss his army line, then to 2 Corps see Wilson GSO2 discuss 2
Corps line.   Good work done.’63  Rawlinson’s diary shows that he personally inspected
the progress of the works and cross-referencing these entries with Morland’s  gives an
indication of how this inspection process worked.  On 2 January Rawlinson visited
Hunter-Weston at VII Corps and was ‘not at all pleased with progress, and told him
so’,64 so a further visit was proposed in a fortnight.  However, one week later Morland
was sent to review progress which was satisfactory, so the second inspection was
cancelled.
While all the changes were being made within the divisions, corps and army
staffs had to organise the construction of defences.  A number of sources of labour were
available: divisional troops, labour battalions, prisoners-of-war and civilians.  The latter
two could not be used in the front line, while labour battalions were of limited use as
they had to be transported to the front daily and provided with living quarters.  Their
suitability for strenuous manual labour must be questioned, if they were category A1
surely they would be in the infantry already.  Thus the bulk of the work had to be done
by the divisional infantry and pioneer battalions.
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The labour problem was permanently on the agenda of corps commanders
conferences.  Corps had no labour of their own and were reliant on their army who in
turn received some from GHQ.  Army commanders often could do little but offer
platitudes.  For example, at a First Army conference of 15 December 1917, when
discussing the labour shortage on the XV Corps front, Horne stated that no increase
could be given but the whole question was being considered ‘with a view to the best
economical distribution’.65  When there is a shortage of any resource it is most
important that it is used wisely, corps commanders, who made many complaints about
the lack of labour, were continuously admonished for ‘wastage’.  Even as early as
Christmas Eve 1917 at an army commanders conference, those present were informed
that labour was not being used well.  Typically there was said to be: lack of organisation
and inaccurate estimates; labour not released at the end of work; insufficient use of task
work and failure to make officers of the labour corps actually responsible for the
execution of tasks.66  The comments on the release of labour are rather amusing, who is
going to give up a scarce resource!  Naturally the word was passed down the chain of
command.  On the 8th January at the First Army corps commanders conference those
present were reminded of the need to economise on labour, ‘Corps Commanders to look
at it.’67  Of course, much of this may have been just for show as a copy of the minutes
went to GHQ.
One can have a certain amount of sympathy with the corps commanders, who
were required to organise their divisions so that the men were rested, trained in defence
and used as labour, because there were insufficient men to do each properly.  Conference
minutes were full of instructions to review the balance of work, training and rest.  GHQ
also felt it had to comment.  OAD 291/31, dated 17 February, points out that in some
higher formations the training of troops in reserve is being carried out to the detriment
of work on the defences,  ‘Army Commanders to look at it’. 68
Rawlinson also looked outside the BEF for labour; once the order for the
defensive had been given he called on his neighbours, the Belgians, on 15 December,
and again on the 22nd, to ask for assistance.  Although courteously received, he came
away empty handed as the Belgians had just taken over the Nieuport sector from the
French and were in the middle of a re-organisation themselves.
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There are more surviving documents dealing with the preparation of defence
schemes than the actual schemes themselves.  The Armies issued a pro-forma to corps
in the form of a set of headings,69 which corps then passed to the divisions in their
area.70  Divisions then drew up a defensive scheme for their sectors which was
incorporated into the overall corps scheme.71  Working in this way had two advantages;
the headings and subsequent instructions acted as an aide memoir to the staff officers
who produced the schemes, ensuring that nothing was left out; also, if a division was
moved its replacement would be familiar with the format of the scheme for its sector.
In the winter of 1917/18 the BEF faced two problems: a shortage of manpower and the
need for a defensive doctrine.  After the war the generals were able to explain their poor
performance by blaming the politicians for the former, while ignoring the latter.  Now
that it has been shown that Lloyd George did not starve the BEF of men, the question
then becomes: why did the BEF perform so badly in its choice of doctrine and in the
March/April battles themselves?
The basis for any answer to this question is the composition of the pre-war
British Army, a small Regular Army that saw itself as part of the Imperial system rather
than a continental land army.  The expansion of the army during the war led to the
inevitable shortage of military skills and especially a lack of officers with staff college
training.   The military staff at GHQ had their hands full fighting the war, with little time
for such things as operational research.  Thus, they had to rely on the ad hoc committee
of three senior officers to look into the question of defensive doctrine.
There is no doubt that GHQ were aware of the German doctrine of elastic
defence but the feeling was that this was too sophisticated for the BEF, the excuse is
usually given that the troops whose only experience was in the offensive could not be
trained in this complex concept in time.  While this may have been true if all that was
expected was a large trench raid to be dealt with by local commanders, the scale of the
expected German offensive would require skills in army and corps commanders that did
not exist.  Thus the choice of a system of rigid defence copied from captured German
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documents was correct as it was the only one the BEF could cope with at that time.  The
British thinking on defence in 1918 may be compared with the Germans’ of 1915/16,
but even as late as 1917 there were still German commanders who believed in rigid
defence.
The acceptance of the German doctrine by the British without any critical
analysis was due to the lack of any department at GHQ similar to the Operations Section
at OHL.  Captured documents were translated, printed by the Stationery Service and sent
out, usually without comment.  Even if there had been such a department, with no
experience to guide them such analysis would have been difficult.
Part of the German doctrine was the use of defended localities, unit, section or
platoon, for harassing the enemy if he broke through the front line.  The BEF translated
this idea into battalion sized ‘birdcages’ that made good artillery targets, while
decreasing battlefield flexibility.  This was also allied to the idea of holding the front
line at all costs.  This almost instinctive soldiers’ reaction took a long time to die out in
the German Army, the British would now have to go through a similar learning
experience.  The reason for the British use of battalions rather than platoons in their
defended localities was again lack of experience, this time in small unit tactics.  For
squads or platoons to be able to act independently would have required a large cadre of
NCOs or subalterns skilled in the defensive battle, which the BEF did not have.
The one success story in BEF’s preparations was the actual building of the
defences.  They undertook this massive building programme in an organised and
professional manner, and completed the front-line defences, which were given priority,
on time.  This must have been due to the abilities of the officers on army, corps and
divisional staffs many of whom were men from the professions, more used to organising
than fighting.
After a winter of labour and training the BEF’s preparations were to be put to the
test.  How they fared on the Lys is described in the next two chapters.
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Chapter 3
THE BREAK-IN BATTLE AND ITS PRELIMINARIES
n the 21 March 1918, the Germans launched their expected offensive with
seventy-six divisions on a forty mile front, outnumbering the British by about 3:1.
At 4.40 a.m. the bombardment started, and at 9.35 a.m. the final pounding of the
British front line, by trench mortars, enabled the leading storm-troop detachments to
O
58
creep forward, ready to rush the dazed defenders.1  Eye-witness accounts describe the
effect as numbing.2  In this five hour period the Germans fired approximately one
million shells (excluding trench mortar rounds).3  The Germans advance was also aided
by a morning ground mist, which enabled them to work round behind the British posts
and attack the defenders in the rear.  The greatest German success on this day was by
von Hutier’s Eighteenth Army against Gough’s Fifth Army in the area taken over from
the French.  By the evening of the 22nd, Gough was forced to order a retreat to the
Crozat Canal, five miles in the rear of his line.  In the north the Germans found the
going much more difficult, especially von Below’s Seventeenth Army opposite the
British Third Army.  Unfortunately the Germans were having success where they least
needed it.  Ludendorff used his reserves in the north to try and effect the breakthrough,
but without success, while instructing von Hutier not to pass the line Noyon - Roye.
Accepting this setback, Ludendorff then directed his efforts against Amiens, the major
rail centre for the supply of the southern part of the British front, using von der
Marwitz’s Second Army.  Von Hutier was allowed to move forward and reached
Montdidier, some forty miles from his start line, the deepest penetration of the whole
war.  At this line he was stopped by a hardening Allied resistance, the exhaustion of his
troops, and the difficulty of supply.
Meanwhile, all efforts were concentrated against Amiens; von der Marwitz was
given the last reserve of nine divisions, but again the Germans ran into the problems of
exhaustion and supply.  The route to Amiens lay across the devastated area of the
Somme battlefield which hampered the progress of vehicles, while British aircraft
attacked the columns of marching reinforcements.  The supply problem had started on
the first day of the offensive; despite the efforts of specially allocated engineer
companies, the movement of material across no-man’s-land and the British front line
area proved more difficult than had been expected.  Ludendorff complained that too
many guns were pushed up at the expense of ammunition.4  As the Germans progressed
into the British back areas, they began to ‘liberate’ the vast amount of stores that had not
                                                
1 The actual times of the assault varied from place to place.
2 Middlebrook, The Kaiser’s Battle, p. 161.
3 Official History, Vol. I, pp. 153-8 gives the number of guns and the stockpile of ammunition for the
bombardment.
4 Ludendorff, Memoirs, Vol. II, p. 580.
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been destroyed.5  While the food would have been a welcome addition to their diet, the
German soldiers also discovered liquor which led to many cases of drunkenness, and
some units were not able to proceed with the advance until its effects had been slept off.
After a pause for supply and rest the offensive against Amiens was renewed on the 30th,
but by then the British line had hardened and French reinforcements were arriving
behind the front.  They tried again on the 4 April with even less success.
Once battle had been joined French assistance to the British, especially the Fifth
Army, was tardy in arriving.  Although no unified command existed at this time there
was a private agreement between Haig and Pétain to come to each other’s aid in the
event of an attack.  At first Pétain considered the German offensive was a diversion, and
                                                
5 Liddell Hart, First World War, p. 396-7.
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that he was soon to be attacked in Champagne.  On the 24 March, during discussions at
the Fifth Army GHQ at Dury, Haig realised that the basic principle of French strategy
was to protect Paris and not, as arranged, to maintain touch with the British.  However,
in the event Ludendorff’s restraining of von Hutier, and the appointment of a single
Allied co-ordinator in General Foch, allowed French reinforcements to arrive and the
Allied remained in touch.   Thus the opportunity to sever the connection was lost to the
Germans.
One Fifth Army casualty does not appear on any list, its commander, General Sir
Hubert Gough.  There had been murmurings against him in high places for some time;
he was known to be a ‘thruster’, and the price in casualties paid for the capture of
Passchendaele did not enhance his reputation.  On 5 March the Secretary of State for
War, Lord Derby, had written privately to Haig suggesting that he remove Gough, who
would be made Governor of Gibraltar as a sop, to which Haig made no reply, but the
crisis brought matters to a head.6  A disaster of this magnitude had to have a reason.  To
pre-empt his critics, Lloyd George decided, with prompting from Sir Henry Wilson the
CIGS, that Gough should be the scapegoat.  The first that Gough knew of  his new part
was on 27 March, when Haig’s Military Secretary, Major-General Ruggles-Brise,
arrived at Fifth Army GHQ and informed Gough that he and his staff required rest.
General Rawlinson was to be moved from the Supreme War Council at Versailles, and
would take over on the next day.  Instead of being sent home, Haig gave Gough the task
of organising a Reserve Army which was to be responsible for the construction of all
GHQ defence lines.  This was probably a ploy to keep him in France, while Haig tried to
change the government’s mind.  Haig championed Gough’s cause at a meeting with
Lloyd George on 3 April, pointing out the difficulties on the Fifth Army front.  Lloyd
George had no answer to this, and was only able to comment that the Somme bridges
had not been destroyed which was only partially true.  At about this time the reason for
the dismissal changed to the ‘official’ reason that his troops had lost confidence in him.
However, Lloyd George prevailed and Gough was sent home pending an enquiry, which
never happened.  He was not honoured like the victorious army commanders after the
war, and had to wait until the thirties for any recognition when he received a KCB.7  In
                                                
6 French, D, The Strategy of the Lloyd George Coalition 1916-1918 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), p.
233.
7 He may be said to have had the last laugh on all his contemporaries, outliving them all, dying aged 92 in
1963.
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an article in the RUSI Journal, Edmonds, who was at GHQ at the time of Gough’s
dismissal, added a little to the version given in the Official History.8  Given Edmonds’
love of gossip this is probably as much as we shall ever know, as he comments that ‘No
official papers are to be found with regard to the supersession of Sir Hubert Gough ...
action was taken by means of verbal directions and personal letters’.9
As the fighting on the Somme was dying down the Germans launched Mars South
against the Arras sector.  Here the British were to have their first success against the new
German tactics, especially in the XIII Corps area.
In his memoirs, Lieut.-General Sir Beavoir de Lisle described the successful
defence by the 56th Division (Major-General F A Dudgeon), against a German attack
using three divisions, with three in reserve, on 28 March.10  On 13 March 1918 de Lisle
took over the XIII Corps defending the Vimy sector, the southern-most part of the First
Army line.11  After a tour of inspection of the defences he decided they were ‘faulty in
principle and inadequate’ and wrote a report in which he pointed out his objections and
proposals for improvement which he took personally to General Horne, the army
commander.  The original defences had all the strength in the front line - a series of half-
company posts with the ground between them covered by machine guns firing indirect.
De Lisle realised that these would soon be destroyed by ‘the overwhelming artillery and
trench mortar fire we should expect’.12  The new defences were to have a first system of
three lines, comprising front and support lines for outposts only with the principal line
of resistance in the reserve line out of trench mortar range.
The second system, made up of front and support lines, 1200 yards behind was
protected by wire and machine-gun positions in front of the trenches.  The artillery
dispositions were also changed, although protected by twelve feet of concrete, it was to
have alternative positions prepared for use when an attack was expected.  We can see
here an example of the defensive system proposed by the GHQ committee, in particular,
his  holding the front line lightly, keeping out of trench mortar range and moving
                                                
8 Edmonds, Sir J, ‘The Fifth Army in March 1918’, RUSI Journal, Vol. LXXXII, No. 525 (Feb. 1937),
pp. 17-31.
9 Ibid., p. 28.
10 De Lisle, Sir B, Reminiscences of Sport and War (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1939), pp. 162-5.
This is amplified by My Narrative of the Great German War in LHCMA, de Lisle MSS, 2 vols.
11 De Lisle had been GOC 29th Division, at that time located in the Ypres Salient.
12 De Lisle, Narrative, Vol. II, p. 73.
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artillery away from their known positions where they could be subject to gas shelling.
After obtaining agreement from Horne - which he did not expect to receive - he briefed
his divisional commanders - 56th and 3rd Canadian.13  The new scheme was put into
effect in ten days, although how much work this change meant is not recorded.
The interrogation of prisoners taken during the Somme battle gave an expected
date of attack north of the Scarpe of 28 March, and consequently during the night of
27/28th the 56th Division artillery was moved to its alternative positions and the outpost
line evacuated except for sentry patrols.  In both memoirs de Lisle claims to have given
the order, whereas in the Official History Horne receives the credit.  The front system
could not be completely evacuated as this would have exposed the flank of the 4th
Division (Major-General T G Matheson), XVII Corps, Third Army, which had a
different defence scheme.  Regardless of who gave the order the XIII Corps defence was
a complete success.  The German bombardment destroyed the outpost system and the
                                                
13 XIII Corps lost 31st and 62nd divisions on 22 and 24 March respectively.
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empty concrete artillery shelters.  The reserve line held up the German advance
sufficiently for an orderly retreat to be made to the second system, the order being given
by de Lisle at 10 a.m.  A second German attack in the afternoon was met with heavy
machine-gun and artillery fire and was a complete failure.  In his memoirs de Lisle made
the caustic comment that ‘so successful was this battle that little notice was taken of
it’.14
Having been saved by their movement on the night of 27/28th the artillery were
able to play an invaluable role in this action.  Edmonds commented that the expenditure
of ammunition ‘from the morning of the 28th to the morning of the 29th was about 750
rounds per 18 pdr and 650 rounds per field howitzer, one of the largest of the war.’15
Even so, he gave the laurels to the machine-guns ‘skilfully disposed which played the
principal part on this day in checking the Germans’.16
The above account begs the question, why could XIII Corps conduct a successful
defence with no reserves to call on when others failed - both before and after?  De Lisle
had applied the textbook, especially in his thinning of the front line garrison.  With their
artillery and machine-guns surviving the bombardment and no mist to hamper them,
56th Division had all their arms available for the defence.  He must have realised what
the German artillery was capable of, and his machine-guns were not hampered by the
mist.  The fact that the Germans were expected, and hence lost the important advantage
of surprise enabled him to make his preparations, especially moving the artillery and
thus saving them for use the next day.
As the divisions of the Third and Fifth (Fourth) Armies came out of the line they were
sent north and fresh troops from the First and Second Armies went south.  This meant
that the First and Second Armies had to hold the line with the minimum of forces while
the shattered divisions absorbed drafts and replaced lost material.  Of  the seven
divisions between Ypres and La Bassée only the 55th and Portuguese had not been
involved on the Somme.  At a conference on 26 March, Haking and Du Cane,
commanders of XI and XV Corps respectively, asked Horne for guidance on how they
should hold their fronts as they now had insufficient troops for the defence schemes.
                                                
14 De Lisle, Reminiscences, p. 164.




he appreciated this fact but it would be unwise for him to lay down the
exact line which should be held on each corps front.  We are not strong
enough now to fight in depth, but the selection of the exact system of
defence to be held must rest with Corps Commanders according to local
conditions.  He considered that as a general rule the battle must be fought
in the Forward Zone.17
Thus the First Army had given up any idea of defence in depth and its commander had
no advice to give.
By continuing the Michael offensive for too long the Germans had to scale down
their attack in Flanders, and so by a touch of ironic humour on someone’s part George
became Georgette.  Two armies were to attack on either side of Armentières. Between
the La Bassée Canal and Armentières seventeen divisions would be employed by the
Sixth Army (von Quast), while between Armentières and Ypres the Fourth Army (von
Arnim) would attack one day later with five.  The Army Group had one division at its
disposal and five were held in OHL reserve.  The main force of the first attack was to be
against the Portuguese defending the plain between Givenchy and Armentières using
four divisions.
In contrast to their meticulous efforts in camouflage in the south, the Germans
made no attempt to disguise their preparations opposite the First Army.  The reason for
this was that there were only nine days between the decision to go ahead with Georgette
and the opening attack.  First Army Intelligence reported on the 6 April:
Since the morning of 21st [March] there was a general decline in the
activity of  the enemy artillery along the whole of the Army front, it
being most marked between the La Bassée canal and Armentières.  The
number of temporary camouflaged positions in the neighbourhood of
Auchy Haisnes and Douvrin has continued to show an increase.18
The lack of shelling was significant to artillerymen.  On showing his new BGRA the
corps front the GOC of XI Corps, Lieut.-General Haking, felt that it was too quiet and
the Germans might attack when the Portuguese were coming out of the line.19  Air
reconnaissance continued to show the accumulation of stores and road making materials
for making a passage across no-man’s-land, while on the ground observers reported the
sounds of heavy transport.  GHQ thought this all pointed to a renewal of the Mars
offensive, with Vimy as the German target.  German deserters gave news of the attack
                                                
17 PRO WO 95/175: General Staff 1st Army, Nov. 17 - Mar 18.
18 IWM, Horne MSS, 73/60/1: First Army Intelligence Summary 16-31st March 1918 dated 6th April,.
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on the 7th but, given the British experience during the previous winter, this was hardly
top grade intelligence.  With the benefit of hindsight there were other pointers but again
the Germans could have been bluffing.  For example, the gas bombardment of
Armentières in the days before the attack was a repetition of the one further south and
the 4th South Staffs reported artillery ranging  shots on their front in the preceding
days.20
The staggering of the attack between the 9th and 10th was probably a subterfuge,
there being no tactical reason for it.  The Germans were aware of the Allies’ ability to
move reserves quickly, so anything that would delay this would be worthwhile as the
Germans wanted to be through the battle zone and into the green fields beyond within
48 hours.  The machine-gun fire to cover their preparations on the night of the 9/10th
was ‘considered a demonstration by the Higher Command’.21
The collapse of the Portuguese Division affected the actions of most of the other
formations facing the Germans on the 9th, and so the description of the break-in battle
will start with them, after an explanation of how they came to be there.  On the outbreak
of war the main military concern of the Portuguese government was for the security of
their largest colonies - Angola and Mozambique.  To counter any German threat much
of their small army and its equipment was despatched to Africa and remained there until
the end of hostilities.  Even though their sympathies lay with the Allies they did not
immediately join the conflict, but in March 1916 relations with Germany were broken
off.  Although the Portuguese Army had no experience of operations above brigade level
it was immediately proposed to form a division for service on the Western Front and a
training cadre was set up in May 1916.  An agreement regulating its co-operation with
the BEF was signed in Lisbon on 3 January 1917; due to the shortage of equipment in
Portugal it was decided that the British would supply rifles and the French their 75mm
field guns, and an advanced party arrived at Brest on 2 February 1917.  In mid-February
1917 it was decided to add another division and on 20 April the Portuguese
Expeditionary Corps (CEP) was formed with its headquarters at Aire-sur-la-Lys when it
became part of the First Army.  From the start the CEP was under strength; the main
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elements did not arrive until July and contingents were still arriving in November.  The
cold damp climate did not suit them and 651 officers and men died of sickness by the
end of the war.22  The manpower shortage led to a re-organisation of the CEP in January
1918, the Portuguese sector of the line was to be held by the three brigades of the 2nd
Division with a fourth brigade from the other in reserve.  The remaining two brigades
were converted into depot and training establishments with surplus troops being
transferred to the line brigades.  This change together with a reduction in the front held
by the CEP was ordered by First Army on 25 February.23
The political situation in Portugal did not help the situation, in December 1917
the Democrat government was overthrown and the Republicans (PRP), ‘a blanket
organisation for many dissident elements,’24 declared the New Republic.  While the new
government was sympathetic to the Allied cause, its policy reflected the general feeling
in the country that support should not be in the form of troops.25  This development
caused serious disaffection amongst the rank-and-file and further lowered their already
poor morale.  All these factors, including also the poor quality of the officers, Haig
called them ‘conceited wretches’,26 made the CEP a dubious ally, so it was decided to
withdraw the corps from the line and place the 2nd Portuguese Division in reserve under
the command of XI Corps.27  General Horne had been concerned about the Portuguese
for some time, in his submission to GHQ in reply to the advanced copy of OAD291/29
he stated that he did not think the Portuguese Corps would stand against a German
attack.28  To support them it was proposed to post British troops in the battle zone so
that the Portuguese need only man the forward zone.29  The order for withdrawal was
temporarily rescinded on 24 March due to the situation on the Third and Fifth Army
fronts,30 but later it was decided to carry it out on the night of the 7/8th, using the 50th
Division (Major-General H Jackson).  This was postponed for 48 hours after
representations to corps by Major-General Jackson, who felt that his troops were not
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ready.31  On 8 April, XI Corps ordered the 55th Division, south of the Portuguese, to
take over from the right brigade of the 2nd Portuguese Division on the night of 9/10
April, while 50th Division was to relieve the centre and left brigades on 9/10th and
10/11th respectively.
All this planning came to nought when the bombardment, orchestrated by Lieut.-
Colonel Bruchmüller, von Hutier’s artillery advisor who had moved north to supervise
the bombardment, started at 4.15 a.m.  It followed the, by now, familiar pattern starting
with gas shelling of the back areas searching out artillery batteries and command
headquarters.  During this initial phase a shell landed on the Portuguese divisional
headquarters at Lestrem and cut communications with the rest of the division which
meant that for the rest of the day General da Costa had to rely on liaison officers to keep
in touch with his units.  At 4.50 a.m. a British liaison officer with the Portuguese alerted
XI Corps (Lieut.-General Sir R Haking) of  the situation and the corps mobile reserves,
11th Cyclist Battalion and King Edward’s Horse, were immediately despatched to man
the rear of the battle zone, while the 50th and 51st Divisions were moved up to the
River Lawe.  We see here, even before the assault had started, a major difference
between the Somme and Lys battles.  The First and Second Armies had refitting
divisions available, a luxury denied to Gough and Byng.  These reserves would prove
crucial in the days to come.
Again the morning was misty, visibility being as low as 40 yards in places, and
did not clear until mid-day.  At 8.45 a.m. the German assault began, using four divisions
against the Portuguese, quickly breaking through their defences.  Most of the Portuguese
then began to move to the rear (although the divisions on either side had seen troops
falling back from about 7.30) and by 11 a.m. most of the Portuguese had left the field or
become casualties.  A German medical officer who was with the first wave relates how
‘they came in droves out of their dug-outs with their hands up’.32  However, a few posts
did hold out and some troops were absorbed into British units.  Neuve Chapelle was not
given up by the 6th (Portuguese) Brigade until midday and the 5th Brigade held up the
German advance south of Richebourg St. Vaast, two miles north of the 55th Division.33
The correspondence with Edmonds is full of stories of the Portuguese flight,
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33 PRO CAB 45/122: J Brind (BGGS XI Corps) to Edmonds.
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usually second-hand and nearly all derogatory.34  From these the legend has grown of a
barefoot division  riding three to a mule all the way to Le Havre, drunk on the contents
of the divisional wine store.  More serious was the charge that soldiers, captured in a
raid, gave away the date of the relief,35 and that the Germans brought forward the attack,
originally planned for the 12th, in order to anticipate this.  Another correspondent
commented that ‘Portuguese prisoners in the cages behind La Bassée were complete
with kit, and did not look as if they put up much of a fight.’36
The retirement of the Portuguese was expected by the First Army, and so the
defensive scheme for that sector placed a British division in the rear of the battle zone.
However, although units were ‘told off’ to be ready to move in the event of an attack,
the speed of the Portuguese retreat caught the staff by surprise.  Given that some sort of
German action was expected this was a serious omission on the part of XI Corps and
First Army.
The action to be taken in the event of a Portuguese collapse had already been
decided between XI and XV Corps - they would move whatever reserves they had into
the battle zone in front of the river Lawe.  The 11th Cyclist Battalion and 1st King
Edward’s Horse were in position between Lacouture and Bout Deville by 7.30 a.m. after
being alerted at 5 a.m.  At the same time the two reserve divisions, 50th (XV Corps) and
51st (XI Corps) were made ready.  The 50th Division (Major-General HC Jackson)
brought up the 149th and 150th Brigades to a position south of Estaires where they
arrived at 6.30 a.m.; while by 9.30 the 151st Brigade was in the battle zone continuing
the line from Bout Deville to Laventie.  Meanwhile, 152 Brigade of the 51st Division
(Major-General GT Carter-Campbell) which was under the command of XI Corps had
been moved to a position behind the King Edward’s Horse at 11.30.  The intention was
that this brigade would take over the front line; but the Germans arrived before they
were able to do so.  At the same time the 153rd Brigade moved into a reserve position
south of Merville and then up to the Lawe at the rear of the battle zone.  The 154th
Brigade was put under the command of the 55th Division and continued the flank,
created by that division with its reserve 166th Brigade, up to Lacouture; this movement
being completed by 9.40 a.m.  Thus between them XI and XV Corps had the German
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advance boxed in almost before it had started.
Leading parties of Germans arrived in front of the King Edward’s Horse’s
position at about 11 a.m. where they were halted by fire.  The fighting went on all day,
and the line held until the late afternoon when the Germans, who had by then brought up
their artillery, began to make headway.  A retirement to the line of the Lawe was ordered
at 5.30, being completed by 8 p.m.  The gap was closed by the quick response of these
two small units which shows how useful mobile troops were in this situation.  Edmonds
commented:
The tenacity and self-sacrifice of the 11th Cyclists and 1/King Edward’s
Horse, who lost half their numbers, had undoubtedly prevented the
German success against the Portuguese from being developed into a
complete breakthrough.37
On the 10th, while the Germans were attacking north of Armentières, the line
                                                
37 Official History, 1918, Vol. II, p. 177.
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held.  However, due to a number of bridges not being properly destroyed, the Germans
were able to force a number of crossings and with increase artillery support began to
push the British line back.  This had been anticipated and a new line, one mile in the
rear, had been prepared the previous night to which the troops retired.  To the south the
German advance was a disaster.
The defence of Givenchy by the 55th Division (Major-General HS Jeudwine)
was the most successful repulse of the new German tactics during the Lys battles.  In the
First Army this was the only division, besides the Portuguese, involved in the front-line
fighting that had not been engaged in the March battles, having been in this sector since
15 February.38  Jeudwine was a member of the committee that had drawn up the original
defensive proposal already described and the Givenchy defences followed this rather
than the zones preferred by GHQ.  The divisional sector was divided into two
subsectors.  The southern Givenchy sector was on slightly higher ground - some 9 feet
above the level of the plain according to a contemporary map - which meant that the
trenches did not continuously flood.  A tunnel had been dug under the village which was
forty feet deep and could protect two companies of the front-line reserve from the
heaviest shells.  Exiting from these deep dug-outs required considerable practice, and
later in the battle the 1st Black Watch were to be caught in this tunnel during a German
attack and suffered many casualties.39  The main defensive line was in front of the
village with no forward line.  The northern Festubert sector consisted of a line of posts
to break up an attack supported by the main line of resistance known as the Village Line,
a series of independent mutually supporting posts rather than continuous trenches,
which were protected by water filled ditches and three belts of wire.40   The whole was
backed up by two more lines in the rear known as Tuning Fork Line and Tuning Fork
Switch.
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Besides relying on the physical defences Jeudwine laid great store in the training
of the division to use them and ‘every man knew what was expected of him’.41  Each
post had its own defensive scheme which was regularly practised, including counter-
attacks in platoon sized groupings.  Anticipating battle casualties all ranks had to be
ready to maintain the chain of command and to ‘step into the shoes of any senior’.42
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Even cooks and clerks were not exempt and had to fire so many rounds over the top
every month.43  From all accounts one gets the impression of a highly motivated
division confident of its own ability, yet the Germans expected a walk-over, considering
them ‘tired and only fit for holding a quiet sector of the line’, much to the disgust of the
Lancashire Territorials.44  On the morning of the 9th, the division had the 164th and
165th Brigades in the line with the 166th in reserve.  As soon as the German
bombardment started, troops were moved up to form a flank facing north, anticipating a
retirement by the Portuguese.  At first the Germans, aided by the mist, made some
progress against the 164th Brigade defending the Givenchy sector, penetrating between
the first line of posts, but they were stopped by the rear defences and counter-attacks
soon restored the situation.  In one of these pockets the brigade captured the brass band
that was to play the Germans into Béthune.45  On the front of the 165th Brigade in the
Festubert sector the outposts fell back on the main line of resistance called the Village
Line and except for the loss of one post - Route A Keep - the line was held.  During the
day the protective flank was continued westward, using a mixture of pioneers,
engineers, tunellers and Portuguese, until it joined with the 51st Division on the Lawe,
over three miles east of the original front line.
The German bombardment had failed to neutralise the divisional artillery, at the
end of the day only 12 out of the 48 guns had been knocked out.46  The remainder,
although often firing by prediction due to the mist, caused many casualties in the
German front and support trenches.  Forward guns often had to defend themselves
against infantry attacks. Jeudwine later wrote: ‘An anti-tank 18 pdr a short distance in
the rear of the front line remained in action all day at point blank range, thanks to all-
round wire and the rifles of its detachment.’47  He thought that the reason for the 55th
Division’s success was the defensive scheme:
The answer to the German tactics of infiltration, hitherto so successful,
had been found.  Small contained posts, organised for all-round fire, with
intervals well laced with wire, and stubbornly held, had broken up the
attack.  Independent platoon counter-attacks had completed the German
confusion.48
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While this is certainly true there are other reasons.  Many units retreated as soon as their
flanks were turned instead of holding out as they had been instructed to do, for example
this was specifically mentioned at the army commanders conference of 23 December
1917 which was mainly concerned with defence.49  In this case the division’s nerve held,
which was probably due to their high level of training.  Another result of the rigorous
training was that continuous counter-attacks were made without waiting for orders from
above, even though they were not always successful.  One advantage of the rigid
defences was good communications; the telephone system was deeply buried and hence
the command knew what was going on and could feed the few reserves to the right place
in time to have an effect.  This also enabled the artillery co-operation to be especially
good, for as soon as a German attack developed annihilating fire was immediately
brought to bear on the back areas.
The division was justly proud of their stand as the following telegram from the
55th Division Association shows:
Sixteen years ago today the old Fifty-fifth Division under your gallant
leadership stood firm at Givenchy.  Today the survivors stand firm in
their respect and admiration for their leader and comrade and trust you
are well.50
The sector to the left of the Portuguese was held by the 40th Division (Major-
General J Ponsonby), which had suffered 2799 casualties in the March fighting.51  It was
pulled out for a rest on 28 March and travelled north absorbing drafts on the way and
doing the many jobs needed to refit a division.  According to one of Edmonds’
correspondents the sector defences were designed for two divisions, one in the forward
zone and battle zone and the other behind the Lys in the rear of the battle zone.52  He
goes on to say ‘Yet the 40th were not withdrawn to the battle zone but remained in the
forward zone with instructions to hold it or die’.  Later in his letter he commented ‘The
principles of Defence in Depth while having been propounded in theory were ignored in
practice’.  The divisional dispositions given in the Official History may be considered
typical for the battle - two brigades in the line with one in reserve, each of the line
brigades having two battalions in the forward zone and one in the battle zone.  On the 9
April 119th and 121st Brigades were in the line with 120th Brigade in reserve near
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Estaires.
Again, the retirement of the Portuguese had been anticipated, and a switch line
had been prepared near Laventie to cover this eventuality.  As soon as divisional HQ
realised that their right flank was in the air they ordered the 119th Brigade on the right to
man this position.  The troops had the greatest difficulty differentiating between the
Germans and Portuguese due to the similar colours of their uniforms and shape of their
helmets in the misty conditions.  So many attackers got past in the confusion and these
troops began to envelop the flank of the right battalion - the 18th Welsh - at about 7.30
a.m. before starting on the left battalion - the 13th East Surreys - who were surrounded
on three sides at 9.10 a.m.  Edmonds claimed that some strong points held out until the
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afternoon, although the East Surrey’s regimental history makes no mention of this.53
The reserve battalion - the 21st Middlesex - was called forward, but even though half
got as far as Fleurbaix, they were forced back with the remains of the 18th Welsh to
Sailly-sur-la-Lys.  During the afternoon the brigade retreated to Bac St. Maur, a crossing
point of the Lys, where three of the four bridges were blown before the British troops
were forced over the river, forming a defensive line on the north bank from about 3.30
p.m.  By now much reduced in numbers, the brigade, together with the remnants of the
120th Brigade, was again forced back towards Steenwerk and were withdrawn at 6 p.m.
The failure to block the river crossing was to have serious repercussions as it allowed
the Germans to get behind the 34th Division defending Armentières.
The story of the 121st Brigade, on the left of the 119th, begins with a
discrepancy between the Official History and the regimental history of the right battalion
-  the 20th Middlesex.54  On the night of the 8/9th the brigade was to have made a raid
using two companies of the 20th Middlesex timed for 4.55 a.m.  The British counter-
bombardment meant that the party could not enter the German trenches and so returned
to their own lines.  In Edmonds’ version the raiding party set off and were not heard
from again.55  The Germans soon penetrated the Middlesex trenches and forced them
back onto their left-hand neighbours - the 13th Green Howards.  The brigade reserves -
the 12th Suffolks - were ordered up to Fleurbaix to form a south facing flank which was
to have been continued by the 119th Brigade who, as mentioned above, had failed to
hold their position.  As a result of this, at about 4.30 p.m. the brigade was forced to
retire onto units of the 101st Brigade (34th Division) and came under their control.
The 120th Brigade in reserve near Estaires at the rear of the battle zone received
the order at 4.45 a.m. to be ready to move to a line east of Laventie where they were to
form part of the defences behind the Portuguese.  The order to move was received at
6.15 a.m. and they moved off at 7.50 a.m., over three hours after the start of the German
bombardment.  Unfortunately, the Germans reached the battle zone before them and so
the brigade took up a position behind Laventie, which had been prepared some days
earlier.  The brigade was now in a precarious situation as both flanks were in the air with
little chance of either gaining touch with other troops.  The pressure of the German
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assault forced them back towards Bac St. Maur where, as already mentioned, they joined
with the remains of the 119th Brigade at about 4 p.m.  At the end of the day the division
‘was reorganised into two composite battalions which, with the Pioneer Battalion and
some Field Companies RE were all that was left of the 40th Division.’56
The Armentières sector posed all sorts of problems for the defenders.  The town
itself was some three miles behind the line and remarkably unscathed considering the
destruction of Ypres, in a similar situation, further to the north.  During the summer of
1917 the Germans had bombarded the town and most of the civilian population had
been evacuated, so at least the defenders would not be troubled by roads clogged with
refugees.  The town itself was in the middle of the battle zone, yet neither side would
have wished to become involved in street fighting, the difficulty of control and supply
were too great.  The River Lys and various canals meander round the town, creating
potential traps for any retreating units.  To reduce this risk the seven bridges across the
Lys were augmented by a number of temporary floating pontoons which could be
quickly swung into position.
This sector of 8000 yards was manned by the 34th Division (Major-General CL
Nicholson) which came into the line on 30 March minus its artillery.  Having suffered
2741 casualties in the south, the infantry battalions had a high proportion of new
drafts.57  The divisional history relates that the defences were not in a good condition,
the trenches being ‘rather decayed’ and the posts which were probably meant to replace
them badly wired.  A XV Corps conference on 1 April left the division in no doubt
about the defence policy - j’y suis, j’y reste.58
One man did try to improve the sector’s defences.  The GSO1 of the 34th
Division, Lieut.-Colonel Sir T Montgomery-Cuninghame, produced a plan to ‘abandon
the front-line trenches, swing a wide gate open for the enemy to enter and pound him
with artillery when he did’.59  According to its author, the proposal was thrown into the
waste paper basket.  Perhaps this sector was not the place for such a plan, it was unlikely
to be subjected to a direct assault, rather a pincer movement on either side.  Regardless
of the reason we do have another example of thinking along the right lines.
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The first week of April was very quiet, there being no hostile patrols in no-
man’s-land, but on the 6th two German deserters gave away the impending attack on the
Portuguese and so work commenced on improving the flank defences.  Then, on the
evening of the 7th Armentières was bombarded with gas causing about 900 casualties,
which given the division’s previous experience, should have been a warning of what
was to come.  The initial bombardment on the 9th excluded the front of the 34th
Division, but the back areas received a further drenching of gas.  This caused problems
for the divisional artillery which was in the process of changeover with the previous
occupants, the 38th Division.  Showing quick initiative the gunners of the 38th took
over all guns in division’s sector, regardless of ownership, while the 34th divisional
artillery took over the duties of the 38th.  General Nicholson thus had the disadvantage
of fighting the rest of the battle with  strange artillery.  The bombardment put the
division on the alert, so at 6 a.m. orders were given to make ready the pontoons and man
the bridge-head defences.
The disposition of the infantry was the usual two brigades in the front line with
one in reserve, in this case 102nd Brigade on the left and 103rd Brigade on the right
with the 101st in reserve (actually the XV Corps reserve) at Erquinghem behind
Armentières.  In fact, this was the only corps reserve, there being only two divisions in
the corps instead of three.  At 10 a.m. the 101st Brigade was transferred from corps
reserve to the division to assist in holding the flank created by the retreating Portuguese,
and moved south-west from Erquinghem, to take up a defensive position to try to stem
the German advance after their capture of the Bac St Maur bridge.  The failure to
destroy this bridge enabled the Germans to easily work their way into the rear areas and
threaten to cut off the division.  Shakespear comments that ‘there are not many instances
of the reserve going into action first.’60
During the morning the right flank of the 34th Division together with some units
of the 40th formed a line running approximately east - west pivoting on Bois Grenier.
At 1.30 p.m. the 74th Brigade - the reserve of the 25th Division on the left of the 34th -
was placed under the command of General Nicholson.61  They moved south from
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Steenwerk and held the advancing Germans at Croix du Bac, following this with an
ambitious counter-attack pushing the Germans back towards the bridge-head over the
Lys.  The fighting continued during the night of 9/10th and by sheer weight of numbers
the 74th Brigade was pushed back to Steenwerck, disputing every position and making
the Germans pay heavily for their success.
On the 10th the Germans resumed their attack on the 101st and 103rd Brigades
and the line was gradually forced back towards Erquinghem.  At a critical point the
situation was saved by the 1/4th West Ridings (147th Brigade, 49th Division) who kept
the Germans out of Erquinghem for five hours.  During the morning anyone who could
hold a rifle was put into the line; tunnellers, gas specialists and clerks fought shoulder to
shoulder with the infantry.  The German attack north of Armentières on the 10th made
the position of the 34th Division precarious and the decision was taken to evacuate the
town and bring the troops north of  the river.  The division was beginning to be caught
in a pincer, and by mid-morning the enemy troops in Steenwerck and Ploegsteert were
only five miles apart.  This retirement had been suggested to corps HQ the previous
evening, and had been refused, but at 10 a.m. the order was received for the retirement
to begin at 3 p.m.  The five hour gap being considered necessary due to the difficulty of
communications.
The plan was for the 102nd Brigade to retire first; the 101st Brigade would hold
the right at Erquinghem, while 103rd Brigade retired north through Armentières and
take up a position on the right of 102nd Brigade north of the river near Pont de Nieppe.
Then the 101st Brigade would cross the river and the bridges would be blown.  The
102nd Brigade received the order at 11.40 a.m. and completed their move by 6.20 p.m.
The other two brigades did not receive the order  until about 3 p.m.  The 101st Brigade
held out until about 5 p.m. and then began their move to the north bank,  but the
Germans began to advance quickly along the north bank and so the masonry bridge was
blown and the last crossings were made by emergency footbridge.  Unfortunately this all
happened so quickly that some men were left on the south side of the river.  The 103rd
Brigade had to move north into the town and then cross the Lys by one of the three
bridges available: the Bailleul - Lille railway bridge, a timber bridge and the bridge at
Pont de Nieppe.  At 6.45 p.m. two of these were blown but the demolition officer, Major
Russell of 208th Field Company RE, decided to  delay the destruction of the crossing at
Pont de Nieppe and await events.  The brigade moved off at 4.30 p.m. under the cover
79
of mist, (for once the weather was on the side of the British) fighting all the way,
although some Germans were met in the town, most of the brigade had crossed the river
by 8.30 p.m. and the charge was fired at 10.40 p.m.
Considering that for many of the officers and men this was their first action the
successful retreat of the 34th Division is quite remarkable.  It was certainly the intention
of the Germans to pinch out the defenders of Armentières in their attack, but the
division’s dogged resistance on the 9th delayed the southern advance and left the gap
through which they could escape.
North of Armentières the ground rises until it becomes the Messines - Wytschaete ridge
which was captured by the Australians in 1917 as a prelude to Third Ypres.  The
Australians had remained to garrison this sector and built the defences during the winter
of 17/18, they were then moved south to relieve tired British divisions after the March
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battles.  The author of the 9th Division history,62 Brig.-General Croft, rated these
defences highly; so well camouflaged were they that his brigade-major fell into a post
while looking for it!  The forward zone was on the slope of the ridge facing the Germans
while the front of the battle zone was on the reverse slope.  A request was made by the
57th Brigade (19th Division) to concentrate the front defences on this support line, but
although divisional HQ agreed higher authority refused.63
This refusal by IX Corps (Lieut.-General Sir A Hamilton Gordon) to allow the
defences to be concentrated on the ridge was ridiculous.  It shows just how little some
staffs understood defence in depth.  This was an ideal position in which to construct a
system similar to that of XIII or XI Corps.  The front line could not be reinforced during
the day as it was under continuous enemy observation.  For some reason the 9th
Division in the same corps went some way to achieving this having only one brigade in
the forward zone.  The divisional commander, Major-General HH Tudor, commented to
Edmonds ‘we had a continuous solid and strongly wired defence line in support and had
no intention of holding the outpost line’.64  In addition, Notes for Infantry Officers on
Trench Warfare discussed reverse slopes, pointing out that if the front line were not too
far down the forward slope then ‘supporting trenches, communications and the works in
which a large proportion of the garrison live, enjoy comparative immunity from
observation’.65  If the back position was taken then there should be sufficient saps to
allow continuous observation of the enemy.  Thus the reverse slope was ‘official’.
 The three divisions defending this section of the line, 9th 19th and 25th, had all
suffered heavy casualties in the March fighting and had only a few days to acquaint
themselves with their sectors of the front.  During this time they had been absorbing
drafts, or as Croft put it, the drafts were absorbing them.  The German attack, again
covered by morning mist, followed the usual pattern, except that the bombardment did
not have quite the same ferocity.  For over two hours artillery positions and any building
were drenched with gas and pounded with HE, and in the last fifteen minutes the front
line was barraged by trench mortars.  The result of the German infantry attack might
also be described as ‘the usual’.  Most of the outposts were quickly over-run and troops
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on the main line of resistance and in the battle zone pushed back.  When the British had
attacked Messines ridge in June 1917 they used an earthquake, ten months later the
Germans used a hurricane.  Both methods of subduing the defenders had the desired
effect.
The 25th Division (Major-General J Charles) had transferred its reserve, 74th
Brigade, to the 40th Division on the previous day to assist in the defence of Armentières
and so the two brigades in the front line would have to fight with no supports.
Anticipating the withdrawal from Armentières, a right flank had been formed of
pioneers and engineers. In addition, the divisional artillery had not yet come up, so it
was dependant on three brigades of army artillery.  The divisional front line, of some
6000 yards, had the added protection of the River Lys which meanders north-south from
Frelinghein to Warneton before turning westward towards Comines.  To cover their
preparations for the crossing there was much firing of machine-guns during the night of
9/10th which together with the mist enabled the Germans to put pontoons over the river
and surmount the obstacle.  The German attack started at about 5.30 a.m. and they were
soon across the forward zone of the 75th Brigade; but they were held east of Ploegsteert
by a detachment from the flank guard aided by the remains of the front-line garrison.
On the left of the 75th Brigade the Germans had less success against the 7th Brigade,
although Ploegsteert wood was captured.  A counter-attack by the 10th Cheshires, the
reserve battalion of  the 75th Brigade, failed to dislodge the Germans from the wood,
and another counter-attack later in the day also failed, in both cases due to insufficient
troops being available.
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The 19th Division on the left of the 25th had the 57th and 58th Brigades in the
front line with the 56th Brigade in support in the battle zone.  In the initial assault only
the 57th Brigade on the right was attacked and the forward troops were forced back
through the two lines of posts and the support line.  On the crest of the ridge they rallied
and, assisted by the guns of A Battery 88th Brigade RFA firing over open sights, kept the
Germans at bay.66  Meanwhile, a new rear line had been established running from
Wulverghem to Wytschaete, and in the late afternoon the defenders of the ridge were
able to move back to its relative safety.
The 58th Brigade’s turn came in the afternoon, their only action of the morning
being to form a defensive flank on the retirement of  the 57th Brigade.  At 2 p.m.
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instructions were given for the forward battalions to move back to conform with the
27th Brigade (9th Division) on their left.   There was a muddle over the orders and the
6th Wiltshires on the right did not receive theirs until 4.30 p.m. when they began to
carry it out; the 9th Royal Welsh Fusiliers on the left having already moved to positions
in the support line.  This enabled the Germans, aided by a late afternoon mist, to work
their way around flanks and break up the two forward battalions.  During the afternoon
the 58th Brigade was transferred to the 9th Division, who moved up part of the 26th
Brigade to a position behind the 58th, to which the survivors of the latter withdrew.
The 9th Division (Major-General H Tudor) held the important sector covering
the Southeast approaches to Ypres and the beginning of the Salient.  The division had
only the 27th Brigade in the forward zone with the 26th and the South African Brigade
in reserve, the latter being only some 1300 strong, mainly draftees.67  The division was
subjected to the same attack as the 58th Brigade, but with less success for the Germans.
Although the front posts were soon over-run the Germans were stopped at the well
wired support line and subjected to a ‘shrivelling fire’.68  The movement of the 26th
Brigade, to cover the gap between the 57th to the 27th once it was realised that the 58th
was in danger of disintegrating, has already been mentioned.  On finding Wytschaete
empty a patrol of the 5th Cameron Highlanders occupied the position until reinforced by
elements of the 62nd Brigade who came under the command of the division in the late
evening.  The brigade’s arrival was opportune as the Germans were mounting an attack
on the patrol which the combined force was able to repulse, the fighting continuing all
night.
One feature of these two days was the counter-attacks mounted to restore the
line.  Probably the most famous was that of the South Africans against Messines, very
late in the afternoon.  At first the brigade commander, Brigadier-General Tanner, refused
as his troops were so inexperienced, but divisional HQ prevailed.  The objectives set by
Tudor were very optimistic given the weakness of the brigade.  Their first was the
Messines - Wytschaete ridge, the second the old British third line in front of the villages
and the third the support line, an advance of over two miles from their start point, the
Steenebeck stream west of the ridge.  At 5.45 p.m. they deployed for the attack: the 1st
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Regiment69 on the right and the 2nd on the left with the 4th in support.  There is
disagreement in the sources over the degree of artillery support.  In his history of the
brigade John Buchan said that it was weak,70 whereas Edmonds states that they attacked
under an excellent barrage fired by the 87th Brigade RFA over new and unregistered
ground.  The advance was met with heavy resistance from the village and farms along
the Messines - Wytschaete road, so the excellent barrage was not sufficient to suppress
the fire of the German defenders.
The 1st Regiment reached Messines, charging the last few yards with fixed
bayonets, and for an hour severe hand-to-hand fighting took place in the village.  The
casualties during the advance were such that the village could not be held and the
remains of the regiment took up a position about 100 yards west of Messines.  This
position may have been part of the British defensive system as there is a line of pill
boxes still to be seen near the New Zealand Memorial just outside the present village.
The 2nd Regiment took its second objective soon after 6.30 p.m., capturing a number of
fortified farms, although on the left Pick House held out and continuously enfiladed the
South African left flank.
Unfortunately this counter-attack took place too late in the day for any further
exploitation and no reserves were available to consolidate the position.  The position
was lost the next day when the Germans resumed their offensive.
Describing a battle from the infantry’s standpoint means that other arms often do not
receive the recognition due to them.  The German bombardment of  British artillery
positions was not as successful on the Lys as in the south, although some guns, in close
support of the infantry, were lost by fire and the speed of the German advance.  Thus,
there were many guns available to assist the infantry, particularly in breaking up troop
concentrations.  Losses could also be quickly made up from the army and GHQ gun
parks which were near at hand.  Examples have already been given of this co-operation,
which Edmonds claimed was partly due to the secure communications provided by the
deep buried cables available to the First and Second Armies.  The main tribute to the
British machine-gunners came from the German accounts summarised at the end of each
chapter of the Official History.  As the British had found in previous battles, the advance
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of large units could be held by one gun skilfully handled.  The British reluctance to give
the machine-gun credit was probably due to its being considered as part of the infantry
and not a separate arm.
Military reputations were safe on the Lys, as the German breakthrough could be
blamed on foreigners - the Portuguese.  Although they were not expected to put up
much resistance it was the speed of the German advance that surprised the British and
caught them without the promised troops in the battle zone.  The defensive schemes for
the divisions on either side of the Portuguese allowed for such an eventuality and while
they were able to put them into practice, the 40th Division was crushed.  The skilful
handling of the 34th Division’s evacuation of Armentières shows what could be
achieved, even when the men were mostly new drafts.
On the 10th the Germans made advances of only 1-2000 yards, mainly because
their bombardment had failed to neutralise the artillery and command structure.  It is
noticeable that the defenders had most success when the Germans were unable to
control the weather!  The new tactics required the advance to be continuous.  As soon as
the leading storm-troops were stopped, the following infantry, who still advanced in
waves, began to bunch and made excellent targets for the artillery.  There are many
examples of large concentrations of German infantry being caught in the open when the
fog lifted.
The BEF failed to learn the main lesson of the 21 March and placed far too many
troops in the forward zone.  Most divisions used the ‘traditional’ trench warfare
disposition of two brigades up with one in the rear, the forward brigades would then
place two battalions in the outpost line and one in the support line.  Given the ferocity of
the German bombardment, which most of them had experienced, these dispositions
should have been reversed.  The Germans preferred to place the three infantry regiments
in line and distribute them in depth, a point had to be continuously reinforced after the
publication of Ludendorff’s Principles in 1916.71  For example, an annex to the GHQ
Intelligence Summary of 20 January 1918 makes the above point, and goes on to say:
Holding a divisional sector with two regiments in line and a counter-
attack regiment in rear, increases the difficulties of command in battle to
a considerable extent, owing to the sectors held by the regiments in line
being usually too broad, and also on account of the fusion of units which
                                                
71 A German regiment was roughly equivalent to a British brigade.
86
quickly occurs during a hostile attack.72
However, some lessons were learned from the March fighting, or perhaps, existing
knowledge was better applied.  Retreating troops tended to pass through a prepared rear
position if there was no garrison in it.  On the Lys even parties of engineers and officers
servants could induce troops to stop and fight.  The King Edward’s Horse were to have
been re-organised as cyclists, but experience showed the need for small bodies of
mounted troops, so they were reprieved.73  In mitigation, it must be pointed out that the
Lys followed so quickly on the previous attacks that it may be unreasonable to expect
the various staffs to have spent much time on reflection.  They were probably far too
busy rebuilding their formations.
Having broken through the British front line the Germans still had to exploit
their success.  The next chapter will describe the breakout battle.
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t might be argued that the Germans had every reason to be pleased with the situation
on the morning of the 11 April.  Between the two canals that marked the boundary of
their attack, the BEF had been pushed out of the front line, except for a few yards on
the southern edge at Givenchy still held tenaciously by the 55th Division.  However, all
was not well for the Germans, everywhere the advance was held up, either by troops
brought in as a counter-move, or by the remnants of the front-line defenders.  To have
any chance of success, they had to keep the front moving and in a state of chaos, so that
they could at least threaten the Channel Ports before more British reinforcements could
arrive.  The battle had now entered a fluid phase that was to last for the next five days,
and cause the Allies much concern.  Although the British line had remained intact the
whole situation was ripe for exploitation, especially in the German Sixth Army sector on
the flat plane of the Lys.  Once the advance became bogged down the advantage might
pass to the defenders, reinforcements could be slotted into the line, field artillery
brought to bear and counter-attacks mounted.  Also, once the defence hardened the
Germans would have the difficulty of getting things moving again, which in turn would
cause delay.  Therefore, the Germans were involved in a race against time.
In fact, British reinforcements were already on the way.  On the 9 April the 29th
and 49th Divisions ‘resting’ in the Ypres salient after the March battle were transferred
to XV Corps defending the Lys plain.  What Haig wanted, and spent the battle trying to
obtain, were fresh French divisions.1  With the second German attack on the 10th it was
realised by GHQ that, with no French divisions immediately to hand, the BEF would
have to look to its own resources, and so divisions were moved from the Third and
Fourth Armies, many without artillery and often still receiving drafts to replace their
losses while on the move.  The 31st, 33rd, and 61st Divisions were ordered north on the
10th together with two fresh twelve battalion divisions, the 5th newly arrived from Italy
and the 1st Australian which was detached from the Australian Corps.  Even the 39th
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Division which, reduced to cadre, had been earmarked for training the Americans was
sent to the battle area.  On the 11th the remaining two brigades (8th and 76th) of the 3rd
Division were moved north of the La Bassée canal to XI Corps, the 9th Brigade having
already gone two days before.  Moving divisions about like this was, of course, robbing
Peter to pay Paul, for if the Germans continued to attack the BEF its infantry would
quickly be used up.  But help had already been arranged by the Prime Minister.  On 23
March ‘staring disaster in the face, Lloyd George was magnificent.  With characteristic
energy and courage, he postponed the morning meeting of the War Cabinet and took
charge in the War Office to locate and rush all available troops to Haig.’2  This is the
ideal task for the man at the top; overriding any departmental demarcations, Lloyd
George was able to co-ordinate the actions of the Adjutant-General’s department at the
War Office and the Shipping Controller, Sir Joseph Maclay.  As a result of this visit the
cross-channel arrangements were shaken up so that the shipping capacity was increased
from 8,000 to 20,000 men per day and in the first week of April 73,618 men were sent
to France.3
Haig’s immediate need was to get the best out of the men he had and to that end
he issued his ‘Backs to the Wall’ order, which concluded:
There is no other course open to us but to fight it out.  Every position
must be held to the last man: there must be no retirement.  With our
backs to the wall and believing in the justice of our cause each one of us
must fight on to the end.  The safety of our homes and the Freedom of
mankind alike depend upon the conduct of each one of us at this critical
moment.4
Although Haig may have had other reasons for issuing this order it left the BEF in no
doubt about the seriousness of the situation, even if there were impolite enquiries
concerning which wall their backs were to be put against.
During the next five days the most vulnerable part of the front would be from the
Nieppe forest to the Flanders hills, covered by XV and IX Corps, the direct route to the
Channel Ports via Hazebrouck.  The Nieppe forest,5 comprising dense marshy woodland
and crossed by only two roads, was an impediment to any exploitation in its vicinity.
Pushing westward along its southern edge would have created a dangerous salient for
the Germans.  The hilly area from Armentières to Ypres was a maze of old trench
                                                                                                                                  
1 This aspect of the battle is described in a later chapter.
2 Woodward, Lloyd George and the Generals, p. 269.
3 Official History, 1918, Vol. II, p. 11.  See also Lloyd George, D, War Memoirs (London: Nicholson &
Watson, 1935), Vol. V, p. 2886.
4 Official History, 1918, Vol. II, p. 512.
89
systems lending itself to defence, which the lack of progress by the Germans on the 10th
had proved.
For convenience, and perhaps clarity, the narrative can be broken into three
parts: the retreat of XI Corps to the line of the La Bassée canal, the XV and IX Corps
fight between the Nieppe forest and the Flanders hills and then the defence of the hills
themselves.  This also follows a reasonably chronological order.
At dawn on the 11th XI Corps still had only the 51st and 55th Divisions in the line,
although the 55th enjoyed considerable machine-gun and artillery support from the 3rd
Division, its right-hand neighbour across the canal, and had its 9th Brigade in reserve in
front of Béthune.  The 55th Division’s line, which extended from Givenchy to Locon
where it was held by some hastily gathered pioneers and sappers, was shelled and
attacked all day by the Germans with little success.  The 51st Division’s line, now
pushed back from its initial position on the Lawe, had an awkward salient in it at Vieille
                                                                                                                                  
5 The timber was used for pit props in the Bruay mines.
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Chapelle where the remains of the King Edward’s Horse and the 6th Gordon
Highlanders still held the village.
During the day troops of the 61st Division began to arrive, the first being the
1/5th Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry (DCLI), the divisional pioneers, supported by 3
companies of the 39th Division machine-gun battalion.6  These units were put straight
into the line south of Merville, the DCLI being very much up to strength having recently
received a draft of 423 other ranks from the UK, bringing its strength up to 24 officers
and 944 other ranks.7  Thus the gap between the 50th and 51st Divisions was plugged,
while at the same time the 3rd Division was moving into position covering the join
between the 55th and 51st Divisions.
Before these reinforcements were in place the Germans continued their assault
and not surprisingly the salient at Vieille Chapelle was lost and the 51st Division was
pushed back about one mile.  It is most likely that the division was saved by its artillery
- 255th and 256th Brigades RFA assisted by the 12th Australian Army Brigade8- which
gave the retreating troops continuous close support.  The guns were often in danger of
being overwhelmed and there were many occasions over the next few days when they
pulled out just in time, the crews having to defend the batteries with rifle and Lewis-gun
fire.  By now the division was becoming short of men, especially officers, very few
having come up with the drafts when the division was rebuilt after the March battle.
Again, the artillery was on hand to assist and a number of  gunner officers became
temporary infantry commanders.  For example, the OC of the 256th Artillery Brigade
took over the 153rd Brigade when its commander became ill.9  Also, a group of
stragglers were formed into four platoons officered by volunteers from the artillery
which were to remain in the line for the next two days:
Having led their commands forward, they remained in action with them
until the 13th inst.  Throughout this period they kept their troops well
under control, particularly during the series of withdrawals in the face of
vastly superior forces in the rearguard action which took place on the
12th inst.  They, indeed, all proved themselves highly capable infantry
leaders.10
There were some changes in command and corps responsibility on the 12th.  XV
Corps covering the Merville sector was transferred from the First to the Second Army.
                                                
6 Bewsher, FW, History of the 51st (Highland) Division (Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1921), p. 308.
7 Wyrall, E, The History of the Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry 1914-18 (London: Methuen, 1932), p.
381.
8 An artillery brigade at the disposal of the Army staff which could be sent where it was most needed.
9 Bewsher, 51st (Highland) Division, p. 306.
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In the next few days this was to prove a sensible move, as during the battles for
Hazebrouck and Bailleul the whole front was under one command.  There was also a
change of GOC in XV Corps, when Lieut.-General Du Cane became the BEF liaison
officer at Foch’s headquarters and was replaced by Lieut.-General de Lisle from XIII
Corps, fresh from his victory at Arras.  Further south, the responsibilities of I Corps
were moved north of the canal to include the areas covered by the 3rd and 55th
Divisions, while XI Corps extended its line to cover the 50th Division transferred from
XV Corps.  The actions of the 50th Division and the arriving 5th Division will be
covered later.  I Corps was further reinforced by the 4th Division from west of Arras.
What amounts to an extra corps becoming involved gave the front more support from
the corps heavy artillery.
On the I Corps front there were no infantry attacks, but the whole area was
shelled all day.  The main German success was again against the 51st Division.  At 5
a.m. the front of the 152nd Brigade opposite Robecq was driven in and the brigade staff
captured, probably due to not having sentries posted.11  A similar fate was almost
suffered by 153rd Brigade staff who left by the back door of the cottage acting as their
headquarters as the Germans entered by the front.12  The confused fighting of the rest of
the day when the Germans almost reached Robecq shows the value of reserves close up
behind the front.  The Germans were unable to fan out from this breach due to quick
actions by the brigades on either side.  To the north the 182nd Brigade13 was able to
hold a flank between the front line and the River Clarence; while to the south the 154th
Brigade was able to hold the line of the La Bassée canal.  To conform with these
retirements, the left of the 3rd Division (76th Brigade) and the whole 61st Division
moved back.  The main thrust of the attack was held by the divisional artillery.
Surprised by the speed of the German advance the gunners became the front line and in
the scramble to escape some guns were lost, their teams being killed by German fire.
However, the artillery was able to cover the crossings of the Clarence and the canal
stopping the German advance.
By evening the 51st Division had ceased to exist as a fighting force, comprising
the 154th Brigade and a collection of engineers and infantry, known as ‘Flemings Force’
and about 1,000 strong, under the command of the CRE Lieut.-Colonel Fleming.
                                                                                                                                  
10 Ibid., p 309.
11 PRO CAB 45/122: Colonel A Symons (GSO1 51st Div) to Edmonds.
12 Bewsher, 51st (Highland) Division, p. 311.
13 61st Division reserve.
92
However, there were now four divisions in XI Corps facing the enemy,14 the 4th having
taken over most of the 51st Division’s line.
The next three days were relatively quiet.  In the 55th Division’s sector Route A
Keep, a fortified position that had been taken on the 9th, was recaptured by companies
found from the 10th and 13th Liverpool Regiment.  On the 14th the 4th Division
mounted a successful attack to pinch out the German salient at Robecq and recapture the
village of Riez du Vinage which shows the value of good preparation coupled with
inspired and gallant leadership.  The men of the 1st Somersets supported by the 1st
Hampshires,15 were moved across the canal in small groups to avoid giving any
indication that something was about to happen.  At 6.30 p.m., when everyone was in
position, the barrage opened up, drawing heavy machine-gun fire from the Germans, but
                                                
14 4th , 51st and 61st in this sector, 50th Division north of Merville.
15 11th Brigade.
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the companies moved off; D(light), B and C in front with A in reserve.  Such was the
ferocity of the German machine-gun fire that the attack soon faltered, but the OC A
Company, Captain LA Osborne, seeing that the attack might fail if it were not pressed,
led two of his platoons through B and C companies against the village in a series of
rushes.  This inspired the other companies to press on and the objective was taken.  An
immediate counter-attack against the newly captured village was driven off by Lewis-
gun and rifle fire, over half the enemy being killed and many more captured.16
The German troops were by now exhausted, while the British front lay on a good
defensive position, the La Bassée canal and the Clarence river.  Thus a rest and re-
supply would be necessary if further progress was to be made.  In fact, it took the
Germans four days to prepare for what was to be their last attempt to force a way
through to Béthune.
                                                
16 Wyrall, E, The History of the Somerset Light Infantry (London: Methuen, 1927), p. 291-3.
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On the 16th the 55th Division was relieved by the 1st Division.  The Lancashire
Territorials had held on against an almost continuous German assault for seven days.
The 3rd Division continued the line from Gorre to Hinges, the 4th from Hinges to
Robecq, and the 61st from Robecq to the Nieppe forest.  The British now had four
divisions where there had been two a week ago, defending canal or river lines and
supported by considerable artillery.
The Germans tried one more time to force a way to Béthune.  Their
bombardment began at 1 a.m. on the 18th but was expected, the game being given away
by a German sergeant-major captured by the 1st Gloucesters.17  Their history claims that
the ferocity of the shelling was heavier than on 21 March, and was of the usual pattern.
The artillery batteries suffered much gas shelling, while any building or cross-roads was
                                                
17 Wyrall, E, The Gloucestershire Regiment in the Great War 1914-18 (London: Methuen, 1931), p. 265.
95
subjected to a storm of high explosive.  At about 7 a.m. attention focused on the front
line after which the German infantry began their advance about one hour later.
In the 1st Division area the village of Givenchy was defended by the 1st Black
Watch (1st Brigade) who had taken over from the 1st Loyal North Lancs just before the
attack and had had little time to practise exiting from the deep dugouts.  The Germans
followed very closely behind the creeping barrage and were able to rush the front-line
defenders, the troops in the tunnels not being quick enough exiting and so getting caught
in a trap, the whole of Givenchy ridge being captured.  The Black Watch also had too
many men in the front line, three companies up with one in reserve,18 and the losses of
the morning made any counter-attack difficult, even after a ‘17th platoon’ was formed
from details and headquarters staff.19  However, as the Germans did not press their
attack it was decided to try and recover the lost ground.  Reinforced by a company of the
brigade reserve, 1st Cameron Highlanders, a counter-attack was mounted in the
afternoon, but the Germans stoutly defended their newly won ground.  This attack had to
be made with little or no artillery support for fear of hitting their own wounded.20  Thus,
we see the value of the 55th Division’s preparation and training.  The Germans seem to
have been content with the capture of the village, as the next day was quiet, this allowed
another counter-attack to be prepared and on the 20th the 1st Northamptons recaptured
most of the lost ground.
The left hand battalion of the brigade, the 1st Loyal North Lancs, were attacked
at the same time and immediately lost the main line of resistance, but their two
companies in reserve counter-attacked and immediately restored the situation.21
On the left of the 1st Brigade, the Festubert sector was held by the 3rd Brigade
with the 1st South Wales Borderers on the left, 1st Gloucesters on the right, and the 2nd
Welsh in reserve.  In the first rush Route A keep, an already much disputed outpost, was
captured from the Borderers and in the Gloucesters’ sector the Germans were able to
work their way round Le Plantin village, although the line in the centre remained firm.
During the day the Gloucesters were almost surrounded,22 the situation being restored
by the brigade reserve later in the day.  Again, the Northamptons cleared up on the 20th,
                                                
18 Wauchope, Black Watch, Vol. II, pp. 82-3.
19 Ibid., p. 87.
20 The 55th Division were still in the line.
21 Wylly, HC: The Loyal North Lancashire Regiment (London: RUSI, 1933), Vol. II, p. 57.
22 Not for nothing do the Gloucesters wear a badge on both front and rear of their caps!
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recapturing Route A Keep, supported by the only artillery available - one 18 pdr.23  By
now holding this small fort was a point of honour.
The attack on the 3rd Division was rather half-hearted considering that it was in
front of the German objective.  In fact, many regimental histories say nothing about any
action on the 18th.  On that morning the division had the 76th Brigade on the left and
the 9th on the right with the 8th in reserve.  When the bombardment started the latter
moved up from Béthune. The defence was assisted by annihilating fire from the artillery
as soon as the German barrage opened, and continued throughout the day in answer to
calls from the front line.  There was usually good co-operation between the infantry and
artillery; for example, the Northumberland Fusiliers’ history states: ‘At 9.30 a.m. the
Germans were seen definitely to be collecting to the east of Loisne Keep and our
artillery was immediately turned on this concentration, with the result that no attack
developed on the front of the Fifth.’24  The lack of a response from the Germans after a
counter-bombardment by the British was typical for this phase of the battle.
The story is much the same with the 4th Division which had the 12th Brigade on
the left and the 10th on the right with the 11th in reserve; again as soon as the
bombardment started the latter moved up in support of the front brigades.  The division
was defending a useful feature - the La Bassée canal.  To effect their crossing the
Germans had prepared ‘pontoons and light footbridges supported on bladders’.25  In the
10th Brigade sector the only danger was early in the day when an attack was mounted
from the cover of Pacaut wood, which gave cover right up to the canal.  After
overrunning a couple of posts on their side of the canal they endeavoured to ‘launch’ an
attack over the canal with no success.  The experience of the 12th Brigade was similar;
although some ground was lost at Riez du Vinage, it was soon retaken in a counter-
attack.
Besides the usual shelling and raids by both sides, this was the end of the
German thrusts towards Béthune and along the southern edge of the Nieppe forest.
The British positions were not particularly strong, since deep trenches were not
possible due to the high water table, and there were still too many men in the front line.
Although the German bombardment was as fierce as that on 9 April and they had a
superiority in numbers of 2:1, they were still unable to get the offensive moving again.26
                                                
23 Atkinson, CT, The History of the South Wales Borderers 1941-18 (London: Medici, 1931), p. 420.
24 Sandilands, HR, The Fifth in the Great War (Dover: Grigg, 1938), p. 219.
25 Official History, 1918, Vol. II, p. 361.
26 The ratio was 3 or 4:1 on 9 April.
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There are two reasons for the Germans’ lack of success.  A lot of the British artillery
survived the bombardment, probably because the Germans had had too little time to
locate all the batteries.  More importantly, the German infantry was becoming tired.  Of
six divisions used on the 18th, four had been in action since the 9th and the other two
had been brought up from the Somme after eleven days rest, so none of them could be
considered fresh.  This tiredness and perhaps a drop in morale led to a lack of resolve in
pressing home the attack.  The German divisions on the 21 March would not have been
put off by a few defenders.
We now move back to the 11 April when XV Corps was being pushed back by the
German assault on Hazebrouck.  On the 9th, before the attack north of Armentières,
reinforcements for XV Corps had been put in hand.  The Second Army provided two
brigades from the 29th Division (86th and 87th) and one from the 49th from the Ypres
defences.  The latter division was to be involved in the fighting the next day.  These
units had the advantage that they had not been involved in the Somme battles.  The third
brigade of the 29th Division, the 88th, arrived on the 10th.  Instead of using these
brigades as one unit, battalions were used to reinforce brigades already in the line.  For
example, the 87th Brigade lost the 1st Borders to the 149th Brigade while 86th Brigade
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lost 2nd Royal Fusiliers to the 151st Brigade.27  This meant that when the brigades came
into action they were already under strength and it also added to the general mixing of
troops.  The 86th and 87th Brigades were sent as a reserve to the 50th Division, which
by now had been reduced to a brigade.
The only other reserve in the area was the 31st Division, which had been bussed
up from near Arras, where it had been in GHQ reserve. It was placed at the disposal of
the First Army.  Two of its brigades reached a position six miles east of Hazebrouck by
the night of the 10/11th; these two brigades were to be in support of the 40th Division
the next day.28  The way in which the four brigades of the 29th and 31st Divisions came
into the line, or to be more exact the line came to them, is typical of the battle.  During
the morning the 92nd Brigade moved forward behind the village of Doulieu, while it
                                                
27 Official History, 1918, Vol. II, p. 198.
28 IWM, Typed divisional history.  The third brigade, the 4th Guards, were delayed due to late arrival of
their busses.
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was proposed to use the 93rd as its support.  When it was found that what remained of
the 40th Division was being scattered the GOC 31st Division, Major-General Bridgford,
decided to use his support in a counter-attack to stem the German advance.  Covered by
only one 18 pdr the advance was successful and a dangerous situation averted.
The 50th Division moved east towards Merville and the line now contained four
fresh brigades instead of four weak ones.  The town of Merville on the right of the corps
sector was under threat from direct German attack and the retirement of the 51st and
50th Divisions on either side of it.  A gap was forming in front of the town which fell in
the late afternoon.  The way to Hazebrouck was now open, but the Germans hesitated in
order to loot the vast amount of stores held in the area.  Meanwhile during the night of
the 11/12th the 4th Guards Brigade, having been delayed by the late arrival of their
transport and the crowded condition of the roads, moved into position behind the
town.29  What remained of the 150th Brigade also moved into position behind the front
north of Merville.
Although units were very intermingled and headquarters were not always sure
where the line was, corps and divisional staffs were still in command.  By moving up
the reserves behind the front, brigade and battalion commanders were able to put them
to their best use.  The control in the front area had to be left to the commanders on the
spot.
Further reinforcements for XV Corps began to arrive during the 12th; the 5th
Division detrained west of the Nieppe forest and the 1st Australian Division arrived at
Hazebrouck.  The Cavalry Corps was ordered up to a position west of the forest to act as
a mobile reserve.  There was an idea of retaking Merville using the 5th Division
augmented by the 4th Guards Brigade but events moved too fast for this to become a
reality.  It was probably just as well; the troops were better used in defence of a line as
counter-attacks were usually expensive.  Also, the necessary artillery preparation would
have been difficult to organise, as no division in XV Corps seems to have been
operating with its own batteries, because divisions usually arrived with only infantry and
had to use whatever guns were available. This shows the inherent difficulty of command
in the mobile battle.
The 50th Division covering the way to Hazebrouck was told to hold out until it
could be relieved by the 5th which was moving along the southern edge of the forest in
                                                
29 The stand of the 4th Guards Brigade on the 12th/13th April is included later as an example of a unit
action
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anticipation of the counter-attack.  During the day the division was able to link up with
the Guards on its left and the 61st Division on the right.  The line south from the forest
was now much more secure.  However, the main German attack was directed against the
31st and 29th Divisions defending the line between the forest and Bailleul.  During the
day the left of this line was forced back pivoting on the Guards who held their position.
XV Corps was now running out of men and so RE Field Companies were put into the
line together with two composite battalions made up of stragglers, machine-gunners,
trench mortar batteries and ‘details’.  A gap, caused by the line being forced back, was
now widening in front of Meteren, the 34th Division on its left having no troops to spare
to cover it.  Again, the situation was saved by a division brought up from the south.  The
33rd Division, moved up on the 10th from First Army, had been allocated to IX Corps
on the left of XV Corps, and one of its brigades (19th) was moving towards Meteren.
The other two brigades (98th and 100th) were already acting as reserves to the 19th and
25th Divisions.  The first troops to arrive in the gap were two companies of  the
machine-gun battalion, under their commanding officer Lieut.-Colonel Seton
Hutchison.30  The guns were moved to a position on a ridge which gave a good field of
fire using a lorry ‘forcibly appropriated’31 as he later described:
In Meteren there stood an ASC motor-lorry column.  I requested the use
of a lorry, but the officer in charge refused it.  I hit him on the head with
the butt of my revolver, and instructed the driver, a bright young fellow
who rendered yeoman assistance to the Division during the ensuing days,
to drive off.32
Later in the day the machine-gunners were augmented by the 19th Brigade infantry, but
the division had to use its machine-guns instead of infantry fire-power, and only after
their commander had risked a court-martial.
Hutchison risked a second court-martial later in the day when he stopped a
battalion marching to the rear and ordered them to take up a line on the ridge, and again
he had to strike the commanding officer before he got his way.  Hutchison’s account of
the battle, and many others, often contain stories of retreating troops, while the Official
History says only that they ‘fell back’.  Perhaps the most vociferous was an Australian,
Lieut.-Colonel Joynt VC, who served with the 1st Australian Division.33  According to
                                                
30 The other two companies were with the infantry brigades.  Hutchison became an exponent of the tactical
use of the machine-gun after the war.  In his correspondence with Edmonds he did not think that the
Official Historian had given sufficient weight to the part played by them in the defence of Meteren.
31 Official History, 1918, Vol. II, p. 271.
32 Hutchison, GS, Warrior (London: Hutchinson, 1932), p. 239.
33 Joynt, W, Saving the Channel Ports (Melbourne, Aus.: Wren, 1978), see pp. 75 and 78 for examples.
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him all British officers were cowards and their men were hardly better; and of course,
they all had to be saved by the Australians.  Somewhere between the two lies the truth.
While the above may be true, they must surely have been the exception, otherwise the
Germans would have had an easy victory.  However, this does show what could be
achieved if unit commanders used their initiative.
This large bite taken out of the British line meant that Bailleul was now
threatened, but the 25th and 34th Divisions, although by now much reduced in strength,
were still holding the northern part of the line which was not attacked much during the
day.  The BEF could not spare any more divisions without endangering the line
elsewhere.  Although French help was on the way, the line would have to be held until
they could arrive.  Perhaps the only advantage the BEF had was that in many places they
now held the high ground.
During the 13th the Australians in XV Corps began to consolidate their line
behind the front held by the 31st and 29th Divisions.  German attacks were broken up
before they could start by combined small arms and artillery fire, but later in the day
sheer weight of numbers forced the defenders back onto the Australian line.  However,
this defence had enabled the Australians to choose their positions and reconnoitre the
ground.  The line was a series of posts and short trenches using what natural cover there
was as a disguise.  This was the last line of defence; ‘once we marched out from here
there would be no coming back and that in fact we were going to dig our graves.’34
The two divisions of  IX Corps, 34th and 25th, holding a salient from Bailleul to
Neuve Eglise, were by now much reduced in numbers but still subjected to attacks by
six German divisions.  Meanwhile, a second line was being organised by Major-General
Nicholson (34th Division) which ran from the Australians’ left along the ridge behind
Bailleul to Kemmel.  Again, groups of  stragglers, reinforcements and engineers were
formed into composite units - brigades or battalions depending on the numbers - which
were used to support the front-line troops.  In this sector a brigade sized unit was formed
under Brig.-General Wyatt which helped to man the rear line as the 25th Division
reserve.35  Wyatt’s Force was typical of these temporary amalgamations of engineers,
reinforcements, remnants of battalions and anyone else who could hold a rifle, that the
British formed during the battle. Usually placed in the reserve line, they were the formed
body of troops required to stop the front-line defenders passing over the rear lines.
                                                
34 Ibid., p. 70.  Verbal instructions to his company.
35 He was GOC 116th Brigade, 39th Div.
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On the morning of the 14th the whole front of XV Corps, from the Nieppe forest
to Strazeele, was held by the 1st Australian Division, except for their extreme right
where elements of the 4th Guards Brigade were still in the line.  Behind these defences
various defensive lines in front of Hazebrouck were being prepared by the 3rd
Australian Brigade and anyone who could hold a shovel.  As a mobile reserve the 2nd
Cavalry Division had come up to the west of Hazebrouck.  The Australian artillery had
not yet arrived and so they were covered by that of the 24th, 34th and 57th Divisions.36
The slightly higher ground behind the Australians gave this artillery good observation
and Joynt records that on being informed by one of his posts that ‘the Huns were
massing in front’ he then ‘rang up for the artillery and described where the Huns were.
Our artillery soon opened up and word came back immediately to the effect that the fire
was doing splendid work, shells bursting right over the Huns who had scattered.’37  This
was repeated all along the line which was to remain firm for the rest of  the battle.  The
thwarting of an attack on the Australian 3rd Battalion was described by their official
historian quoting a Corporal Turvey: ‘We saw miles of infantry slowly but surely goose-
stepping towards us, officers on grey horses riding up and down the column.’38  A
message was sent back to the artillery and the Germans were scattered.  On subsequent
days the same thing happened, as on the 17th:
Although the German officers could be seen leaping out of the trenches
and trying to induce their men to follow, the barrage of the defending
artillery and the fire of small arms was so intense that the German
infantry standing along the trenches would not leave shelter.39
This shows that even German infantry needed an artillery barrage to cover an advance.
                                                
36 Official History, 1918, Vol. II, p. 307 fn.
37 Joynt, Channel Ports, p. 85.
38 Bean, C, The Australian Imperial Force in France (Sydney, Aus.: University of Queensland Press,
1937), Vol. V, p. 466.
39 Ibid., p. 484-5.
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Meanwhile, the IX Corps front, which now included the town of Bailleul, was
attacked all day by the Germans, but without any success.  The corps front was defended
by troops of  the 33rd, 34th, 25th and 19th Divisions, but so intermingled had
formations become that the 34th Division was actually comprised of parts of  the 147th,
101st, 74th, 88th, 103rd, 7th, 75th, and 102nd Brigades.40  During the night the 34th
Division was moved back to the second line while its place was taken by two brigades
of the 59th Division (176th and 177th) which had been transferred from Ypres.
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Although muddled the position on the IX Corps front was on the 15th held in
depth, even if some divisions were not fighting with their own brigades.  The 33rd
Division was still holding the right of the corps line at Meteren, and in front of Bailleul
the 59th Division had now taken over the 34th Division front assisted by the 71st
Brigade (6th Division) in the 49th Division sector.  On the corps left the 19th Division
had 178th Brigade (59th Division), 108th Brigade (36th Division) and its own 58th
Brigade in the line, ‘well down the forward slope of the Ravetsberg ridge, under
observation from the enemy and movement was impossible’.41  In support were the tired
remains of the 19th, 34th and 49th Divisions.
French help had also started to arrive in the back areas, their 133rd Division
having begun to concentrate at Castre north-east of Hazebrouck on the 13th, while the
28th Division started to arrive west of Poperinghe on the 14th.  The next day the French
II Cavalry Corps arrived at Cassell north of Hazebrouck.
The Germans did not begin their attack on IX Corps until noon on the 15th when
the bombardment began, a high point known as Crucifix Hill receiving particular
attention.  Although gallantly defended by the 1/4th Lincolns they had to vacate it when
the 9th Norfolks on their left gave way allowing the Germans to enfilade the Lincolns.
The line then began to crumble; with their flank exposed the next battalion on the left,
the 2/5th Lincolns, had to retire to the second line.42
During the night the 176th Brigade, with no support on its left flank, retired
through Bailleul and the town was lost.  Thus the 34th Division was again in the front
line, but the presence of this manned second line had saved the day.  On one side of the
59th Division, the 33rd Division was not attacked but as a precaution manned a switch
line to the west of Bailleul when the 176th Brigade withdrew.  The brigades on the left
of Bailleul also withdrew to the second line, once a proposed counter-attack to recapture
the hill was abandoned.  The successful attack on the 1st Lincolns shows how
vulnerable the British line was, especially when the position being held had no natural
defence.  Edmonds recorded this dilemma:
The advisability of withdrawing north of Bailleul had been discussed, for
the line was of no tactical value; yet the Army commander was unwilling
to abandon it for reasons of morale.  If the enemy, disheartened by severe
losses and failures, found that the British were withdrawing not only
from the Ypres salient but also from Bailleul, he might regain his
                                                                                                                                  
40 Official History, 1918, Vol. II, p. 308.
41 Simpson, CR, History of the Lincolnshire Regiment 1914-18 (London: Medici, 1931), p. 321.
42 Ibid., pp. 321-2.
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confidence.43
The BEF had not fully realised the lesson the Germans had learned in a hard school:
give up a line of no tactical value for a better one and reduce casualties.
The pressure on the IX Corps line continued the next day (16 April), but the
enemy only had success on each flank.  The line in front of Meteren was held by the 4th
King’s with the 5th Scottish Rifles on the right and Tank Corps troops on the left, with
the 2nd New Zealand Entrenching Battalion in reserve.  When the 5th Tank Battalion44
fell back the left flank of the Kings was exposed and their C Company ‘practically
disappeared’.45  The battalion was obliged to fall back and the village was lost.  During
the fight two companies of New Zealanders were surrounded and 100 were captured, ‘a
number which by far exceeded the greatest aggregate total captured by the Germans in
any one action from the Division’.46  The village of Meteren held a key position on the
ridge and so a counter-attack by the 1st Middlesex to recapture it took place at 1 p.m.
Although they reached the village, they had to withdraw ‘as our guns were short
shooting’.47  According to Edmonds the Germans used tanks in this attack but none of
the regimental histories make any mention of  the appearance of enemy armour.48  In
contrast to the failure of the 33rd Division to hold Meteren the 34th Division on the left
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behind Bailleul was able to break up the German attack on its line by artillery fire before
it got started.
At the same time as they were having success at Meteren the Germans were
capturing the village of Wytschaete held by the 62nd Brigade.  Covered by a ground
mist two German divisions attacked the two front-line battalions, the 1/7th West Yorks
and the 1st Lincolns.  The battalions held out for as long as possible, both the regimental
historians quoted from brigade reports: ‘No officer, platoon post or individual
surrendered and the fighting was prolonged until 6.30 a.m.’49 and ‘On our extended
front they encountered the full force of the enemy attack on the morning of the 16th and
fought most gallantly until overwhelmed by superior numbers’.50  After capturing the
village ‘the enemy seemed contented with his gains and, though he maintained a heavy
fire, made no further effort to advance’51.  In a footnote to this remark Edmonds quotes
the German sources as saying that the Germans were concerned about not advancing
without artillery cover, a charge usually levelled at the British.
General Plumer decided to mount a counter-attack to recapture both Meteren and
Wytschaete with the assistance of the newly arrived French troops.  Both attacks turned
out to be operational disasters and did not augur well for future Anglo-French co-
operation.  The French 28th Division was to assist the 9th Division at Wytschaete and
the 133rd were to recapture Meteren.
The attack on Wytschaete was to take place in the evening of the 16th with the
British on the left and the French on the right.  During the afternoon there was much
contact between XXII Corps, 9th Division and the French, but the latter prevaricated
about when they would be ready.  As the GOC XXII Corps explained to Edmonds ‘I
shall never forget going to the French 28th Division headquarters at about 5 p.m. on the
16th and realising that they had either not issued the orders for the attack, or the orders
had not reached the troops - I could not make out which it was - and that all my plans
and études and combined orders had gone to pot!’52  In the event the French did not
attack, ‘although their higher command was under the impression that they had’.53  Even
so, the British set off at 7.30 p.m. and the South Africans and the 7th Seaforth
Highlanders reached the village and held out until the next day, they had to retire as
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there was no support on their flanks.  Godley was perhaps rather foolish to carry out this
counter-attack when he could not be sure of half his forces.
The Germans now decided to implement their Tannenberg scheme, a pincer movement
either side of Ypres.54  By the 17th the British line had come back almost to the walls of
the city, so part of the prize, the Ypres salient had been denied the enemy. The capture of
Ypres would be a great propaganda coup for the Germans, but more important tactically
were the Flanders Hills which gave excellent artillery observation of the whole plain.
The loss of the Messines - Wytschaete ridge and the continuing enemy pressure
south of Ypres placed the troops in the Salient in a precarious position. A German attack
would draw in reinforcements that the BEF could ill afford to commit, even if they
could be found.  Plumer had already thinned his line and sent divisions to the Somme
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during March and was holding the ground with the minimum of forces.  The defensive
schemes drawn up earlier in the year had taken into account the difficulty of holding this
ground and most of the Salient had been designated the forward zone.  An addendum to
OAD 291/29 dealing with the Flesquières and Ypres salients stated that ‘these salients
are unsuitable to fight a defensive battle in’.55  Plumer had to balance this against the
emotive giving of ground, especially in this area which had cost so many British lives
the previous year.
Edmonds said very little about the withdrawal from the Salient.  This reticence
seems strange considering the sheer detail of the rest of the volume.  It may be that he
wished to keep away from the emotive subject of Passchendaele, but in doing so he
missed a chance to comment on good staff work and generalship.  A number of
decisions were taken, starting on the 11th when the order was given to move back some
of the artillery.  That evening the clearing of the Salient started, not only of the guns, but
also the tons of ammunition dumped ready to feed them together with all the stores and
paraphernalia required by a modern army.  The forward zone with its defenders and the
minimum of artillery support was left as a thin crust, while the main body of the troops
prepared the new line.  On the 15 April Plumer gave the order for the Outpost garrison
to move back to the main line of resistance in front of Ypres.  General Harington,
Plumer’s MGGS, gives a touching picture of the scene in his biography of his ‘Chief’.56
He relates that Plumer was reluctant to give the order and was very affected by the
occasion.  During the night of the 15/16th the garrison of the forward zone moved back
to a position just in front of Ypres.  Although everyone would have been aware of the
sacrifices made in previous years in these few square miles of Flanders, few would have
any regrets at leaving that muddy wasteland, the Ypres salient being a posting that all
divisions dreaded.  The withdrawal was a complete success, being completed at 4 a.m.
when the last troops who were manning the outpost line moved back.
The British withdrawal wrong-footed the Germans and placed a great temptation
in their path.  The Germans, thinking they had the BEF on the run, decided to bring the
date of their attack forward to the 17th and to endeavour to separate the British and
Belgians.  However, this meant that they would only be able to use four of the eight
divisions allocated for the attack as two were busy following up the British and Belgians
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and two had not completely detrained.57  Also, on the 17th their artillery was still
building up its ammunition dumps for the bombardment.  So began what the Belgians
were to call the Battle of Merckem.
On the 27 March the Belgians had extended their line south, replacing the British
32nd Division with their 10th Division in the Bixschoote sector.  They had then moved
back a few thousand yards to comply with the British withdrawal from the Ypres salient,
the Ypres - Staden railway just south of Langemarck being the inter-army boundary.
The high water table meant that the ground was quite unsuitable for deep excavations
and many sections of trench were not splinter-proof due to the absence of a parados.
Occasional dug-outs from the old German front line were pressed into service, but of
course the doors faced the wrong way.  It would seem that the Belgians had followed the
British defensive doctrine and were organised as: a line of sentry posts, a line of isolated
strongpoints, a support trench line and a line of unfinished redoubts.
At dawn on the 17th the Germans bombarded the whole Belgian line and at 8
a.m. attacked from the cover of the Houthulst Forest with four divisions, without the
cover of mist, the two divisions, holding the southern six miles.
In the Bixschoote sector the front posts of the Belgian 10th Division were soon
overwhelmed, but the Germans were unable to exploit this success due to stout infantry
resistance from the support line and artillery fire from both Belgian and British (II
Corps) guns.  This fire and Belgian counter-attacks forced the Germans to retire and the
front line was regained.  The Germans had greater initial success against the 3rd
Division in the Merckem sector.  They broke through and took the strongpoint at Kippe
and began to fight their way down the support trench while keeping up a forward
pressure.  However, fire from the survivors and reserves located on higher ground
behind the line brought the attack to a standstill at about mid-day.  In the afternoon,
Belgian counter-attacks again retrieved the front line.
South of Ypres, the weight of the attack would fall on the 19th Division of XI
Corps, defending the Kemmel sector with 178th Brigade (59th Division) and a
composite force made up from its own 56th, 57th and 58th Brigades ‘co-ordinated’ by
Brigadier-General TA Cubitt.58  Behind these brigades, at the foot of Kemmel Hill, was
the Kemmel Defence Force of about 900 men commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Bousfield
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which had been assembled on the 12th.  The defenders had a number of trench systems
available to them.  Behind the front line, at a distance varying between 1 and 2000
yards, ran the Vierstraat line and a similar distance behind that the Cheapside line.  In
the northern part of the XXII Corps sector there was a further trench between these two
called the Voormezeele line.
The German bombardment of  the 19th Division started at 6 a.m. and fell mainly
on Kemmel Hill rather than the front line.  The infantry advance, which started at 8.30,
was met with artillery and small arms fire which held it.  At 10 a.m. the bombardment
switched to the British front line and an hour later another attack was mounted which
suffered a similar fate, as did a third attempt at 6.30 p.m.  According to Edmonds the
Germans claimed to have attacked again the next day (18th) at 4.30 a.m., but as there
were no British records of any fighting he concluded that the Germans troops jumping
off were hit by their own artillery.  Later an attack was mounted that came to nothing.
Over the next four days the hard pressed troops of IX Corps were replaced in the
line by the French.59  The British 19th, 25th and 34th Divisions were relieved by the
French 133rd, 34th and 28th Divisions although the British artillery remained as the
French guns had yet to arrive.
It was obvious to the Germans that something more than a quick bombardment
followed by a rush for the enemy trenches was required if the British or French were
going to be dislodged from their defensive positions in the Kemmel sector.  The German
doctrine was now collapsing.  So, there was a lull of five days while the Germans
brought up extra divisions, gave those in place a rest and stockpiled ammunition.  To
enhance their chances of success the crack Alpine Corps were brought up opposite
Kemmel.
The sector of front attacked in this second phase was held by three corps, one
French and two British.  The French XXXVI Corps comprised 28th, 34th, 133rd and
154th Divisions; XXII Corps (Lieut.-General Godley) 9th and 21st Divisions plus the
39th Division Composite Brigade; II Corps (Lieut.-General C Jacob) 6th, 36th and 41st
Divisions.  The British artillery was learning to keep hidden, most guns were silent only
firing during an attack, and the batteries were moved between day and night positions.60
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At 2.30 a.m. on the 25th April the French Army had its first experience of
Bruchmüller’s new artillery tactics.  In the area around Kemmel occupied by the French
28th Division they were successful in neutralising all the artillery.  Under cover of the
almost inevitable mist the infantry assault commenced at 6 a.m. after an hour long
bombardment of the front line, and one hour later the Lieb Regiment of the Alpine
Corps had reached the summit of Kemmel Hill.  The story was much the same all along
the French front and by 11 a.m. the Germans had halted at the Kemmelbeek stream in
the valley behind the hill under the protection of an artillery barrage.  The situation was
now serious, especially in the 28th Division sector; a breach 5,000 yards wide had been
made in the front and there were few reserves available to stem the German tide.  At 8
a.m. when it was realised that the front was in trouble, the reserve regiment of the 28th
Division, the 99th, was ordered to man the rear line running Locre - Scherpenberg - La
Clytte to join with the British.  The other two divisions were able to continue this line to
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the front near Bailleul with local reserves.  In the event the 99th Regiment was only able
to man the rear line from Locre to La Clytte and so for many hours a gap of about one
mile existed in the line.
The three divisions of XXII Corps had fully utilised the network of defences
available to them between their junction with the French and Ypres, and infantry was
disposed in depth all along the line.  Initially, even the 12th Royal Scots on the French
immediate left held the German advance and ‘subsequent assaults against the front of
the battalion were repulsed with enormous losses to the Boches, and the 12th Royal
Scots sent a cheerful message to Brig.-General Croft that all was well’.61  However, this
cheerfulness on the part of the Royal Scots was short-lived as the Germans began to roll
up the British front from the south.  Although they tried to form a flank with their
reserve company they were forced back to the Cheapside line and the battalion was
severely mauled, ‘by nightfall, after stragglers had come in, only 88 could be
mustered’.62  In the rear of the Royal Scots the 6th KOSB holding the southern part of
the Vierstraat line were soon under attack.  The forward two companies suffered heavily,
both losing their CO and adjutant early on; the remaining two companies fought their
way back to the Cheapside line where they joined the 9th KOYLI.63  In addition, two
companies of the 11th Royal Scots, the reserve of the 27th Brigade, and the 8th Black
Watch were sent to this critical part of the British line.
The next sector was held jointly by the 64th and 146th Brigades: 1/5th W Yorks,
1st E Yorks, 1/6th W Yorks, with the 1/7th W Yorks in reserve on the Vierstraat line
really only a company.64  During the morning the front line was penetrated in a number
of places by the Germans and the Yorkshire battalions began to break up.  In fact, by
mid-morning they had been reduced to platoon sized groupings as their casualty figures
show. The 1/6th W Yorks and 1st E Yorks could only muster on the Cheapside line 29
and 46 officers and men respectively,65 while the 1/5th W Yorks starting the day with
602 officers and men was reduced to 24.66  To the left of these Yorkshiremen, the
northern limit of the German attack, the Scots of the 26th Brigade held the line and
threw a protective flank on their right which held.67
                                                
61 Ewing, Royal Scots, p. 632.
62 Official History, 1918, Vol. II, p. 418.
63 Gillon, S, The King’s Own Scottish Borderers in the Great War (London: Nelson, 1930), p. 372.
64 Wyrall, West Yorkshire Regiment, Vol. II, p. 264.
65 Official History, 1918, Vol. II, p. 419.
66 Wyrral, West Yorkshire Regiment, Vol. II, p. 266.
67 Official History, 1918, Vol. II, p. 420.
113
In summary, the day had not gone too badly for the British, for while the front
line had been lost the support lines were still intact.  In the north, the Vierstraat Line
became the front line, but in the south the situation was not so good as the front line was
now the Cheapside line with its right in the air because of the gap between the 9th
KOYLI and the French.  This gap was probably the best opportunity the Germans had
had since the crushing of the Portuguese two weeks before.  By exploiting it they would
have been in the immediate rear of the Cheapside line, with every chance of widening
the breach still further and rolling up a whole section of the British front.  The reason for
the Germans’ failure to seize this chance was fear of counter-attack; also the troops were
also under orders ‘not to go forward to their final objective until the artillery had been
brought up’.68  This a far cry from the spirit of 21 March.  Clearly the Germans were
becoming much more cautious probably due to the stiffer British resistance and their
casualties to date.
The German fear of a counter-attack was not groundless, since plans to recover
the lost positions were put in motion as soon as Kemmel Hill was lost.  The French 39th
Division, moving up from the south,  was to co-operate with the 25th Division which
had received reinforcements, and attack at 5.30 p.m.  This may have been French
bravado as the division was some 13 miles away west of Poperinghe.  Although it
started to move at 10.30 a.m. it was still six miles away at 2.30 and so the attack was
postponed until the following day.  Even British divisions moved slowly and the 25th
did not pass under French orders until the late afternoon when, with the 147th Brigade
of the 49th Division which had also been moved up, it closed the gap which had been
left open by the French.
The muddle continued throughout the night with the objectives of the 25th
Division being changed three times.  In addition to the advance by the troops under
French command the troops of XXII Corps holding the Cheapside line were to advance,
presumably to recapture the lost portion of the Vierstraat line.  To add to the general
confusion it rained heavily all night.  The advance of the 25th Division commenced at 3
a.m. with the 7th Brigade on the left, 74th on the right and the 75th in support.  The
experience of the 3rd Worcesters, 74th Brigade, was typical of the front battalions.
The darkness, the rain and mud made the going so difficult that there was
no possibility of keeping up with the barrage.  Presently the stumbling
troops reached the line of the Kemmelbeek stream; which was found to
be a serious obstacle, the banks being very steep.  Down one bank,
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through the stream, and up the other bank, the platoons struggled as best
they could in the dark and the rain.69
On the left of  the 25th Division the troops moved forward, but with no touch on
either flank in the darkness, fog and rain they were forced to return to their starting
points.  The French 39th Division had hardly moved at all and their experience is best
summed up by their official history as quoted by Edmonds:
From the very moment it started its advance struck against infantry
strong in numbers and well provided with machine-guns; it hardly did
more than pass through the exhausted medley of units holding the front
and establish a solid line south-east of the Scherpenberg.70
Edmonds attributed the failure of the counter-attack to ‘bad staff arrangements, poor
artillery support, and the lack of drive exhibited by the French infantry’.71  To this might
be added the atrocious weather and attacking at night with inexperienced troops.  Yet.
Despite this, the 25th Division had managed to reach its objective.  Again Lieut.-
General Godley was not impressed.  He wrote after the war to Edmonds ‘after April
25th when they lost Kemmel, they let us down even worse; when after more études and
conferences, they were to retake Kemmel Hill and we were to retake Kemmel Village.
They never even started and my 25th Division re-took Kemmel Village and then had to
come out of it again owing to their right flank being left open by the French.’72
To the south the French 154th Division was able to hold a series of attacks
against its line.  Similarly a morning attack against Voormezeele was driven off and
even when the intensity of the bombardment was increased in the afternoon the line
held.
The Germans successfully attacked the southern part of the Ypres outpost line,
which alarmed Second Army sufficiently that the order was given to withdraw to the
line of resistance close up to the city ramparts which was accomplished during the night
of the 26/27th.
The Germans had one more try to break the Allied line between Bailleul and
Ypres, known as the battle of Scherpenberg.  After two days of preparations, of which
the Allies were aware from interrogating prisoners and deserters, the barrage opened at 3
a.m. on the 29 April, to be answered immediately by a counter-barrage.  Even so the
German infantry moved off at 5.40.  Their only success in the British sector was against
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the 89th Brigade which comprised three battalions of the Liverpool Regiment, which
had come up on the night of the 27/28th and manned the line around Voormezeele.  The
17th King’s were forced back to the main line of resistance from the Voormezeele
switch, although not before two companies had been surrounded and captured, but again
the Germans did not follow.  The other two battalions (18th and 19th) kept the Germans
at bay mostly by small arms fire as their communications with the artillery had been cut
by the bombardment.73
The French line was again broken by the Alpine Corps, despite heavy artillery
and small-arms fire.  Alarm was then spread by the French command, claiming the loss
of Mount Rouge and the Scherpenberg.  A personal recognisance by Brig.-General
Craigie-Halkett (74th Brigade) showed that the hills were unoccupied by either side.
Although the 31st Division were called forward to assist the French, the latter were able
to put their own house in order and a counter-attack pushed back the Germans almost to
their starting point.  With this poor German performance the Battles of the Lys rather
petered out.  Except for the tank battle at Villers Bretonneux on 24 April, this was the
last German attempt to break the British line
The battle had been a severe trial for all levels of the BEF.  On a number of occasions
the Germans had been within an ace of breaking the British front; on the 12th they
might have pushed forward to Hazebrouck and on the 27th an exploitable gap was
available at Kemmel.  These two missed opportunities must be added to the might-have-
beens of history.  Hazebrouck railway junction was a key part of the British supply
network and the Flanders Hills were the gateway to Ypres.  While the latter was of no
strategic value, the name was known to everyone and its capture would have had
enormous propaganda value for the Germans.
The British had used nearly half their divisions in the battle.  Of about 60 divisions in
the BEF, 27 were to be involved on the Lys.74  On the 9 April there were 18 divisions
between the La Bassée Canal and the Belgians in the line or reforming.  Of these only
four had not already been involved in the fighting (29th, 49th, 55th and the 2nd
Portuguese), while 14 had been re-built or were in the process of doing so.  During the
battle nine divisions were moved up from south of the canal, of these six were fresh.
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The divisions brought in were usually formed up behind the front and the line
allowed to come to them, thus the difficult manoeuvre of a relief during a battle was
avoided.  Of course, there were exceptions; parts of the 61st Division were put straight
into the line when they arrived because that was where they were needed.  Once
committed to the battle divisions and brigades were often broken up and used
piecemeal, rather than being used as complete formations or units.  For example, the
51st Division, which was the reserve of XI Corps, had the 152nd Brigade under corps
orders,75 while 154th Brigade was put under the command of 55th Division on the 9th.76
Thus for a while the divisional commander, Major-General Carter-Campbell, had only
one brigade under his command.  There was no reason why the division should not have
fought under its general, being next to the 55th in the line.  Even Edmonds was critical
of this, commenting ‘It would have probably have been better to have employed his
division as a whole.’77  The fault seems to have been with the corps, ‘they thought all
they had to do was move brigades about.’78
There is much evidence that the Germans had problems with logistics, as they
did not attack on the whole front, but instead worked their way from south to north,
pausing to bring up ammunition.  Also, the Germans’ transport arrangements were very
bad and the condition of the animals was poor’.79  These difficulties were compounded
by the numerous damaged bridges over the Lys and its canals.80  Added to this was the
continuous attacks by the RAF on any target behind the German lines.
A study of the way the German advance was stopped may give a clue to fighting
the defensive battle with few reserves.  The key was firepower, especially artillery,
coupled with a good position.  However, on occasions this was not enough, as by sheer
weight of numbers the Germans were able to break through the front line.  But they
were then stopped by another requirement - a rear defensive line.  This often bought
sufficient time for reserves to be brought up and the German advance to be stopped.
They then had the problem of getting the battle mobile again, which was never properly
achieved.  This would not have worked as a front-line defence as the German artillery
firepower was then superior.  The intangible factor in all this was the morale of the
troops on both sides.  Lack of success coupled with heavy casualties seem to have
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dampened the Germans’ enthusiasm and made them more cautious, whereas the British
determination to see the battle through to the end must have helped.
When the Germans reached the British back areas they entered a land of milk
and honey.  Accounts of the fighting on the Somme usually quote Rudolf Binding’s
description of the looting of Albert and there was a repeat performance on the Lys.81
The problem is to ascertain how widespread this was.  Most examples come from the
Merville district which was used by the BEF as a depot and hospital area.  Two of
Edmonds’ correspondents specifically mentioned intoxicated Germans in their accounts.
Captain PW Clark related how a captured German gave the information that the Grand
Place in Estaires was full of his countrymen sleeping off the effects of their looting, so
the British artillery was turned on them.82  Two Germans singing at the tops of their
voices staggered into the 5th Division’s line after having found the ‘EF Canteen and its
whisky’.83  From the German side, Westman related how the troops ‘had found huge
depots of wines and spirits, and each man had taken a bottle of whisky or the like, and
had constantly sipped it as though it was lemonade’.84  As a doctor Westman also
marvelled at the quantity and quality of the medical stores he came across, even such
seemingly mundane items as cotton bandages, gauze and rubber gloves being worthy of
comment.  What the Germans may have found was the quartermaster’s rum store.85  In
the front line - when the divisional commander allowed it - the men were given a tot of
rum at stand-to.  Taking into account the number of men involved there must have been
thousands of gallons in storage.86
Not all the looting was done by the Germans.  The Chateau at La Motte au Bois
north of Merville was used as a corps and divisional headquarters as described in
chapter 5.  The owner, Baroness de la Grange, moved to Paris in early March where she
received news that her ‘treasures’ were in danger; accompanied by Lieut.-General de
Lisle (GOC XV Corps) she visited her home to retrieve the contents of her safe.
Thinking to reward the XV Corps staff with some of her famous 1808 brandy she found
that the wine cellar was bare.87  The culprits must have worn khaki as the chateau
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enormous amount of liquor stored for their consumption.
86 A rough calculation gives a daily consumption of about 100 gallons.
87 Grange, Baroness de la, Open House in Flanders (London: Murray, 1929).
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remained in Allied hands for the whole war.
Of course, these tales of drunkenness made good anecdotes, but the real find for
the German soldiers was something much more mundane, food.  As they penetrated the
back areas they found the BEF’s larder, huge stores of tinned goods, white bread and
fresh meat.  By 1918 Germany was really hungry, as a combination of the Royal Navy’s
blockade and the deteriorating condition of the country’s rolling stock meant that
imports had ceased and supplies from the East could not be moved to the cities.  Even
though the troops received the best, their rations were poor compared with the British,
between three and four thousand calories per day.88  It should also be remembered that
young men eat enormous amounts, as anyone with teenage sons will testify.
Middlebrook quotes a number of German soldiers’ complaints about their rations and
stories of pilfered food.89  While it is not unusual for soldiers to consider the army’s
property their own, they would have to have been hungry to bother with ‘winning’ bread
and potatoes.  These letters also show that the Germans expected to find food and drink
and there is evidence that the looting was organised as well as opportunistic.  Colonel-
General von Eunem, GOC Third Army, said at the end of June after the offensives
against the French, ‘One motive for the bravery of our infantry in this attack is the lust
for plunder.’  A guards division suggested the formation of a ‘booty platoon’ in every
battalion to prevent arbitrary actions while securing the spoils for the battalion in
question.90
The British troops on the other hand were very well fed.  In the front line it was
mainly bully beef and biscuits, but also available were tinned stew, bacon and jam.  To
drink there was tea and cocoa, not insipid brown powder but whole beans roasted,
crushed, mixed with sugar and arrowroot pressed and stamped out in large thick slabs.91
For smokers there seems to have been a never ending supply of ‘gaspers’.92  As if this
were not enough some men and certainly many officers received parcels from home and
in back areas many French women with a few chickens made a living selling ‘egg and
chips’.  Of course, institutional food soon becomes boring but there were few
complaints from the British side about hunger and often men fed better in the army than
they did at home.
                                                
88 Anon., German Army Handbook April 1918 (London: Arms & Armour Press, 1977).
89 Middlebrook, The Kaiser’s Battle, pp. 61-2 and 359.
90 Deist, W, ‘The Military Collapse of the German Empire’, War in History, Vol. 3, No.2, (1996), p. 200.
91 Probably Royal Naval in origin, known to them as ‘kye’.
92 According to contemporary newspapers tobacco could be sent to the troops duty-free.
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The breakdown in discipline in the German Army is usually considered to have
started with the looting during the Spring Offensives.  Although some disaffection had
started during the preceding winter the morale of the troops was high and the training
and preparations for the battle made them expect great things.  When all that
materialised was a lot of casualties for no strategic gain the rot began to set in.  In fact,
the Germans gained nothing from their offensives against the British except a lot of
territory they did not need, a longer front and no shelter equivalent to the strong
defensive lines they had left.
The issuing of OAD291/29 was not the last directive to be issued by GHQ on defence.
On the 19 April, General Foch issued a directive on the defensive battle.93  In it he
insisted on a foot by foot defence organised in two lines ‘using a series of defensive
organisations and numerous and powerful artillery’.  The counter-attack troops were not
to be just thrown in as this was usually a dead loss.  Rather they should be a separate
body with objectives and artillery support.  Reserve troops were to be ready to man the
second line to ‘ensure that troops retiring are stopped there’.  This does pre-suppose that
the BEF has sufficient troops to form these counter-attack and reserve formations.
This directive was sent by General Horne to his subordinates on 21 April. In a
later letter to Lieut.-General Maxse (XVIII Corps) he reinforced these principles
pointing out that the ground occupied was to be held, although the front line could be
manned lightly while the main garrison should hold the rear defensive lines.  In addition
the front was to be protected by ‘well organised artillery and machine-gun barrages’.94
Meanwhile, in May 1918 GHQ published SS210 The Division in Defence which
was reinforced by a memorandum from Haig to his army commanders dated 7 June.95
Like OAD291/29, SS210 lays down principles rather than practical advice and there is
ample evidence that it was prepared before the spring battles.  The use of ‘forward’
rather than ‘outpost was changed in January 1918,96 yet on page 20 ‘outpost’ was used
when describing the disposition of troops.  These dispositions refer to twelfths of the
infantry in the division and not ninths as one would expect in May 1918 after the
infantry re-organisation.  Yet tantalisingly the disposition shows one brigade in forward
                                                
93 Official History, 1918, Vol. II, p. 519-20.
94 IWM, Horne MSS, 73/60/2: Horne - Maxse, 9 May 1918.  A note about the directive was pencilled on
the letter.
95 IWM, Dawnay MSS, 69/21/6: Memorandum on Defensive Measures, 7 June 1918.
96 Official History, 1918, Vol. I, p. 42.
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zone, one on the main line of resistance and one in the battle zone.  The memo gives
two lessons to be learned from the recent fighting; the forward zone should be one mile
in front of the main battle position and that when an attack was likely men should be
withdrawn from the forward zone although it should be able to withstand large raids.
Both SS210 and the memo were clear that there should be no retirement without orders
from above; the memo states that: ‘It remains as true as ever that for all troops actually
allotted to the defence of any position, there is, subject to any orders which they may
receive from superior authority, only one degree of resistance, and that is to the last
round and to the last man’.  On the other hand it points out the importance of
commanders knowing which positions may be given up; although this might appear a
contradiction it means that front-line commanders were beginning to be allowed some
flexibility.  Thus, GHQ were learning the error of packing the front line.  It is probable
that SS210 was prepared soon after OAD291/29, but edited before publication in May.
In October 1918 GHQ issued a version of SS196 Diagrams of Field Defences
which shows that the BEF had learned  to move the main line of resistance to the rear.97
The layout was very much like that used by De Lisle at Arras on 28 March.   The front
system was to comprise two lines; the first, a line of posts or shell holes wired round
with continuous wire in front; the second, 150-300 yards behind was to comprise a
trench with Lewis gun support posts also with wire in front.  The main line of resistance
was to be 1000-4000 yards behind and similar to the front system, but with machine-
guns in front firing direct.  As the war ended one month later it was, of course, untested.
The BEF did learn one practical lesson from the March fighting which was
applied on the Lys,  that is, that troops falling back will not rally on a prepared line
unless it is manned.  In addition, they found it was often a waste to slot reserve divisions
into the battle where the position may have been a poor one for defence.  Better to man a
good defensive position behind the front and allow the troops to fall back onto it.
When the troops had been pushed out of their defence zones they lost the use of
the communication system that had been built up over the previous three years.  All the
levels of the command structure from the front-line dugout to GHQ were connected by a
telegraph and telephone system.  Commanders had become very used to this very simple
and safe method of communicating with their adjacent levels in the hierarchy.  Wireless
sets had become much more reliable and less cumbersome and were used to supplement
the telephone from brigade upwards.  However, the RFC and the RA made the greatest
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tactical use of this new invention; one of the original uses for aircraft was artillery
spotting and it was by now quite usual for the RFC to direct artillery shoots using
wireless calls.98  On the ground, the destructive power of  both sides’ artillery meant that
overhead (air) lines were useless anywhere near the front, and so, much work had been
put into buried cables, command posts and telephone exchanges.  The point where these
cables came up to the surface and were thus more vulnerable were one of the main
targets of the German bombardment.  The First and Second Armies were perhaps better
served by these buried cables as they were often laid as a preliminary to a major battle.
Edmonds specifically mentions the system around Messines laid for the offensive there
in 1917.  The BEF became reliant on this buried system: ‘It is impossible to
overestimate the value of direct verbal and telegraphic communications between
infantry and artillery and between commanders during battle: it engenders confidence.’99
This ability to communicate was the cement that held the components of the
BEF’s weapons system together.  Once broken, the fighting ability of the higher
formations degraded into a large number of independent small units and orders took
hours to reach their destination, and were usually out of date by the time they arrived,
while commanders had little idea of what was happening at the front.  For example, the
shell that destroyed the headquarters of the Portuguese Corps at dawn on 9 April
contributed as much to the confusion as the retreating troops.  Confusion did not
necessarily require a break in the wires.  The air/artillery co-operation broke down
during the retreat of the Fifth Army, since many batteries did not erect their aerials when
they halted and consequently zone calls from aircraft observers went unheeded, which
resulted in some bad feeling.100  Once away from the buried system the divisions were
‘dependant on the mobile field equipment of signal units: the telephone system which
could be provided was restricted and precarious’.101  However, the signal units managed
to keep things stitched together.  Cable sections worked at night ‘competing with
unforeseen moves of divisional HQ’.102  The war diaries of these signal units tell the
story in more detail.  For example, the 31st Division signals were moved forty miles on
the 10th and spent the next four days keeping the lines open between  corps, division
and the infantry and artillery brigades, although it took three days to get everything
                                                                                                                                  
97 General Staff, Diagrams of Field Defences, IWM/Battery Press Reprint (SS196).
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99 PRO CAB 45/123: HEW Edwards (IX Corps Signals) to Edmonds.
100 Jones HA, The War in the Air, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934), Vol. IV, p. 358-9.
101 PRO CAB 45/123: R Chevenix-Trench to Edmonds.
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connected together as the lines were continuously broken by shell-fire.103
The casualty figures for the Spring Offensives give the lie to the myth that the defender
suffers less than the attacker.104  The Allies lost 330,000 men between 21 March and 30
April, while the corresponding figure for the Germans was 348,000.105  However, the
British figures contain 76,000 men who were made prisoner, while many German
wounded would return to fight later in the year.  For the Lys, Edmonds gave the British
figure of 82,000, no German figures being available.  Thus as far as casualties were
concerned, the Spring Offensives were no different from the other Great War battles;
both sides lost about the same number of men.  One of the highest British unit casualty
figures was that of the 4th Guards Brigade, 1451 out of 2020 who went into battle.  This
action will be looked at in the next chapter.
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123
Chapter 5
THE 4TH GUARDS BRIGADE AND THE DEFENCE OF
HAZEBROUCK
n his despatch of 20 July 1918, which describes the fighting on the Lys, Sir Douglas
Haig wrote:
    The performance of all troops engaged in this most gallant stand, and
especially that of the 4th Guards Brigade, on whose front of more than
4000 yards the heaviest attacks fell, is worthy of the highest praise.  No
more brilliant exploit has taken place since the opening of the enemy's
offensive, though gallant actions have been without number.1
This chapter will analyse in detail the action referred to by Haig, and it will be used to
see how prepared one unit was for mobile warfare.
Before moving onto the battle itself, it is worth looking at the topography which
has changed little in the past eighty years.  The area is roughly one mile square, the
north-western edge being the Bois d'Aval, part of the Nieppe forest, even today very
dense woodland.  In the north-east corner is the village of Vieux Berquin.  The western
edge is the river Bourre, at the time used for barge traffic between the Lys and
Hazebrouck, about ten feet wide and crossed in the north by a lifting bridge called Pont
Tournant, which was only replaced in 1990, probably the last survivor of the battle.
There was a lock adjacent to Pont Tournant and a footbridge further downstream of
which nothing remains today.  The eastern edge is a straight road that runs between
Estaires and Vieux Berquin.  In the south is the Plate Becque stream about four feet
wide and crossed by two bridges.  The country is very flat, crossed by drainage ditches
and highly cultivated with many small farms.  In 1918, there were orchards attached to
the farms and the remnants are still visible today.  Except for the farm buildings there
are no natural defensive positions.
The regimental histories often refer to places as hamlets, but even this may be
considered a little too grandiose, as they are really two or three farms grouped near each
                                                
1 Boraston, J, Sir Douglas Haig’s Despatches (London: Dent, 1920), p. 227.
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other.  The only habitation of any size is Caudescure which boasts a church and café.
The road between Neuf Berquin and Vieux Berquin is now one continuous
development; places such as Pont Rondin and La Couronne are not identified.  The town
of Merville is visible from most of the area; for most of the war it had been a rest and
stores centre.  Like most of the area, much of it was destroyed during this and
subsequent fighting.
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According to an account of the battle written by Major Trappes-Lomax many of
the place names on the Royal Engineers map used at the time were incorrect.2  The farm
where the Grenadiers set up their headquarters during the night of 11/12th is named
Gars Brugghe; this is not a place name at all, but describes the tract of land between the
main road and the forest, the correct name being Ferme Gombert.  To confuse matters
this name is given to the farm to the south of Verte Rue which was actually called Ferme
Beaulieu, the name given to the farm some 1000 yards to the west where the Grenadiers
spent the night of 12/13th.  All this was determined by officers returning to the scene of
the battle during the early 1930's.  In keeping with the other published sources the
following narrative will use the ‘traditional’ place-names.  Reference to the French
Institut Géographique National (IGN) map of the area produces some more mysteries.
The large house called L'Epinette which figures in the Coldstream story is shown as a
château and the name L'Epinette refers to the cross-roads between Caudescure and Les
Puresbecques.  During a visit to the battlefield in 1991 the author spoke to the lady who
lived in the house.  Apparently L'Epinette was the name of a café at the southern end of
Arrewage of which there is no trace today.  Some of the names of other landmarks
sound suspiciously like cafés i.e. la Couronne - The Crown.  Le Collège to which the
brigade were supposed to advance on the 12th is an imposing ecclesiastical building
even today; in those days it stood on its own, but now Merville has surrounded it.
The 4th Guards Brigade was commanded by Brig.-General Hon. LJP Butler who had
recently taken over from Brigadier-General Lord Ardee, the latter having been badly
gassed.  The three battalions in the brigade were the 4th Grenadier, 3rd Coldstream and
2nd Irish Guards, who were commanded by Lieut.-Colonels WS Pilcher, F Longueville
and HRLG Alexander3 respectively.
The brigade was resting in billets some twenty miles away near Tinques, when
the German assault on the Lys commenced.  On the 10 April there was a full ceremonial
inspection of all three battalions by the GOC 31st Division, Major-General Bridgford,4
at the football ground in Tinques.  The brigade war diary reports that he expressed great
                                                
2 Grenadier Guards Archives: The 4th Guards Brigade in Front of Hazebrouck, Major T Trappes-Lomax,
(1935).
3 Later Field Marshal Earl Alexander of Tunis.
4 He was sacked shortly after the battle. NAM, Bridgford MSS, 9204-174: Manuscript account.
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admiration for the smart appearance of all ranks.5  Later that day orders were received
that they were to be moved by London busses from Tinques, sixty kilometres in a semi-
circle to a position north of Merville.6  In the confusion their busses were twelve hours
late, so the troops had to spend a tiring night by the roadside waiting and had no proper
breakfast, as the cookers had already gone with the transport.  Such was the situation on
the roads, crowded with refugees and retreating troops, that the journey to their
destination took ten hours.
A staff car met the column and took the brigadier-general and the brigade-major,
Captain Oliver Lyttleton,7 to see the GOC XV Corps, Lieut.-General Sir Beauvoir de
Lisle, at his headquarters in a château at La Motte, a small village on the northern edge
of the Bois d'Aval, leaving Lieut.-Colonel Alexander in command of the brigade.  Here
they were appraised of the latest German successes and the supposed position of British
troops in the area, although precise information was scarce.  The General was aware of
the gap between the 29th and 50th Divisions around the village of Vieux Berquin, which
included the important Estaires - Hazebrouck road.  The 4th Guards Brigade were the
only troops available to plug this gap, and so they were instructed to deploy as quickly
as possible to deny the enemy the route to the important town of Hazebrouck and thence
the road to the sea.  Most sources are agreed that the corps commander's parting words
were something like ‘unless you do something before morning there will be no more fox
hunting’.8  The brigadier-general and the brigade-major then left at about 6.15 p.m. to
walk the four miles to the brigade debussing point at Strazeele, about a mile north of
Vieux Berquin.
At about this time Lieut.-General de Lisle also issued an order that ‘no
retirement must be made without an order in writing, signed by a responsible officer,
who must be prepared to justify his action before a court-martial’9.  How much this
affected thinking during the battle is not known.
The brigade debussed during the evening of the 11th at Strazeele where they met
up with their transport and marched to Le Paradis just south of the Hazebrouck -
Bailleul railway, about one mile north of Vieux Berquin, arriving at about 9.30 p.m.
While moving south intelligence was received from stragglers moving to the rear that
                                                
5 PRO WO 95/1225: War Diary, 4th Guards Brigade, 9 April 1918.
6 Some accounts say lorries.
7 Created Viscount Chandos of Aldershot in 1954.
8 He was a keen fox hunter and polo player.
9 PRO WO 95/1226: 4th Battalion Grenadier Guards,  Staff ride document (undated).
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the enemy was advancing up the road from Neuf Berquin and so No. 1 Company of the
Coldstream under Captain JAC Whitaker was sent forward to Vieux Berquin to cover
the important cross roads there.10  At about midnight Brigadier-General Butler called a
conference of his battalion commanders and gave orders for the disposition of their
troops.  The Coldstream were to be on the right, the Grenadiers on their left with the
Irish Guards in reserve.  There are some differences between the sources about these
positions, it would seem that the original positions were chosen at the conference and
then changed by a later message.11  The line had to be chosen from the map there being
no time for reconnaissance.  The No 2 Company Irish Guards, under Captain Bambridge
was sent down the Strazeele - Neuf Berquin road to act as an advanced guard for the
brigade.12  The 12th Battalion Kings Own Yorkshire Light Infantry were ordered by
division, on the evening of the 11th, to cover the cross-roads at La Couronne to Bleu and
endeavour to gain touch with the 95th Brigade on their left flank.  12 KOYLI were a
New Army battalion, originally called the Halifax Pals, who were the pioneer battalion
of the 31st Division.  They were moved into the line to support the hard pressed infantry
and had been practising in musketry for the previous weeks.  152 Brigade Royal Field
Artillery, who were actually part of the 34th Division, had their 18 pdr batteries south of
the Bois d'Aval.  A Forward Observation Officer, Lieut. Lewis, was established with his
telephone link at the Grenadier Guards battalion HQ. This was all the artillery support
the brigade would have during the next two days.  The brigade trench mortar battery was
left at Strazeele and are not heard of until the afternoon of the 13th.  At some time two
sections (8 guns) of the 31st Division Machine Gun Battalion were placed under the
command of the brigade.
There were other British troops in front of the 4th Guards Brigade line. The
remnants of the 150th Brigade were north of Les Puresbecques, while to the west of
them 149th Brigade held a line from Vierhouck to Genet Corner. The OC of the 1/6th
Northumberland Fusiliers (149th Brigade), Major Temperley, sent a message to the
brigade: ‘I am holding on alright [sic] round VIERHOUCK with about 50 to 60 men.
Could hold them up with help. Troops all round have retired.’13
                                                
10 Lieut. (Acting Captain) JAC Whitaker, wounded and captured during the advance on the morning of the
12th.
11 PRO WO 95/1226: 3rd Battalion Coldstream Guards, Messages, BMS169, Brigade to Battalions, 12
April.
12 Captain GC Bambridge, wounded in the leg on the 12th.
13 PRO WO 95/1226: Coldstream messages.
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The Germans were also making their preparations; in all ten battalions of
infantry plus numerous field-guns would attack the three Guards battalions over the next
two days.  The German 87th Brigade (35th Division) were to advance up the Neuf
Berquin to Vieux Berquin road with the objective of capturing the latter; it proposed to
use all its three regiments - 141st, 176th and 61st - in the attack.  To the west the
German 16th Brigade (8th Division) was to capture the Bois d'Aval and thence to
Hazebrouck.  Two of its regiments were to be used in the attack - 72nd and 93rd - with
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the 153rd in reserve.
The position was by no means ideal.  No-one had any idea where the front line
lay or the strength of the enemy and what, if any, troops were on the brigade flanks.  A
shortage of tools meant that the troops were insufficiently dug in when dawn broke and
again no breakfasts had been received.  The lack of tools was to cause serious problems
over the next two days.
After a dark cold night, the 12th broke fine and clear with a sky full of enemy
observation balloons which were to give the RAF some good sport, five being downed
in the Merville sector alone.14  Immediately the Germans attacked in great numbers
along the whole front with artillery and machine-gun support.  Their attack first fell on
the remains of the 149th and 150th Brigades who were exhausted, having been in action
and retreating since the 10th.  Before 9.00 a.m. the 150th Brigade was forced back to the
north-west by the German 93rd Regiment, leaving the way clear to the Coldstream,
where their progress was halted. The 1/6th Northumberland Fusiliers put up a splendid
resistance against the German 72nd Regiment and held on until between 10.00 and
10.30 a.m. when their ammunition ran out and they were forced to surrender.  The 1/4th
and 1/5th Northumberland Fusiliers were forced back through the Grenadier’s lines,
where some of them stayed, by the German 141st Regiment.  At 9.00 a.m. the Germans
established a line some 400 yards from No. 2 Company of the Grenadiers.
Meanwhile, at dawn the Guards began to assess their situation, Captain Pryce15
on the Grenadier’s left flank reported that: ‘It will not be possible to get a line better
than the present one, which is bad, without going right in front of the village or
demolishing several buildings which would entail much labour and could only be done
by night.’16  Patrols from both front battalions were sent out to form an outpost line,  but
were fired on by the Germans and had to retire back to the main line of resistance.  The
Germans then began to consolidate their position in front of the Guards’ line before
mounting an attack.
                                                
14 Smith Jr, M, World War I in the Air (Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, 1977), pp. 239-40.
15 Captain TT Pryce, killed on the 13th.
16 Grenadier Guards Archive.  Pryce message timed at 8 a.m. All Pryce’s messages are from this source.
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At 8.20 a.m. 31st Division telephoned Brigadier-General Butler and informed
him that troops of 50th Division were reported between Vierhouck and Pont Rondin and
also on the south bank of the River Bourre, mid-way between Merville and Les
Puresbecques, and that Les Puresbecques was unoccupied.  The order was given for the
4th Guards Brigade to secure a line from Le Collège to the road junction south of Genet
Corner and prevent movement along the Neuf Berquin road.  Brigadier-General Butler
had a problem.  While his instructions from the corps commander were quite explicit, to
plug the gap until the Australians arrived, he must also have been aware that the brigade
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had not joined with other troops on either flank.  His next step was very sensible.  He
visited his battalion commanders to obtain first hand information about the situation.
While walking between the battalion HQ he heard the sound of the German attack, and
his discussions with the two front-line battalion commanders confirmed this.
The plan was for the Coldstream and Grenadiers to advance at 11.00 a.m. to their
objective with two companies of the Irish Guards in echelon on the right flank to give
protection and try to link up with the 50th Division,17 while 152nd Brigade RFA was to
put down a barrage on the Neuf Berquin - Merville road.18  It would seem that
Brigadier-General Butler gave verbal orders to his battalion commanders who passed
them on to the companies by written message.  There is ample evidence that some of
these messages either did not arrive or were late.  For example, a Coldstream message
began ‘Your message only reached me at 11.15 a.m. owing to orderly being wounded’.19
Captain Pryce’s message was also late in arriving; he reported to his adjutant ‘Your SD7
received at 11.5 a.m. Am moving at 11.15’.  All this was confirmed after the war.
Captain Whitaker, OC No. 1 Company, Coldstream Guards, wrote to Edmonds that ‘No.
1 Company was the only one to attack as the others did not receive the order until after
11.00 a.m.’.20
The attempted forward movement was a failure.  For an advance to be successful
it would have been necessary to capture and hold the two bridges over the Plate Becque
as the 1500 yards to the new position was over open ground.  No. 1 Company of the
Coldstream who were on the right flank gained the Plate Becque, an advance of 400
yards, but were forced to withdraw, due to fierce enemy fire from Les Puresbecques and
the orchards south-west of Vierhouck.  The intelligence given to the brigade by
divisional HQ was completely out of date.  According to Whitaker he ‘knew that there
were machine-guns (at least 6) in Les Puresbecques.’21  On the Grenadier’s right, No. 1
Company pushed their two platoons down the road to Vierhouck.  They were met by
intense fire suffering heavy casualties and did not manage to cross the Plate Becque.  On
the far left No. 2 Company of the Grenadiers reached Pont Rondin, their objective. Led
by their company commander, Captain TT Pryce, they worked their way from house to
house, against fierce opposition.  While they were doing this they were continuously
                                                
17 No. 1 (Lieut. FSL Smith) and No. 2 (Capt. GC Bambridge).
18 According to their war diary they spent the 12th moving to new positions, they fired 3407 rounds on the
12th and 2057 on the 13th.
19 PRO WO 95/1226: Coldstream messages, Captain Elwes OC No. 4 Company to Battalion HQ.
20 PRO CAB 45/122: JAC Whitaker to Edmonds (wrongly filed)
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shot at by a battery of field guns located 300 yards south of Pont Rondin, firing over
open sights.  Thus the picture created in Oliver Lyttleton's autobiography of ‘the two
battalions advancing in perfect order’ is completely false.22
Brigadier-General Butler received no advantage from his abortive forward
movement. In fact he was in a much weaker position.  No. 1 Company of the
                                                                                                                                  
21 Ibid.
22 Chandos, Memoirs, p. 95.
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Coldstream had lost all three officers,23 and was reduced to about 40 men under
Sergeant Vickers, who was the acting CSM at the time.
The Coldstream were fortunate to have two companies of the Irish Guards to reinforce
the weakened right flank.  The right company of the Grenadiers - No. 1 - had tried to
                                                
23 Captain JAC Whitaker, wounded and missing; Lieut. CW Raphael, wounded; 2nd Lieut. AM Carr,
missing.
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move forward and were now not in their original fire positions, however poor they may
have been, but were scattered in isolated groups where the advance had left them.
Captain Pryce - No. 2 Company - was forced to give up his gains in Pont Rondin and
return to his starting position and as a result of the action the company had lost heavily.
In order to join up with the 12th KOYLI at La Couronne, No. 4 Company of the Irish
Guards was placed under the control of the Grenadiers and helped to form a line along
the Vieux Berquin - Estaires road.
At this time 12th  KOYLI, on the left flank, were placed under the command of
the 4th Guards Brigade, but this just extended the brigade line, although they did bring
with them the remaining two sections of 8 guns of C Company 31st Division Machine-
gun Battalion.  Unknown to the brigade some of the 150th Brigade were still in position
west of Pont Tournant where men had been falling back all morning.
Supported by artillery and trench mortars controlled from the observation
balloons the Germans attacked again in afternoon starting at about 3.30 p.m.  The first
attack was on the brigade right; No. 1 Company Coldstream Guards and some of the
150th Brigade were forced back by the 93rd Regiment and the line gave at about 4.00
p.m. along the road from Pont Tournant to the cross-roads which marked the right of
No. 3 Company. As they moved forward the Germans were exposed to fire from the
Irish Guards No. 2 Company.  With great speed and initiative the commanders of No. 2
Companies Irish and Coldstream Guards, who were in reserve, mounted a counter-attack
and the line was restored, but casualties among the Irish Guards were particularly heavy.
Thus the advance of the 93rd Regiment was stayed.
During the late afternoon and early evening the weary troops of the 150th
Brigade left the field and retired to La Motte.  In the general confusion the survivors of
No. 1 Company Coldstream Guards, still under Sergeant Vickers, were scattered and
lost touch with the battalion.  Most accounts have them withdrawing to Pont Tournant
where 2nd Lieut. Leadbitter had a Lewis-gun section.24
The German 72nd Regiment attacked the two remaining Coldstream companies
(3 and 4) at 4.30 p.m. but made no progress.  The defenders must have been helped by
the Plate Becque stream, which must have been difficult to cross under fire.
On the brigade left, the Grenadier battalions were attacked by the German 141st
Regiment which also had difficulties with the Plate Becque.  The Grenadiers were
assisted by an 18 pdr battery of 152 Brigade RFA which inflicted many casualties on the
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advancing Germans.  All accounts pay tribute to the bravery of their Forward
Observation Officer at battalion HQ, Lieut. Lewis, who continuously exposed himself to
get observation, and his linesmen who repaired the telephone cables in the open under
fire.  The whole day battalion HQ of the Grenadiers was fired at by two field guns
located only about 2000 yards away on the road south of Pont Rondin.  This was
probably the same battery that was firing at Captain Pryce.
On the left of the line, to the north-east, the Germans attacked the 149th Brigade
who continued the front from the KOYLI left. Gradually during the afternoon the
KOYLI left was forced to retreat towards the outskirts of Vieux Berquin pivoting on La
Couronne.
There was a certain amount of muddle during the night of 12/13th as brigade HQ
re-adjusted the line.  From a surviving message we know that Brigadier-General Butler
proposed a three battalion front, which would have left him 210 Field Company RE and
the trench mortar battery as his reserves.  Also, the Grenadiers’ line was to be adjusted
to face south-east rather than south so that it could meet with 12 KOYLI near La
Couronne.  It was hoped that units of the 5th Division would take over the right of the
brigade front, thus increasing the reserves.25  Later, the battalions were informed that the
poor situation on the left of the brigade meant that ‘any withdrawal should be made so
as to face the enemy Eastward rather than SE’26.
The easiest way to understand the night's movements is to follow each battalion
in turn.  As the 5th Division arrived, the order for the Irish Guards to occupy the right
flank was cancelled, and they were moved to a reserve line just east of the enclosures in
Caudescure and Arrewage facing eastwards.  While organising this they acquired a
company of the 1st Battalion Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry, from 95th Brigade, who
were slotted into the line between No. 2 and 3 Companies of the Irish Guards.  From
north to south and facing east the reserve line was No. 4 Company,  No. 3 Company,
DCLI company, No. 2 Company, and facing south-east No. 1 Company.  Battalion HQ
moved to a house in Caudescure, having sheltered in a farm in Verte Rue after being
shelled out of Ferme Gombert.  During the night they received ammunition and further
shovels, but dawn found them still digging in.  As the night was pitch black it is
surprising that anyone found their way around.27
                                                                                                                                  
24 2nd Lieut. CO Leadbitter, missing on the 13th
25 The 5th Division left Italy on the 1st April
26 PRO WO 95/1226: Coldstream messages.
27 Aldous, JRT, ‘Something of War’, Royal Engineers Journal, March 1981, p. 41.
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The Coldstream were to be responsible for the same front as on the 12th except
that their left was extended.  Lieut.-Colonel Longueville withdrew No. 2 Company to a
line some 3-400 yards in the rear to act as his reserve, while No. 3 Company were to
remain in their trenches.  On the battalion left he instructed Captain Elwes, commanding
No. 4 Company, to extend his left to include Le Cornet Perdu, thus giving the
Coldstream a front of almost 2000 yards. Battalion HQ moved in the early evening to
Ferme Beaulieu, where it was established by 10 p.m. Lieut.-Colonel Longueville then
spent the rest of the night looking for the remains of No. 1 Company. Trappes-Lomax
says that Lieut.-Colonel Longueville searched for them during the early hours of the
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next day and only found them at dawn.
The Grenadier line was about 1800 yards long.  Such were the casualties of the
12th that Lieut.-Colonel Pilcher had to put all his companies up, and even then it was
one man for every ten yards of front.  To complicate matters the line readjustment was in
two stages.  A battalion order issued before the brigade order defined a line facing east
about La Couronne. Upon receipt of the brigade order, Captain Minchin28 was
despatched with new instructions from battalion HQ to the companies, arriving at the
front around midnight.  He was informed by Captain Pryce that the men were too tired
to dig the new line, but after confirming his instructions Captain Minchin prevailed.  It
must have been a superhuman effort to start digging again after two days and nights
without sleep and only the prospect of the next day's fighting, plus the discipline of the
Guards Regiments, could have motivated them.  Assisted by 210 Field Company RE,
they dug a series of pits each holding four or five men, but even so in many places there
were wide gaps between them. They were thus able to snatch some sleep while one man
kept watch.  They also had to contend with the old trench enemy - water - at about three
feet.  During the night battalion HQ joined the Coldstream at Ferme Beaulieu.  The
Grenadiers were not so lucky as the other battalions with their supplies; the ammunition
for the left three companies was left on the road north of La Couronne at dawn and only
Captain Pryce was able to obtain only five boxes.  This was to have a decisive effect the
next day.
Let us not forget 12th KOYLI who, as mentioned earlier were now part of the
brigade.29  The exact location of their line is not recorded but their regimental history
states that they were in touch with the Grenadiers on their right and the South Wales
Borderers on their left and that a new line was dug during the night.  To cover any gap in
the line No. 3 Company Irish Guards30 was placed under the command of the Grenadiers
and sent to Verte Rue to be ready to counter-attack, although in the event they were used
for a very different purpose.
                                                
28 Capt. T Minchin DSO, wounded on the 13th.
29 Many accounts mention that 12 KOYLI were given the sobriquet “The Yorkshire Guards” for their
efforts on the 13th.  This does not seem to have stuck as it is not mentioned in reference works on military
nicknames.
30 Lieut. MR Fitzgerald, killed on the 13th.
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The Germans must have been really frustrated by this relatively small group of
determined men standing in the path of their advance towards Hazebrouck.  The task set
the Guards was almost done, as the Australians and the 5th Division were moving into
position and elsewhere resistance was stiffening.  Thus although the Guards position
was weak, the addition of the Australians gave the defence of this part of the front some
depth.
In contrast to the 12th, dawn on the 13th found the battlefield shrouded in mist,
of which the Germans took full advantage, bringing machine-guns right up to the line.
Their first attack was by the 2nd Battalion of the 72nd Regiment against the Coldstream
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aided by an armoured car, which three times came up the road from Les Puresbecques to
within 10 yards of No. 3 Company's line, and three times was driven back by Lewis-gun
and rifle fire.  Meanwhile No. 5 Company of the 72nd Regiment attacked the
Coldstream’s No. 4 Company positions in front of L'Epinette calling out in the mist that
they were the ‘King’s Company Grenadiers’.31  This was probably the most foolish ruse
that they could have tried as every guardsman knows that this company is No. 1
Company Grenadier Guards, at the time serving with the Guards Division.  However the
Germans prevailed and eventually, after heavy losses, captured L’Epinette. Any
advantage that the Germans may have gained from their breach of the line was
fortunately short lived.  The remains of  No. 1 Company under Sergeant Vickers, having
been located in the early hours by Lieut.-Colonel Longueville and sent to reinforce the
garrison at L'Epinette, although arriving too late to assist in its defence, were able to halt
the German advance in the open ground behind.
The attack spread from the Coldstream’s position all along the brigade front.
Throughout the morning the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 141st Regiment assisted by
machine-guns, trench mortars and light artillery attacked the thinly held line of the
Grenadier’s No. 3 and No. 4 Companies.  Captain Pryce and No. 2 Company were again
attacked by troops supported by field guns fired at point blank range.
On the left of the line the attacks on 12 KOYLI commenced at about 8.30 a.m.
and four times during the morning the Germans were repulsed.  Meanwhile the
Australians were moving into position and the Guards task was nearly over.
The situation was still considered critical however as the Brigadier-General sent
a message to his battalions stating that: ‘If compelled to retire Brigade will take up line
SE corner of BOIS D'AVAL - VERTE RUE - LA COURONNE.  Should this be much
enfiladed the senior CO must give the necessary orders (but there must be no retirement
without orders from Bde. H.Q.) to swing back left and hold line S.E. corner of BOIS
D'AVAL - VIEUX BERQUIN church to point of junction between 12 KOYLI’.32  This
shows that brigade was still trying to control the battle from two miles in the rear and
allowing the commanders on the spot little chance to make quick decisions if the
situation suddenly deteriorated.  It was the left of the line that was the problem, the right
being anchored on the 5th Division.
The afternoon saw the gradual break-up of the line as continuous German
                                                
31 PRO WO 95/1226: Coldstream messages.
32 Ibid.
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pressure, plus the shortage of men and ammunition, took their toll.  On the right of the
brigade the Coldstream were repeatedly attacked by the 2nd Battalion of the 72nd
Regiment until No. 2 and No. 3 Companies were finally overwhelmed at about 2.30
p.m.  The advancing Germans were halted by the reserve line, mainly No. 1 Company of
the Irish Guards in their trenches south of Arrewage.  There were many deeds of
heroism during this last desperate phase of the battle.  One Coldstreamer 17800 Private
H R Jacotine was in the left post of No. 3 Company which he continued to defend single
handed for twenty minutes after the other occupants had become casualties until finally
he was killed by a grenade.33  The redoubtable Sergeant Vickers and some Irish Guards,
still positioned behind L'Epinette, were able to hold on until nightfall when they fell
back onto the Australian lines.
Number 1 Company of the Grenadiers, together with No. 4 Company of the
Coldstream who had fallen back on them during the morning, held on until 4.30 p.m.
when they were overwhelmed by the 1st Battalion of the 72nd Regiment.  The other
three companies of the Grenadiers were proving too much for the 141st Regiment and
so the assistance of their right neighbour, the 176th, was called upon. The two centre
companies - No. 3 and No. 4 - held on until about 3.00 p.m. when, their ammunition
being exhausted, they too were overwhelmed.
During the afternoon forty men from the brigade Trench Mortar Battery armed
only with rifles, under Lieut.. AG Pinder, a Coldstream officer, and C Company of 1
DCLI arrived at the battalion HQ of the Irish Guards in Caudescure, and were put into
the line to replace Fitzgerald's No. 3 Company which had been sent to Verte Rue in the
morning. 34
                                                
33 Private Jacotine did not receive an award for his bravery (the rank of guardsman was not created until
22nd November 1918). According to his record, he was born in Ceylon and came to Britain to enlist.
34 Trappes-Lomax states that the mortars were lost on the night of 12/13th and not recovered until the
16th. What little story lies behind this is not recorded.
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On the left of the brigade, at 1.30 p.m. 12 KOYLI were bombarded from the
trench they had vacated the day before and the line was broken.  They fell back and
rallied at La Becque farm, but so heavy was the machine-gun fire that they were forced
to retreat to the Australian lines on the Rue du Bois, and thus the Germans captured
Vieux Berquin.  The collapse of the left flank allowed the Germans to penetrate as far as
Verte Rue where further eastward movement was stopped by the timely intervention of
the battalion HQ staff of the Grenadiers and Coldstream.  In the late afternoon the
battalion HQ of the Grenadiers and Coldstream moved to Caudescure with the Irish
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Guards.  As a consequence of this Captain Pryce and the remains of No. 2 Company
were surrounded on three sides.  Captain Pryce sent his last recorded message, ‘My left
flank is entirely in the air. The KOYLI have gone.’35  Lieut.-Colonel Pilcher's reply was
very much to the point: ‘Hold on as long as possible.  Shoot Germans advancing.  You
must hold VERTE RUE - LA COURONNE at all costs.’36
Lieut.-Colonel Alexander who happened to be in the vicinity realised that the
only reserve near enough to be of any assistance to the Grenadier’s No. 2 Company was
his No. 3, who had earlier been despatched to Verte Rue ready to plug any gap in the
Coldstream’s line.  On his own initiative he ordered Lieut. Fitzgerald to form a
defensive flank on Pryce's left astride the La Couronne - Verte Rue road.  At 3.30 p.m.
they moved off but were attacked by the 2nd Battalion of the 176th Regiment coming
south after their capture of Vieux Berquin, and caught in the open by machine-guns
firing from the cover of houses on the Vieux Berquin - Neuf Berquin road.  Although
they returned the enemy fire, unable to find cover of any sort, they were all soon
casualties, including all the officers.37  Only one NCO and six men rejoined the battalion
under cover of darkness.
Of all the descriptions of Captain Pryce's last actions that written by Lieut.-
Colonel Ponsonby in the Grenadier Regimental History is by far the best.
By the evening the defenders were practically at the end of their tether.
Only eighteen out of the thirty were left, and they had used up every
scrap of ammunition. The Germans were in Verte Rue, and the
beleaguered band could see the field-grey uniforms advancing towards
Bois d'Aval. It was now 8.15. Suddenly Captain Pryce perceived a new
move against him. A party of the enemy had made up their minds to test
the strength of their obstinate opponents; they pressed forward, and got to
within 80 yards of the stubbornly-held trenches. The position seemed
hopeless, but not for a moment did he flinch. Though the last cartridge
had been fired, the men still had their bayonets, and he ordered them to
charge.
Straight at the advancing enemy he rushed at the head of his handful of
men. The Germans were completely taken aback. They dared not fire, for
fear of hitting their own men, who were now in the rear of the
Grenadiers' desperately defended position, and retired. Thereupon
Captain Pryce decided to take his men back to the trench again.
But by now the enemy had seen. They had realised the almost incredible
weakness of the hitherto unknown force, that had so long successfully
kept them at bay. And, restored to confidence, they came on once more.
Once more Captain Pryce led the tattered remnant of his company - that
                                                
35 Grenadier Guards Archive: Pryce message.
36 Trappes-Lomax, 4th Guards Brigade, p. 13.
37 Lieut. MR Fitzgerald, killed; Lieut. Lord Settrington, missing; 2nd Lieut. BM Cassidy, killed.
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now numbered only fourteen - to the charge, and when last seen they
were still fighting fearlessly and doggedly against overwhelming odds.38
Only one man, a corporal, returned to the brigade lines the next night after hiding in
Vieux Berquin.  Later 14 men were found to be prisoners in Germany.
                                                
38 Ponsonby, Grenadier Guards, Vol. III, pp. 46-7.
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The force of the German advance was now spent, the Guards having bought
sufficient time the for the Australians to get into their positions.  The Guards remained
in the line with the Australians during the night of the 13/14th and for the next day.  The
14th was quiet compared with the previous two, although there were a few minor
skirmishes on the right of the line and at midday an attack developed against the 5th
Division on the brigade right preceded by an artillery barrage.
During the evening the brigade was taken out of the line and marched through La
Motte to Le Tir Anglais from where they were to be transported to Hazebrouck to help
man the defences.  The Coldstream were caught by artillery fire during the relief and
sustained some casualties.  Unfortunately transport was in short supply and some men
had to march the whole way to the billets in Borre on the road between Hazebrouck and
Strazeele.  Such were the casualties that it was necessary to re-organise the brigade, the
Coldstream and Grenadiers were combined into a composite battalion under the
command of Lieut.-Colonel Pilcher, the Irish Guards were just able to make a weak
battalion and the 12 KOYLI were the third battalion in the brigade.
Two statistics give a measure of the ferocity of the action.  Firstly, it is reported
that the Grenadiers fired 110,000 rounds of ammunition during the two days and the
Coldstream almost as much.  Secondly, the casualty figures for the brigade are well
recorded although there are some small variations between the sources have used the
figures given by Trappes-Lomax.
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The POW figures include the wounded prisoners.  Many of those killed have no
known grave.  Some are commemorated on the Ploegsteert Memorial over the border in
Belgium.  Even allowing for the officers and men left out, the battalions could only have
145
been two companies in strength.
The highest tributes were paid to the brigade.  Lieut.-General De Lisle sent the
following message:
The record of the glorious stand against overwhelming odds made by the
4th Guards Brigade is of exceptional interest. The History of the British
Army can record nothing finer than the action of the 4th Guards Brigade
on the 12th and 13th April.39
If the words of Senior Officers sound hollow, the following from an Australian -
Lieut. Kerr of the 8th Australian Battalion - would not have been given lightly:
The men of my company and battalion are full of admiration for the way
in which the Guards fought. The moral effect on our troops by their
resistance was excellent.40
We tend to forget those waiting at home for news,41 the Regimental Lieut.-
Colonel of the Grenadier Guards, Lieut.-Colonel Henry Streatfeild, wrote to Lieut.-
Colonel Pilcher thanking him for his report of the battle and after giving news of those
officers who were reported prisoners, he added ‘I earnestly hope that Pryce may still be
alive to receive some recognition of his extraordinary bravery and skilled leadership.
Your description of the way he led his company is very fine.  If any man ever deserved a
VC he does.’42
On the 19 April the 4th Guards Brigade was again in the line when the 31st
Division relieved the 2nd Australian Brigade (1st Australian Division) somewhere
between Caudescure and Strazeele. Brig.-General Butler was gassed on the 24th during
a bombardment of the Bois d'Aval and Lieut.-Colonel Alexander temporarily took
command until his return on the 7 May.
The brigade left the 31st Division on the 20 May, without 12 KOYLI, drafts
having arrived from England allowing the Coldstream and Grenadiers to regain their
separate identities.  After a period of digging defences they moved to billets at Criel
Plage between Treport and Dieppe.  Even so they were a spent force and became part of
the GHQ reserve.  In September 1918 they were formed into a motorised column as part
of the Cavalry Corps, but were never used.  At the Armistice they rejoined the Guards
Division at Maubeuge, from where the BEF had started in 1914.  The shattered village
of Vieux Berquin was recaptured on the 13 August and gradually the inhabitants
                                                
39 Ross-of-Bladensberg, The Coldstream Guards, Vol. II, p. 252.
40 Trappes-Lomax, 4th Guards Brigade, p. 17.
41 Including the author’s grandmother
42 Letter in the possession of Mr. J. Pilcher.  Pryce’s VC was gazetted on 12 May 1918 and is now on
display at the Grenadier Guards Regimental Headquarters.
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returned and rebuilt their homes and their lives.
There were many actions similar to this during the March and April battles and any
could be used to examine how prepared the BEF was.  By choosing the Guards we have
units that consider themselves the best and have an ethos of excellence.
Lieut.-Colonel Pilcher added a section ‘Some lessons to be learned’ to his after
battle report.43  He was certainly aware that there was some room for improvement in
his battalion’s performance, commenting that there was an ‘urgent necessity in training
the men in open warfare’.  He was also conscious of his lack of firepower; besides the
lack of artillery support, he was keen to take the fight to the enemy by pushing up
snipers and Lewis guns together with forward field guns to take on the German artillery.
He points out that a trench mortar battery ‘would have been useful’; and also rifle
grenades.  At a more mundane level he suggested that 70% of the men should carry
shovels, the Coldstream certainly suffered from a lack of  these as a message was sent
by the OC No. 3 Company asking for some early on the 13th.44  The problem with this
type of report is that the commander is unlikely to admit to his own, or others’,
mistakes.
However, in staff rides between the wars there was some criticism of the conduct
of  the battle.  Staff rides were training exercises for subalterns, often conducted on the
Great War battlefields; of course these were undertaken with the benefit of hindsight and
daylight.  There is evidence of much discussion of the position taken up by the brigade
and the lack of depth to the line was pointed out.45  Unfortunately, such is the
topography that there is no obvious line to be defended, although the Verte Rue, being
nearer the forest would have given easier communication.  All were agreed that brigade
headquarters was too far back, while the battalion headquarters were too far forward,
almost in the front line.  Also, the brigade formed the line with too little information, i.e.
no reconnaissance.  It was suggested that the brigade should have been held in a position
of readiness until dawn and then moved forward.  This would have allowed for a hot
meal as the future was uncertain.  In fact, the transport was moved separately and the
brigade had to rely on the charity of a French baker when it arrived at Strazeele.  All
were agreed that the forward movement on the 11th was a waste of men and the
                                                
43 PRO WO 95/1226: 4th Battalion Grenadier Guards,  Staff ride document.
44 PRO WO 95/1226: Coldstream messages.
45 PRO WO 95/1226: 4th Battalion Grenadier Guards,  Staff ride document
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brigadier should have refused the order from division as he was under superior orders.
This muddle shows that the brigade was not used to open warfare.
The surviving field messages give some insight into how the command of the
battle operated.  Brigade took no tactical part in the battle.  All their messages gave
information on troops arriving in the area, and situation reports on other brigades in the
line.  In fact, when Butler wanted to give a tactical order, he had to go and see for
himself what was happening.  Many messages have time sent and received on them
which show it often took over an hour to cover a few hundred yards, if they ever arrived
at all.  This type of command stifles initiative, but there are some examples of officers
and men acting on their own.  The decision by Lieut.-Colonel Alexander to move his
No. 3 Company to Pryce’s aid and Sergeant Vickers46 leading the remains of his
company are just two examples.
Other units also found open warfare difficult.  After a forty-two mile march the
31st Division signals unit arrived on the battlefield.47  They immediately set about
establishing sounder and telephone communication from division to brigades via cables
and airlines.  Wireless sets, when available, were issued to brigades, who were also
responsible for the telephone links within their command.  These links were
continuously broken by shellfire and it was not until the 13th that ‘communications were
established between the Artillery Brigades and the Infantry Brigades they were
covering’.48  Thus this communications network was unreliable, and so, field messages
had to be used.
The lesson that the BEF had to learn from the battles was to allow subordinate
commanders, the men on the spot, to make decisions.  Orders which required the
sanction of a commander before they could be carried out; or the one from De Lisle that
‘no retirement should be made or  the line re-adjusted, except by order of a responsible
officer prepared to justify his decision before a court-martial’ were counter-productive.
Perhaps initiative is fine so long as it is successful.
                                                
46 He was awarded a bar to the DCM he had won three weeks before.




THE BATTLE FOR THE RESERVES
he arrival of the French divisions during the battles for the Flanders hills was not
the result of an existing plan; rather, it was the outcome of a political campaign
fought by Haig and GHQ during late March and April 1918.  In general, GHQ
took little part in the higher direction of battles; that was the job of army and corps
commanders.  The staff at Montreuil kept the lines of communications working,
supplying men and material to the battlefield; in the spring of 1918 the BEF had ample
guns and ammunition, it was men they were short of.  The immediate requirement was
for divisions that could be moved up in support of, or take over from, the tired ones in
the front line.  The only source of such formations was the French Army; but the French
were loathe to give up any reserves as they expected to be attacked themselves.  What
was missing was a co-ordinated Allied military effort that would allow for mutual
assistance in times like these.  The March attack was the catalyst that gave the Allies
military unity and the Lys was its first test.
It is surprising that the Allies had got through over three years of coalition war
with very little formal co-ordination of their efforts.  The two original corps of the BEF
had been considered part of the French effort, if only because of the difference in size of
the forces involved.  In 1915 the British held about one-fifth of the line and gradually
extended their line southwards during 1916.  When Haig took over the command of the
BEF in late 1915, Kitchener informed him that ‘your command is an independent one,
and that you will in no case come under the order of any Allied General’.49  However,
Haig ‘acted on General Joffre’s “General Instructions” as if they had been Orders, but
retained absolute freedom of action as to how I carried them out.’50  In practice this
meant that the two commanders-in-chief had to form a working relationship.
At the end of 1916 there were changes at the top in both camps:  Lloyd George
                                                
49 Blake, The Private Papers of  Sir Douglas Haig, p. 121.
50 Ibid., p. 202.
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replaced Asquith as Prime Minister, while Nivelle replaced Joffre as the French
commander-in-chief.  Lloyd George was not convinced that the war could be won on the
Western Front,  where the price in casualties was becoming too high.  He favoured the
so-called ‘Easterner’ solution of knocking out the Turks and Austrians, while holding
the Germans in France and Flanders. Coupled with this Lloyd George had little faith in
his military advisors, and would dearly have liked to rid himself of Haig, and the CIGS
General Sir William Robertson.  Lloyd George’s problem was that while his political
position was weak Haig and the ‘army faction’ had a lot of support both inside and
outside the Government.  To make matters worse the dislike was reciprocated.
Lloyd George tried both the direct and indirect approach to curb the powers of
Robertson and Haig, while at the same time obtaining a unified command.  On 26 and
27 February 1917, a conference was held at Calais ostensibly to discuss the preparations
for the 1917 campaigns.  Lloyd George with the connivance of the French proposed to
place Haig under the command of the French commander-in-chief, General Nivelle.  In
the event neither Lloyd George nor the French would face up to Haig and Robertson;
Lloyd George went to bed claiming he was ill and the French generals blamed their
politicians.  In October 1917 Lloyd George had another try at the Rapallo conference,
suggesting to the French the establishment of a body to study the war as a whole and
make plans for its prosecution having regard for every front.  This led to the decision to
form what was to be known as the Supreme War Council (SWC).  The French proposed
Foch as their representative, but Lloyd George, looking to the SWC as a way of curbing
Robertson’s power, objected.  In the end General Sir Henry Wilson, was appointed to
represent Britain.
The appointment of Wilson was another reason why there would be no support
for the new organisation from the British Army.  Wilson was not liked by his peers;
besides being ‘the ugliest man in the army’51 his love of intrigue made him unpopular.
Every large organisation seems to breed a Henry Wilson, with often only mediocre
ability but a master politician, in the right place at the right time and able to cultivate the
decision makers.  Wilson had become a favourite of Lloyd George’s, due to his support
for the latter’s policies and his ability to explain complex military problems to the
layman. Henry Wilson is often portrayed as a buffoon, especially when compared with
his rather dour contemporaries.  In addition to his habit of giving nick-names to his
associates, his diaries are full of flippant remarks.  For example, when describing his
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journey to Doullens with Lord Milner on 26 March he comments: ‘A certain amount of
natives on the move’.52  However, Lloyd George was not a fool; he probably saw Wilson
for what he was and was not taken in by the glibness, but used him in his fight with the
army.
The CIGS was the military advisor of the Government, and so now it had two.
To Robertson this dilution of his authority was almost the final straw but he refused to
resign.  However, Robertson decided that he had had enough, and resigned on 9
February 1918, Wilson becoming CIGS.53  Wilson’s place on the SWC was taken by the
Fourth Army commander, General Sir Henry Rawlinson,54 a forceful character, and the
two were soon in conflict over the formation of a General Reserve.  Rawlinson’s move
in March to take over Gough’s army command, when the latter was sacked, enabled
Wilson to put in his ‘own man’, Major-General Sackville-West.55
The dismissal of Haig proved to be too difficult; as well as having powerful
friends, including the king, Haig personified the BEF and his name was a household
word.  Besides, there was no obvious successor.  Under the cover of inspecting the
BEF’s defences Lloyd George sent General Smuts and Sir Maurice Hankey to France in
January in an abortive attempt to look for a replacement.  Thus, for the want of an
acceptable successor, Haig’s position was secure.
The SWC was a step in the right direction, there being no disagreement about
the need for such a body.  It was, however, formed for the wrong reason: ‘in setting up
the Council, the real object of ministers was not so much to provide effective unity of
military command as to acquire for themselves a greater control over the military
chiefs.’56  Setting up such a body implied the creation of an Allied commander-in-chief
or generalissimo at some stage, to which both politicians and generals were opposed.
What may have been at the back of everyone’s mind was the fact that if the BEF came
under orders of GQG or a French generalissimo, then Britain might be considered a
junior partner in the coalition; which would have repercussions when it came to divide
the victors’ spoils.
The SWC’s proposal to form a Strategic Reserve floundered on the question of
                                                                                                                                  
51 His own description of himself.
52 IWM, Wilson MSS: Diary, 26 March 1918.
53 Ironically, Robertson went to Eastern Command, the appointment Wilson gave up to become British
Military Representative on the SWC
54 At this time the Fourth Army staff were responsible for the Ypres Salient, Plumer having gone to Italy
to restore the situation there.
55 Known for some reason by the sobriquet ‘Tit Willow’.  The Wilson diaries are full of these nick-names.
151
command and opposition from Haig and Pétain.57  The idea took shape at the beginning
of  1918 as a method of countering the expected German offensive.  On 25 January ‘the
permanent military representatives approved joint note 14, which urged the creation of
an Allied manoeuvre force for the French and Italian fronts.’58  The difficulty was, who
should command it, the SWC or the commanders-in-chief?  As a compromise, and
probably a means of enhancing his own position, Wilson suggested to Lloyd George that
the Permanent Military Representatives59 form an Executive War Board, with Foch as
chairman, to control the reserves.60  Thus Foch moved a step further towards becoming
supreme commander.  Unfortunately, for the moment, his was destined to be an empty
command, neither Haig nor Pétain handed over a single soldier to his reserve.  To be fair
to Haig, he had few to offer; five of his divisions had been moved to Italy in December
which left him only six in GHQ reserve.61  Pétain also claimed he had no divisions to
offer, adding ‘that a committee could not run a battle, and that he could not upset all the
plans he had already made with Haig.62
Haig and Pétain had made their own arrangements for co-operation between the
French and British Armies in the event of a German attack.  This went further than a
‘handshake’ between the two commanders-in-chief.  French and British staffs
commanded by General Humbert (French Third Army) and Lieut.-General Hamilton
Gordon (IX Corps) were charged with working out zones for the concentration of troops
behind each front together with methods of supply.  Unfortunately the two formations
detailed to carry out these preparations were ‘without troops’.63  Thus in the event of an
attack they would have to acquire the necessary forces from their superiors.  From their
experience of the previous years, they probably thought they had plenty of time to firm
up these reserves behind their neighbour’s front.  By their lukewarm support for the
SWC and especially the Strategic Reserve, Haig and Pétain forced themselves into this
dangerous corner.  While the mechanics of mutual assistance could be worked out, the
circumstances under which they could be used had, by necessity, to be vague, as they
depended on what action the Germans took.  What would happen if both armies were
attacked simultaneously, or the other was expecting to be attacked?  In addition, both
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commanders were servants of their respective governments and might be called upon to
provide troops for some venture away from the Western Front.
As we have seen in Chapter 3 all these preparations came to nought when put to
the test.  On 24 March Haig met Pétain at Dury, where he learned that the French were
reluctant to release divisions to assist the British, believing they too were about to be
attacked in Champagne, which shows how effective the German deceptions were.  In
addition, Pétain, who was under orders to cover Paris at all costs, was willing to lose
contact with the BEF if the Germans continued to press their attack, and even move the
reserves forming up near Montdidier to the south-west.  Haig realised that he needed
assistance and hurried back to GHQ in order to summon his superiors to France, ‘to
arrange that General Foch or some other determined general, who would fight, should
be given supreme control of the operations in France’.64  Haig was perhaps
remembering Foch’s appointment in November 1914 to co-ordinate Belgian, British and
French forces on the left wing of the Allied front.  This was a great leap forward, for the
only way to save the situation was overall command of the Allied forces by one man and
he had to be French, since they had the reserves and the war was being fought on their
territory.  In fact, on the same day, Lord Milner was on his way to Versailles and Paris,
having been sent by Lloyd George to review the situation.  The new CIGS, Sir Henry
Wilson, was hot on his heels after a telephone discussion with Foch during which it was
agreed that ‘someone must catch hold, or we shall be beaten’.65  In fact, Wilson left for
France before Haig’s message reached him.
The wording of Haig’s diary gives the impression that the whole idea of Foch
taking command of the Allied armies was his; however, Henry Wilson also claims some
credit.  The two met at GHQ the next day to discuss what should be done.  According to
Wilson, Haig would have preferred Pétain in overall command, but in the end agreed
that Foch should have the post.  Meanwhile, Milner had had an indecisive day with the
French; also, due to messages going astray, neither party had been able to get together,
but a conference was to be held at Dury the next day.  On learning this when Wilson and
Milner met at Versailles later that evening, Wilson then visited Foch at his home where
it was decided that ‘at our meeting at Dury tomorrow I would suggest that he (Foch)
should be commissioned by both governments to co-ordinate the military action of the
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two C in Cs’.66  The meeting with his good friend Foch was Wilson’s contribution to the
appointment of  Foch as generalissimo, political manoeuvring at its best!  Although,
according to Foch, Wilson wanted Clemenceau to be the co-ordinator with Foch as
technical advisor.  Foch pointed out that what he wanted was to ‘get the British and
French to work more closely together’.67
On 26 March the British delegation and the French political and military leaders
were to have met at Dury, but the venue was changed to Doullens, as Haig had arranged
to meet with his army commanders there in the morning.  Those present were: for the
French, President Poincaré, Clemenceau, Loucheur,68 Foch, Pétain and Weygand; for the
British, Lord Milner, Wilson, Haig, his chief-of-staff Lawrence, and Major-General
Montgomery representing General Rawlinson.  Poincaré, as chairman, asked Haig for a
report of the British situation followed by a similar request to Pétain. The decisive
moment had now arrived and the meeting broke up into a number of small groups.  The
outcome of these discussions was a proposal drafted by Clemenceau that Foch should be
charged with ‘the co-ordination of the action of the British and French Armies in front
of Amiens’.  Thus Foch got some of what he wanted.  Haig realised that this tentative
first step did not go far enough, and that Foch would be subordinate to himself and
Pétain, while what he wanted was for Foch to control Pétain so that the French reserves
would be released.  In this he was quite correct; it is difficult to see what Foch could
have done that was not already being performed by the commanders-in-chief, army and
corps commanders.  The French troops and especially the reserves would still have been
under the command of Pétain.  Thus Haig took the next step and proposed that Foch
should ‘co-ordinate the action of all Allied Armies on the Western front’.69  This
document was then signed by Clemenceau and Milner, the latter being in a difficult
position as he did not really have the authority for such an action, although he was the
British political representative on the SWC.  Regardless of whose idea it was, and who
said what, the Allies now had the beginnings of a unified command.  Wilson and Milner
then left for home.
Having got his way, Foch found that he had been placed in an anomalous
position.  Co-ordination does not necessary imply authority.  All he could do was to ‘flit
from one headquarters to another’ to suggest and persuade, rather than direct, which was
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what was needed.70  To someone of Foch’s dynamic nature this must have been very
frustrating, so this anomaly was the subject of correspondence between Foch and
Clemenceau.71
To clarify the situation Clemenceau called a further conference, which met in the
Marie at Beauvais on 3 April.  The British war Cabinet were against the final step - the
appointment of Foch to the Supreme Command.  However, the final decision was left to
Lloyd George’s discretion.72  The Beauvais Conference was a much grander affair than
Doullens; those present were: for the French, Clemenceau, Foch and Pétain; for the
British, Lloyd George, Haig, Wilson and Brigadier-General Spears, the Head of the
British Military Mission in Paris; for the Americans, Generals Pershing and Bliss.
According to Lloyd George, he had a discussion with Clemenceau before the
meeting, when it was decided that ‘Foch should be endowed with greater and more
direct authority over the Allied forces’.73  These preliminary discussions were a feature
of inter-Allied conferences,74 with Wilson wavering and Haig opposed, the outcome was
uncertain.  So Lloyd George took command and when the full conference met at 3 p.m.
Foch’s instructions were amended to:
the strategic direction of military operations.  The Commanders-in-Chief
of the British, French and American Armies will have full control of the
tactical action of their respective Armies.  Each Commander-in-Chief
will have the right of appeal to his government if, in his opinion, his
Army is endangered by any order received from General Foch.75
Wilson claims that the last sentence was added by him as an escape clause.  The
conference was also used by Haig as an opportunity to push for a French offensive, to
relieve the pressure on the BEF; Foch and Pétain ‘both stated their determination to start
attacking “as soon as possible”’,76 although they could hardly say otherwise considering
the assembled company.    Haig doubted whether anything would come of these fine
words, continuing in his diary: ‘But will they ever attack.  I doubt whether the French
Army, as a whole, is now fit for an offensive’.  Thus we see that once the first step was
taken the others followed easily.  It took the Allies’ darkest hour since 1914 to bring
about this unified command.   It is interesting that, when the backs were to the wall, all
constitutional and procedural arguments that had been raised in the previous year
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disappeared.
The Belgians and Italians were left out of the agreement, although the Italians
were represented on the SWC.  In both cases there were constitutional difficulties owing
to ‘the fact that in each case the King was the head of the fighting forces’.77  On 17
April Foch and Clemenceau visited Belgian GHQ and suggested that the Belgian Army
should become part of Foch’s command.  The king refused, even though his ministers
tried to prove that his command was titular only and that the chief of the army staff was
responsible for operations.78  This was not formally sorted out until almost the end of
the war; meanwhile, Foch worked through the Belgian chief-of-staff, General Gillain.
If Lloyd George thought that this new organisation had Haig boxed in he was
wrong.  It might be argued that Haig’s position was stronger after the Beauvais
Conference.  He was now responsible to a man who would act as a buffer between
himself and the politicians.  Any argument between Foch and Lloyd George would be
bound to involve that other fire eater, Clemenceau.
Haig’s diary gives no indication how he felt during these trying days, but the
strain on him must have been enormous.  His army was being destroyed, and there was
no sign of any reinforcements from the French.  If things continued as they were, the
BEF would be forced to form a box around the Channel ports, or retreat towards the
south, and following this the Germans might easily win.  We get some clues from
Wilson’s diary.  When he met Haig at GHQ on 25 March he found him ‘cowed.  He said
that unless the whole French Army came up, we were beaten and it would be better to
make peace on any terms we could...’.79  After the conference at Doullens the next day
Haig had recovered his spirits; when Wilson met him in the evening ‘just going for a
ride and he told me he was greatly pleased with our new arrangements.’80  Again, on 9
April Wilson found Haig ‘tired - no drive - almost a beaten man - speaks of peace to get
him out of his difficulties.’81  This was rather rich from a man who was unable to make
a decision, and been a failure as a corps commander; but, it does give some idea of the
strain Haig was under.  Haig certainly received support from his religion.  On 16 April
he wrote to the Church of Scotland chaplain at GHQ, the Rev. George Duncan; ‘I am
very grateful for your thinking of me at this time, and I know I am sustained in my
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efforts by that Great Unseen Power, otherwise I c’d not be standing the strain as I am
doing’.82
The Battles of the Lys was the first test of these new arrangements, and Foch would
immediately experience the difficulty of serving two masters, the Allied forces and the
French Government.83  At the beginning of April evidence was mounting that the next
German attack would be against the British in Flanders.  However, Foch was
concentrating his efforts on securing Amiens, and making ready for a counter-offensive
by British and French Armies on the Somme.  Also, the position around Amiens was
delicately poised, since to keep the Allies guessing, the Germans had deliberately not
dug in, and thus still threatened Paris.  On the 6 April, Haig sent his Director of
Operations, Major-General Davidson, to Foch’s Headquarters at Beauvais with three
suggestions for French assistance.  These were an offensive, the relief of British
divisions in the line, or the placing of French reserves west of Vimy ridge.84  As nothing
was settled from Davidson’s mission, Haig wrote to Foch the same evening pressing
him to accept one of the three proposals, also asking for a meeting on the 7 April,
presumably so that he could press his case.
They duly met at Aumale but with no success for Haig, as Foch was still
concentrating on Amiens and his proposed offensive.  However, this did not take place
as both commanders, Rawlinson and Pétain, felt they had insufficient forces to carry it
out.  Haig had guessed what the result of this conference would be, and had telegraphed
Wilson asking him to use his influence with Foch, which he did by sending a telegram
reiterating Haig’s views.  After his failure to persuade Foch, Haig asked Wilson to come
to France to press the point in person.  It is interesting to note that for all his distrust of
Wilson, Haig was able to have a professional relationship with him, even to the extent
of allowing Wilson the opportunity to succeed where he had failed.
Foch did not create a large staff to go with his position, for had he tried to usurp
the powers of GHQ and GQG, the appeals procedure might have been brought into
action immediately as this would have been a threat to the positions of Haig and Pétain.
Instead, he relied on a small group of officers led by the trusted Weygand, who was
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moved from the Supreme War Council back to being Foch’s chief-of-staff.  There were
also practical reasons for Foch not creating a staff:  Much of GHQ work was involved
with the quartermaster’s function and these would have had to remain separate.  Also,
Foch would have become bogged down in the detail, and thus unable to perform the
function for which he was appointed.  There was also the question of a British liaison
officer at Foch’s headquarters. Wilson suggested Lieut.-General Du Cane to Haig and
Foch on 6 April, an idea that was initially rebuffed by Foch.85  But, on the 9th he
relented, and Du Cane was moved from XV Corps to take up the position on the 12
April, being replaced by Lieut.-General De Lisle.  Why Du Cane was chosen remains a
mystery.  By his own admission: ‘I was amused that nobody took the trouble to ask me if
I talked French’.86  It may just be that he was loyal to Haig and knew how GHQ worked.
When it became obvious that an attack against the British First Army was
imminent, Haig appealed again to Foch for troops, suggesting the French take over part
of the line in the Ypres sector to enable the BEF to form a reserve behind the front.
Foch’s reply was to sent Weygand to explain that none could be sent.  However, on the 9
April when the German offensive became a reality, Foch was visiting Haig at GHQ.
Haig explained his view that the Germans were trying to destroy his army and Foch
began to thaw; while refusing to take over any part of the British front, he did offer to
place four French divisions behind Amiens ready to move north if required.  Even after
it was explained that this move would block the lines of communication of the Fourth
Army, Foch remained adamant, explaining that he wanted to keep the French reserves
intact ready to meet any emergency, believing that this attack in the north was a feint to
draw French reserves away from protecting Paris.
There then followed an exchange of notes.  On the 10th, Haig reminded Foch of
the situation and asked him to ‘relieve part of the British front and take an active part in
the battle’.87  Foch had already written to Haig asking to be kept informed about any
orders he gave to the First and Second Armies, and what troops were available to
reinforce them.  Perhaps rather unnecessarily he instructed Haig not to give ground
voluntarily as it might be interpreted by the Germans as a sign of weakness.  At last
Foch became willing to see the British point of view.  Late in the evening of the 10th,
accompanied by Weygand, he went to see Haig and admitted that the main German
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thrust was against the British.  However, he still believed that the danger lay between the
Somme and Arras.  In fact Foch considered that there were two battles, and saw his
priority to be to stabilise the southern front and so reduce the German threat to Paris.
On the 11th Haig sent yet another note to Foch, this time by Major-General
Davidson, in which he again pointed out the lack of British reserves, and asked for four
French divisions to be placed behind the British on a line, St Omer - Dunkirk.  Again,
Foch’s reply was a statement of the obvious: the British were to ‘check the enemy with
troops already fighting’ and he followed this with advice on the line to be held.88   This
was a ring around the existing front, to which ‘reinforcements must be sent’;89 if the
BEF had had men they would not have been in this situation.  However, perhaps as a
sop, he did propose that the French II Cavalry Corps due at Hesdin the next day should
continue to Cassel to assist the British Second Army.  Two infantry divisions were also
on the way by rail, 133rd from Paix and 28th from Belfort, to a concentration point
south of Dunkirk.  This force was to form a line behind the Second Army.
The 11 - 14 April were perhaps the worst days for the British.  The Germans
continued to press forward against a diminishing BEF and as each day passed the
position of the Channel Ports looked more precarious.  In order to protect their
communications with Britain GHQ began to consider inundations in the Ports’
hinterland behind which a new defensive line could be formed.  The line suggested by
Foch in his note of the 11th was now in preparation by GHQ.  The Germans were to be
held at all costs on this line.
On the 12th Haig also instructed the British Cavalry Corps to be moved up to
Aire to join the French II Cavalry Corps and 133rd Division.  In this way he created a
mobile force to counter any German breakthrough down the Lys valley or towards
Hazebrouck.  Some urgency seems to have been put into the French as on the 12th the
French cavalry covered 70 miles in one day.  These troops, commanded by General
Robillot, were placed under the instructions of General Plumer who had taken command
of most of the battle front, when the Second Army line was extended south of the
Nieppe forest.  The same day, Haig met Clemenceau who had visited the Bruay mines,
the major source of coal for the French.  Haig took this opportunity of pressing his case,
explaining the British situation and asking that the French reserves might be hastened
and more troops sent to the St. Omer-Dunkirk line.  Clemenceau,  knowing that the
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latter had already been refused, would have none of it and referred Haig back to the
normal channels.
A second conference was held at Abbeville on the 14th attended by Haig, Milner,
Lawrence, Foch, Weygand and Du Cane.  Haig went over the old ground and ‘explained
the urgent need for the French to take a more active share in the battle’, pointing out that
the French reserves were too far south to stop any advance by the Germans on the
Channel ports.90  Foch began his reply by pointing out the tenacity of the British troops
at Ypres during October and November 1914, but then asked Haig for his proposals.  In
reply, Haig requested the four divisions under General Maistre, which were concentrated
in the south, be moved further north to act as a reserve for the British First Army.  While
Foch promised to consider Haig’s proposals, he went on to refuse a relief during the
battle, and to point out that an attack could start at any point of the front, (meaning the
southern sector) the French reserves now being spread out to meet this contingency.  He
then finished by stating that the Battle of Hazebrouck was finished.  While this may
have been true, as two fresh divisions, the 5th and 1st Australian, now blocked the
Germans’ path to Hazebrouck, the situation to the north was still unstable.  After the
conference Foch relented slightly and ordered the French Tenth Army to prepare plans
to move a division to Frévent, one day’s journey from the battlefield.  Haig was not
impressed by Foch’s generalship, writing in his diary:
Foch seems to me unmethodical and takes a “short view” of  the
situation.  For instance, he does not look ahead and make a forecast of
what may be required in a week in a certain area and arrange accordingly.
He only provides from day to day sufficient troops to keep the railway
accommodation filled up.  Also (as at Ypres in 1914) he is very
disinclined to engage French troops in the battle.91
Surely it was troops that Haig wanted quickly, one wonders what else he expected given
that if the transport was full what else could be sent?
The next day Foch outlined to Clemenceau and Milner the reasons for his refusal
to send more assistance to Haig .92  The Germans still had a reserve of 48 divisions
which could be used anywhere between Noyon and Arras.  He was particularly
concerned about the Montdidier-Luce sector where the Germans had not yet dug in,
another German subterfuge to keep the Allies guessing, which caused much suffering to
the tired German troops.
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By the 15th there were two French infantry divisions plus one cavalry corps
behind the Lys front.  In the evening Plumer agreed with General Robillot that the
French infantry should relieve two of the Second Army’s tired divisions.  On hearing of
this arrangement Foch immediately telegraphed Colonel Desticker, his liaison officer at
Plumer’s HQ, forbidding their use in the front line.  However, Robillot, as the man on
the spot, disregarded these instructions and the French 28th Division moved forward to
a position three miles north-west of Kemmel while the 133rd Division made ready to
replace the British 33rd covering Meteren.  Later that night two brigades of French
cavalry were added to the force at Meteren.
The British Third and Fourth Armies fared much better with the supply of
French troops.  Two French armies were being formed behind the British and by the 15
April the Fifth (Micheler) and Tenth (Maistre) Armies, each of four divisions, were in
position as shown on the map. The movement of French divisions between corps,
armies and groupments was as complex as the British, but while the Tenth Army stayed
as four divisions the Fifth increased to about eight.  These troops could have been put
into the line to relieve tired British ones but this Foch steadfastly refused to do.  His
reason was the dangerous time when the exchange was taking place; this sounds more
like an excuse, since this operation was something that both sides had been practising
for four years.  Also, it is more likely that the British would have put them on a good
line behind the forward troops, so that the front could come to them.  Foch was also still
concerned with the threat to Paris, and there appeared to him no reason why the
Germans should not restart the fighting on the Somme, while there was still the threat of
an attack in Champagne.  To give weight to this view the Germans had been
bombarding Paris with long-range artillery which produced more psychological than
material damage.
If Haig thought that his First and Second Armies would receive French
reinforcements as soon as battle was joined he was mistaken.  While we now know that
by the 15 April the danger was over, the battle still had another two weeks to run.  While
Foch’s statement that the battle for Hazebrouck was finished was proved correct, it must
have annoyed the hard pressed British commanders at the time.  The key lies in Foch’s
relationship with Clemenceau, which was similar to that between Haig and Lloyd
George although in this case it was more moral than political.  Foch considered
Clemenceau an ‘unbridled rake’ while Clemenceau could not stand Catholic generals,
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and Foch in particular.93  A whispering campaign against Foch had been going on for
some time, Wilson recorded in his diary: ‘Foch is ‘guggu’, that is judgement is gone,
that he is ill, etc.  The usual thing’.94  There was also mistrust between Clemenceau and
the British government over the manpower question.  He felt that they were not pulling
their weight on the Western Front as there was a large army in the UK and conscription
had not been introduced in Ireland.  Against this background of mutual distrust Foch had
to pick his way carefully, for to move divisions to Flanders might not have been
politically possible and Foch would not have wanted to go down in history as the man
who saved the British but lost Paris.
The French Army had 32 divisions in various stages of reserve out of a total of
about 100.95  According to Edmonds Foch was unwilling to use them in a defensive
battle as they were untried after the mutinies.96  However, the French troops fought well
against the two German attacks against their line; they had nor refused to defend French
soil, but were only tired of fruitless attacks.97  Foch felt the Lys attack was a feint to use
up the Allies’ reserves and ‘cover a more important action in another place’, perhaps
against the French.98  Thus, the reason for Foch’s refusal, or unwillingness, to move
French divisions north was as much political as military.
From now on, the British having weathered the storm, Foch acted in a more
confident manner.  During the morning of the 16th he ordered Pétain to get a division
ready to move to Flanders, and in addition, the Tenth Army was to make ready to send
the 34th Division to the same destination by lorry.  In the afternoon another conference
was held at Abbeville, those present being the same as before with the addition of the
CIGS, General Wilson.  On the 13th Clemenceau had asked Lloyd George to go to
France for a consultation; Wilson ‘feared that “the Tiger” contemplated interference in
the military operations, and he dreaded what might happen were the British Prime
Minister also to take a hand’.99  Lloyd George was persuaded by Wilson that this was
not the time to intervene, but after a telephone call from Clemenceau, Wilson went over
in his place. Yet again, Haig pressed his case for French reinforcements.  The British
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were now looking at forming a box around the Channel Ports protected by inundations
behind which the BEF could retreat.  Wilson had already contacted Foch concerning this
matter on the 11th and authority was given by Foch the next day for this move.  By
blocking the River Aa near St Omer and opening the sluices, a flood would be created
between Aire and St Omer.  The flooding between St Omer and Dunkirk was to have to
be created by pumping engines at Dunkirk.  When Foch explained his actions on the
River Aa, Wilson stated that this was inadequate.  He wanted the full inundation to be
commenced at once.  Foch decided to go and see for himself and left for Second Army
Headquarters where he gave Plumer a lecture on how to hold Kemmel.  There was one
positive result from all this; the French 34th Division was ordered to move north at 6.00
a.m. the next day.
The difference in style between Foch and Haig must have been noticeable to his
Army commanders.  After three years they had become used to Haig’s almost taciturn
demeanour, while Foch was full of Gallic charm and given to long discourses on the
point in question.  There was also a different style of command.  Haig’s statements were
orders which were later confirmed by his staff in writing.  French generals knew from
experience that they should ignore the rhetoric and await the written instructions.
Wilson met Foch the next day (17th) and again pressed for the full inundation
which Foch refused.  Wilson then played the politician.  In a note to Foch he pointed out
that the BEF could continue to give battle where it stood or fall back behind the
inundations.  If Foch wanted the former, which Wilson knew he did, then fresh
divisions, which could only be French,  would be required.  Foch seems to have ignored
this and gone on the visit to the Belgians with Clemenceau already described, and then
to Dunkirk to give orders for the making of inundations and the building of defences.
Later he ordered two more French divisions to the north (39th and 154th), which were
placed with other French formations into a reformed Détachment d’Armée du Nord
(DAN) under General de Mitry.  Thus while French divisions were assisting the British
they were still under French command.
It is very noticeable that Foch was ‘obstinate’ in meetings and conferences with
the British command, but gave orders for assistance verbally afterwards.  Meetings are
public occasions, minutes are kept and the participants make notes whereas telephoned
instructions could always have been ‘misunderstood’.  During the 18 and 19 April there
was further evidence of Foch operating behind the scenes when he suggested to Haig
that tired British divisions might be exchanged for French ones from a quiet sector, the
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so-called roulement.  This was followed by a letter to Haig explaining that he was
anxious to put fifteen French divisions behind the British Army, but could not do so
unless they were exchanged for British ones.100  By this device Foch could assist the
British while not seeming to weaken the strength of the French line.
After discussing the matter with Milner, who had replaced Derby as Minister of
War in mid-April,101 and gaining an assurance from Pétain that the divisions would be
reconstructed before they went into the line, Haig agreed to Foch’s proposal.  Four
divisions were reconstituted as IX Corps (Lieut.-General Sir A Hamilton Gordon) and
sent to the Chemin-des-Dames, unfortunately to be the scene of the next German attack.
Wilson over-reacted to this move by Foch and Haig.  He felt that the BEF would lose its
identity if it became mixed up with the French Army; his fears were quickly calmed by
Foch, who, at the meeting at Abbeville on 27th, said that nothing would be done without
Haig’s approval.102
The cordial relationship already existing between Foch and Wilson gave the
former an ally in London who could explain his actions to the politicians; also, Wilson
had the advantage that he spoke fluent French.  In fact, as the Allies began to work
closer together which meant contact at the lower level of command, rather than just
through generals, the lack of bi-lingual liaison officers became a problem.  Many British
officers would have learned French at school, but ‘la plume de ma tante’ would be of
little use, say, in calling up an artillery barrage from a neighbouring French division.
After the 19th there was a lull in the battle as the Germans prepared for their
assault on the Monts des Flandres and Foch busied himself in the south, not returning to
Flanders for ten days.  The loss of Kemmel Hill by the French 28th Division on the 26
April re-focused his attention on the northern sector.  Foch’s immediate concern was
that this new assault might cause the British to fall back on their rear lines.  In a
telephone call to Haig he insisted that a withdrawal of troops west of Ypres ‘must not be
contemplated’.103  To add weight to this he instructed Pétain to send more artillery and
aircraft to the DAN.
On 27 April the last conference at Abbeville during the battle already referred to
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was held.104  The day before, Haig had discussed the military agenda with Wilson and
Milner.  To give some relief to his by now worn out divisions he wanted the French to
take over the line held by his two northern corps - XXII and II in the Ypres salient,
which would release about five divisions.  Wilson wanted to have a contingency plan in
case the Germans made more gains.  The subject of roulement, already mentioned
above, was settled and Haig moved on to discuss the relief of II and XXII Corps.  He
proposed that these formations should change places with the French troops behind the
British Third Army.  As might be expected Foch did not agree, using his usual argument
against relieving troops in the middle of a battle.  However, he proposed to visit
Flanders to see the situation for himself.  The business of salt water inundations and
retreats to rear lines was brushed aside.  Foch then set off to visit Generals Plumer, de
Mitry and Gillain, the Belgian chief-of-staff.  Each was subjected to the usual lecture,
but afterwards Foch made arrangements to send one extra division to the north and
relieve the three French divisions which had been mauled in the battle for Kemmel.  So
much for not relieving divisions in the middle of a battle!
On the 29th the Germans made their unsuccessful attack on the Scherpenberg
and so ended the Battles of the Lys.
There were differing views on the performance of Foch and the French Army
during the Michael and Georgette offensives.  The British Army thought that they had
been let down by their allies.  Lieut.-General Godley, commenting on the draft of the
Official History, wrote to Edmonds that ‘you let Foch and the French down too easily.  It
was obvious to us all that we were getting no help from Foch, and that the troops he did
send reluctantly and under pressure, were no good’.105  He went on to complain about
the French reluctance to move forward to retake Kemmel Hill.  Brigadier-General Croft
was much more to the point ‘The 28 French Division did not distinguish itself on the
25th, and any comments on their part of the action must be derogatory’.106  These were
private letters, but in a review of Tome VI of the French Official History in the Army
Quarterly the reviewer commented that:
Very little is said about the loss of Kemmel by the French; all we are told
is “the French garrison of Kemmel [village] and Kemmel Hill decimated
by the bombardment, pressed on all sides, had yielded bit by bit after a
heroic resistance”.[author’s translation]  Those who saw the French
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troops leaving Kemmel Hill without any attempt at resistance will hardly
agree with this account.107
Haig also had a poor opinion of the French.  On the 29 April he told Milner:
of certain bad work of the French Staffs during the recent concentrations,
e.g., when a French Division is moving by rail, the Transportation service
never knows what is going to arrive; in fact total lack of method.  At the
beginning of the battle, Divisions arrived near Montdidier with 50 rounds
small arm ammunition per man, no cookers, no Artillery, so men were
not only half starving but had no means for fighting!108
This comment shows that the arrangements for mutual support had not been worked out
very well.109  After describing the loss of Kemmel Hill Haig commented ‘What Allies to
fight with’.110  Edmonds on the other hand was full of praise for the French.
Summarising the conference on the 14 April he stated that:  ‘Though General Foch’s
decision cost the British Army many lives, and its leaders many anxious hours, in the
circumstances one cannot but admire his judgement of the situation and his resistance to
the very heavy pressure put upon him.’111  He also makes the point in his reflections on
the Spring Offensives that ‘The appointment of General Foch to co-ordinate and control
the Allied efforts prevented the disaster of the separation of the two Armies.’112  It was
difficult for Edmonds to be critical of the French as at the time the first two 1918
volumes were published as Pétain was the French Minister of War.  In addition, both
Foch and Pétain had been made Marshals of France, as much a civil honour as a military
one,  being a position that had a considerable aura of mystique for the French people.
So, to avoid a row, Edmonds took the easy course and said nothing.  What Edmonds did
not explain was the political pressure Foch was under.  Certainly, Foch did the best he
could for his British allies, and even though it may not have been as much as Haig
wanted, he was the only man with sufficient stature and prestige to do the job.
Might Haig have saved himself all these arguments with Foch if he had
supported the formation of the General Reserve?  It was unlikely, since presumably the
divisions allocated by Haig and Pétain would have remained in their respective sectors,
Pétain would still have lost his nerve, and Foch was the man in charge of the Military
Representatives at Versailles.  The SWC was not part of any command structure and
while Rawlinson would probably have given Haig the British reserves, or Haig would
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have taken them without asking, the same difficulties over the French formations would
have arisen.  One cannot imagine Lawrence or Davidson being sent to Versailles with a
‘chitty’ for 20 French divisions.  No, in the end it was better that the divisions remained
under their respective commanders-in-chief.
Haig may have had a hidden agenda in his continuous demand for French
divisions.  He was looking to take the offensive in 1919, when the American presence
would shift the manpower pendulum in the Allies’ favour, and knew that there were few
British drafts available, once the mobile reserves had been used up.  If the Germans
continued to hammer his army, when victory came Britain might take third place at the
victors’ table and the sacrifice might have been for very little.  It was thus imperative
that the French took some of the strain.
There has been much criticism of Haig’s conduct of the Great War battles;113 but,
surely his main task was to interface with his superiors at home and the commanders-in-
chief of the other members of the coalition.  There were matters that only he could deal
with; for example, none of the British Army commanders had the necessary authority to
negotiate for the supply of French reserves to aid the BEF.  During March and April, we
see Haig the master politician at work; first subordinating himself to Foch, then
plugging away at conference after conference, until he received some measure of what
he wanted.  This shows the need for the supreme command to have been in place long
before the Spring Offensives, but it took the brink of disaster to bring it about.  The
gentleman’s agreement between Haig and Pétain was a fudge, to stop others becoming
involved, and would never have worked; had the situation been reversed, Haig could not
have sent divisions to aid the French without putting the BEF in jeopardy.  For once,
Henry Wilson was probably right, when he claimed that Haig was ‘living off the charity
of Pétain’.114  The main result of this frustration was that by the end of April 1918 Haig
and Foch had achieved a working relationship that was to pay dividends during the
summer and autumn.
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Chapter 7
THE PRESS AND THE SPRING OFFENSIVES
he Spring Offensives give us an opportunity to look at a number of aspects of war
reporting: how accurate the reporting was, what the public was told and how the
newspapers dealt with retreat.  The government had to balance keeping the public
informed against keeping public sympathy and support for the war.  Until the spring of
1918 the newspapers had mainly covered Allied offensives, which could always be
reported as going to plan, as the real objectives were obviously never published.  A
German offensive would give the problem of how much of the enemy’s success should
be reported, and how British failure was to be represented.  In addition, failures by
Britain’s allies would require careful handling, as would the dismissal of a full general,
or the appointment of a French one to command a British field marshal.  The
newspapers were also the main means of spreading anti-German propaganda, to
maintain public support for the war; this was achieved by a continuous reinforcement of
the concept of ‘the beastly Hun’.
Before the war it had been planned that approved war correspondents would
accompany the BEF to France.  In the event, these arrangements were cancelled by Lord
Kitchener and the army sailed into a news blackout.  Initially the public was starved of
news; this state of affairs could not go on and so Kitchener relented slightly.  The war
would be covered by an officer appointed for the purpose.  On the basis that he had
written a book,1 Churchill suggested to Kitchener Colonel E D Swinton, who had been
Assistant Secretary to the Committee of Imperial Defence before the war and at the time
was serving as Deputy Director of Railways with the BEF.  Thus on 7 September 1914
was born the ‘Eyewitness’ system which lasted for ten months.  The newspaper
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proprietors resented Swinton doing their job for them, and as time went on, and the war
was not over by Christmas 1914, they began to apply pressure on the government to
honour the pre-war agreement and allow war correspondents in France.  Phillip
Knightley has shown that it was pressure from the USA to improve the war reporting
that made the Cabinet press GHQ to allow a few correspondents in France.2  In June
1915, six correspondents representing the major dailies and agencies arrived at GHQ at
first for a short tour, but this core remained for the rest of the war.  Others came and
went but there were never more than about twenty at any one time.3  The post of Official
Correspondent was now redundant, so Swinton left to pursue his career with the tank.
Initially the war correspondents had been subject to severe censorship, but by 1918 the
BEF had accepted them and they had become part of the GHQ team.  Before each major
action briefings were held and after battle reports were made available to them.
The government imposed censorship immediately war broke out.  This
formalised an agreement between the Admiralty, War Office and the Press that the latter
would not publish matters considered sensitive by the former.4  ‘The Censorship’
became a large organisation covering, besides newspapers, overseas telephone, telegraph
and postal communications.  Here we are only concerned with that portion that dealt
with the news - The Press Bureau.  The instrument which gave the government its
powers was the Defence of the Realm Act (DORA).  This Act was very far ranging,
covering the collection, recording, publishing or communicating any information about
the army or navy (Regulation 18).  Spreading rumours or ‘statements likely to cause
disaffection to His Majesty’ (Regulation 27), which included anything which would
deter recruitment, made the perpetrator liable to prosecution.  Just in case something had
not been covered a catch-all clause of publishing information useful to the enemy was
included.  Initially offences could be tried by the military or naval Courts Martial but
this was later changed, after objections from the Press, to civilian courts.  Although
there were a number of refinements, these provisions remained in force until the Press
Bureau was closed on the 30 April 1919. The government was at pains to show that
while the Press was censored it was not controlled, therefore opinion in the form of
editorials and articles was allowed, together with German communiqués.  An editor had
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two choices before publication: submit the material to the Press Bureau or ‘publish and
be dammed’, thus risking prosecution.  Which course was chosen probably depended on
the newspaper’s attitude to the government.  The Times and Daily Telegraph in general
were not contentious while at the other extreme the Morning Post and the Globe were
more radical.
After the first few days of the March battle, it must have been obvious that the BEF was
conducting a fighting retreat, and while the facts could not be withheld, they would
require careful presentation.  In general, the public was informed of the situation
remarkably quickly.  Many newspaper editions contained a map showing the extent of
the German advance, and reports on the situation augmented by dispatches from GHQ
and the paper’s war correspondent.  It is this presentation of the facts that is interesting.
Bad news is never welcome, especially in war-time; however, there is often something
positive that can be reported, usually that the people on the spot are doing all they can.
Thus, over the years the bearers of bad news have learned the art of ‘deflection’:
accentuate the positive aspects of what happened while minimising the negative parts.
War reporting in the newspapers may be divided into GHQ communiqués,
dispatches from war correspondents, editorial comment and what may be termed pure
propaganda.
The GHQ dispatches were of no use to anyone.  Brief and sterile, they gave
almost no information, which of course was the intention.  The start of the German
offensive was telegraphed at 10.27 a.m. as follows: ‘A heavy bombardment was opened
by the enemy shortly before dawn this morning against our whole front from the
neighbourhood of Vendeuil, south of St. Quentin to the River Scarpe’.5 The report then
went on to list the previous night’s raids.  Similarly, on the 9 April ‘Early this morning
the enemy’s artillery developed great activity on a front extending from La Bassée to the
south of Armentières’.  For some reason GHQ found it necessary to report even when
things were quiet.  These dispatches detailed raids, both British and German, and the
odd artillery barrage.  It would surely have had more effective to have reported by
exception.  German reports were just as short, but the style was more ‘bullish’:  ‘French
Divisions brought up from Noyon were defeated at Fréniches and Bethancourt. Bussy
was captured. We are standing on the heights to the north of Noyon’.6
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The detailed news came from the war correspondents’ dispatches.  These were
very similar in style, and due to the ‘pooling’ system contained the same news stories.7
Discounting small factual errors that were bound to occur, the content varies from
reasonably accurate descriptions to wild flights of fancy with various shades of grey in
between,.  The theme running through all the correspondents’ writing was of units and
formation standing firm against overwhelming odds, while the men remained in good
heart.
The reporting of some actions shows that the war correspondents were privy to
after battle reports.  Nothing was said about the sacrifice of the 4th Guards Brigade until
2 May, when the action was described in most war correspondents’ reports.8  The
articles specifically mentioned the bravery of Private Jacotine and Captain Pryce,
Pryce’s message about fighting back-to-back, and the corporal in his company who got
away.  Also, the writing was completely factual, there being no embroidery whatsoever.
Such detail as this could surely have only come from a report rather than a participant in
the action.  All the details were mentioned in the brigade after battle report.
The pooling system used for collecting war news both in France and London
meant that there was little variation between the newspapers in this respect.  The news
stories given above are contained in most of the other papers.  This was not so with
editorials, because opinion was allowed a free reign so that there could be no accusation
of a muzzled press.  This can be illustrated by looking at the two ends of the spectrum.
The Times generally supported the government in the national interest while the
Morning Post may be considered the organ of the War Office.
The Morning Post pulled no punches right from the start.  On 25 March its
editorial attacked the sending of troops to minor theatres.
This great battle teaches us all - even the least imaginative and the most
ignorant of war - the vital nature of the Western Front.  It is here that the
war is being decided, here and upon the North Sea.  What would we give
now for all those glorious legions we have sent to the ends of the earth at
the behest of our amateurs in strategy!  Even the dazzling glories of
Jerusalem and the vital junction of Muslimie fade into insignificance in
the light of this conflict on the Somme.
Even morale boosting could be used to start a campaign to bring back Sir
William Robertson.  After commenting on the confidence generated by a message sent
by the King to his troops and an open letter to Haig from Lloyd George, the editorial
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concluded with:
Our Army organisation, both at Whitehall and in the field, may be trusted
to justify that confidence, although perhaps we may be permitted to
regret the absence of out greatest soldier from the post of supreme
direction .  Sir William Robertson, as the Government and country know,
foresaw this situation.  We hope we may be allowed to recall the attacks
on Sir William Robertson which were allowed to appear in the Press
were mainly on the ground that he was a stupid Westerner, and that he
said “Non, non,” to all the demands for a diversion of troops to the peaks
of the Dolomites and the vital junction of  Muslimie.  Muslimie, which is
somewhere near the Taurus mountains, was believed to be the navel of
world strategy then.  Now it is the “great strategic point of Amiens”.9
This was followed the next day by an editorial on whether the BEF was surprised or not
which concludes:
But if they were not surprised, did they not ask for men?  And
were the men given or were the men refused?  Did Sir William
Robertson warn the Government of the situation that was certain to arise
when the Germans brought their Eastern Armies over?  And, did the
Government take the measures which Sir William Robertson advised
them to take?  These are the questions that are urgent because the danger
is urgent.10
Finally on the 18 April under the headline ‘Bring Back Robertson’ the paper gave its
final blast on the matter.
Our beloved Prime Minister is frantically busying himself in obtaining
men.  Does he remember how many times Sir William Robertson asked
for men, not after but a year before the defeat, and how many times was
he refused?  Does he remember also how Sir William Robertson argued
against the extension of the British line, which beat out too thin the fine
metal of our defence?  He is busying himself now about more men.  Let
us remind him that in war provision should be made not after a battle but
before it, and that Sir William Robertson desired to make that provision.
And who prevented that provision being made? Why Mr Lloyd George
who understands the temper of England so little that he feared a social
revolution.  But numbers are not the only necessity in war.  Organisation,
leadership, a sound mind at the top, these are even more important.  As
long as Sir William Robertson was Chief of  the Staff both the Army and
the nation knew that they would not be let down by any lack of these
qualities in the supreme direction of the war.
These editorials have been quoted in full to show just how far newspapers were
allowed to go in expressing their opinions without fear of prosecution.  The Times was
much more supportive of the government.  In a call to mobilise Britain’s strength to the
last available man the government was urged to stop looking back at what might have
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been and who can be blamed.
We trust that the government are under no misapprehension about the
immense reserve of driving-power which they have behind them at this
crisis in an anxious, an understanding, and a thoroughly united people.11
However, even The Times might contain the occasional barb.  Reporting the speech by
Lloyd George in Parliament when he pointed out that the attack was foreseen ‘by Sir
Henry Wilson and his colleagues at Versailles’ an editorial  commented.
‘We would only add here that, when the proper time comes, it will be
necessary to ask what steps were taken to act upon it during the vital
weeks of February and the first half of March.’12
At the time no-one would have been shocked by the Morning Post and similar papers
such as The Globe, in fact it would have been expected, people buy the newspaper that
reflects their views.
The main message that the Press was trying to get across to the public was that
the Germans were trying to force a decision.  The headline ‘Greatest Battle of the War’
appeared in many newspapers.13  Together with phrases such as ‘50 miles of our line
attacked on a vaster scale than ever before’14 and ‘Enemy’s Terrific Blow’15 the
editorials confirmed the seriousness of the situation.  On the 23 March The Times
opened with:
The British Army, already tried in this war in a hundred fierce conflicts,
is battling today for the safety and the liberty of these islands and of
Western civilisation.
The war correspondents had been preparing the public for the coming battle.
Philip Gibbs wrote in The Times on the 19 February:
Any moment now we may see the beginning of the enemy’s last and
desperate effort to end the war by a decisive victory, for the offensive
which he has been preparing for months is imminent.
Then, in his despatch on the first day of the battle he wrote:
The attack already appears to be on a formidable scale, with a vast
amount of artillery and masses of men, and there is reason to believe that
it is indeed the beginning of the great offensive advertised for so long a
time and with such ferocious menaces by the enemy’s agents in neutral
countries.16
Even as late as July the German intentions were being hammered home:
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Gradually, after the monstrous efforts of the enemy to smash us to pieces
from the opening of his offensive on March 21, we are regaining power
of the initiative ...17
The newspapers were quick to take up the question of whether the BEF was
surprised by the German attack.  On the 22 March The Times reported that: ‘Three days
ago the British Cabinet received information from Headquarters in France that a great
German attack was going to be launched immediately’.18  Continuing in an editorial the
next day: ‘In the initial stages, the German offensive contained no surprises.  Our Army
was not caught unawares.  Nothing in the war has been more remarkable than the
unerring accuracy with which our Intelligence has lately divined the intentions of the
enemy’.19  On the 9 April Lloyd George confirmed in Parliament that the German
offensive had been foreseen. ‘The Prime Minister disclosed the fact that the exact
tactical form which it would take, the place where the blow would be delivered, and
almost the very number of divisions that would be used, had all been predicted so long
ago as January by Sir Henry Wilson and his colleagues at Versailles.’20
Generally, units and formations were not mentioned by name.  One exception to
this rule was the successful defence of Givenchy by the 55th Division on 9 April. News
of its action appeared in the newspapers the next day; the division was even referred to
by name and the fact that it contained ‘Lancashire men’ was made known.  Philip Gibbs,
who wrote the article, emphasised that there were three attacks, each of which was
repulsed, and that the captured German instructions said that Givenchy was defended by
six companies of tired men.21  Even GHQ threw caution to the wind and issued a special
communiqué on the division’s achievement.
German gains north and south of Ypres had enlarged the Salient which was in
danger of being pinched out.  While acknowledging the sacrifices made the previous
year the public were informed of the necessity of pulling back.  For example, the usually
strident Morning Post published the following report ‘from a special correspondent’:
Our front in Flanders has been straightened and eased of a dangerous
salient which raised its head across the Passchendaele Ridge.  We have
withdrawn voluntarily from the ground taken last year, and have come
back unhindered or delayed to the lower battlefield in a wide curve round
Ypres, still retaining that ruin, and bending with great freedom past the
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cellars of Wytschaete into a position behind Bailleul.  It is not a pleasant
thing to record, but the situation created by the German drive across the
Lys has made this re-adjustment necessary, and it must be accepted as the
fortune of war.22
The Daily Mirror took much the same line over both Armentières and the Salient:
It has probably been in part a sentimental reason which impelled us to
hold the bulge that the town made in our line, very much as we held the
Ypres salient because of the memory of gallant fights that cling around
it.23
Haig’s ‘Backs to the Wall” order’ was printed in full in most papers, very often
with little comment, allowing it to speak for itself.  The Morning Post, however,
commented in its editorial:
The special Order of the Day issued by Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig
to all ranks of the British Army in France and Flanders will become
historic, as the high call that rallied the indomitable valour of the British
soldier to victory.  When Vice-Admiral Lord Nelson hoisted his famous
signal before the battle of Trafalgar his officers and men said among
themselves that the Commander-in-Chief had no need to remind them of
their duty, and they were very likely right.24
The Daily Mail was a little more down-to-earth:
...there may be no mistaking the emergency or misunderstanding what the
nation and its Army are called upon to do.  The nation which proves
itself capable of any sacrifice for freedom will assuredly prevail over a
nation such as Germany that only seeks the subjugation of other peoples.
The Army in the same spirit will act on the words of Sir Douglas Haig’s
moving order.  “Victory belongs to the side which holds out longest”.
We know our men will put forth all their heroism with Spartan firmness
and tenacity.25
An advertising copywriter quickly saw the potential of Haig’s order.  Under the
heading ‘Is your back to the wall?  Sir Douglas Haig’s message carries a message for
you’, the public were exhorted to ‘Buy War Bonds’.26
The examples above show that some news items were reported with little
embellishment.  However, others would require careful handling if offending Britain’s
allies was to be avoided.
The complete collapse of the Portuguese front required special handling.  The
heaviness of the preliminary bombardment, the width of their front, and the number of
opposing troops were all emphasised.  Many of the articles had a basis of fact which was
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embellished.  Gibbs wrote of a battalion of Portuguese around Lacouture who fought
until they had used up all of their ammunition, called for more, and then ‘went on
stubbornly clinging to their positions, until a large proportion had been killed’.  It has
been shown that the Portuguese artillery did better than their infantry, although many
guns were captured intact and used by the Germans.  In the newspapers the Portuguese
field guns that survived the bombardment were turned on the Germans at point blank
range, and the retreating gunners brought the breech blocks of their weapons away with
them.  The Portuguese ‘heavies’ were working under British supervision and did well.
When describing this Gibbs stated ‘and the British Commanding Officer is loud in
praise of the splendid way they ‘”stuck it” with their British comrades’.27  Another
correspondent, Hamilton Fyfe, who was syndicated to many papers and gave a similar
story to Gibbs.
The loss of Kemmel Hill by the French 28th Division on the 26 April could not
be reported as the rout that has been described in a previous chapter.  Anglo-French
relations would have become more strained.  There were two options: say little about the
French, which is what the Daily Mirror did, there being plenty of British action going on
in the same area; or make it up.  Both Gibbs and Hamilton Fyfe gave accounts of what
happened on the hill which can only be described as fantasy.  Under the headline ‘Fall of
Kemmel’ Gibbs described a heroic stand by the French garrison: ‘French troops had
sworn that they would never leave Kemmel while they lived’.  Aircraft reconnaissance
in the afternoon showed the top of the hill ‘crowned with blue as defenders, facing both
ways made their last stand!’28  Hamilton Fyfe’s prose was similar: ‘The French infantry
on the hill had received orders to defend it with the utmost energy and to the last.  I have
heard that the General told his men that “they were to stay on it until they died rather
than retreat,” and his command was implicitly obeyed.’29
Gibbs’ dispatches were collated into a series of books after the war.  In the
volume dealing with 1918 he wrote in an Author’s Note: ‘My daily record is here
printed just as I wrote it with only some names of battalions and numbers of divisions
added to my narrative’.30  Comparing his book with the original shows that much of the
text quoted above was edited, the second quotation has become ‘Small parties of them
on the west of the hill held out until midday or beyond, according to reports of out
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airmen, who flew over them; but by nine o’clock in the morning, owing to gaps made by
the enemy, the main French line was compelled to draw back from Kemmel’.31
The subordinating of a British field marshal to a French general might be
expected to cause adverse comment in the newspapers.  This was not so.  The
announcement of Foch’s new position came after over a week of bad news from the
Western Front; obviously, desperate situations call for desperate measures.  The reason
given for Foch’s appointment was the creation of an Allied unified command similar to
that of the Germans.  Thus, when the story broke headlines were typically ‘General Foch
in sole command’,32 or ‘Great Britain and France under one Chief’,33 the latter with
pictures of Haig, Foch and Pershing.  The newspapers missed, or were not aware of, the
subtle differences between the results of the Doullens and Beauvais Conferences;  also,
the anomalous position of the Belgians was not picked up.  Foch’s qualifications for the
job seem to have been more important than his actual duties.  The Illustrated London
News carried a picture of Foch with the caption ‘He has by consent of the British,
American and Belgian governments been appointed Generalissimo of the Western Front.
Before the war he was acknowledged as a foremost writer on tactics and strategy by
Europe.  His brilliant and masterly tactics won the battle of the Marne ... he is sixty-five
years of age, but with the physical and mental powers of a man of forty’.34  The next
week’s edition carried a full page picture, with a quotation from Lloyd George speaking
in Parliament: ‘The enemy has had the incalculable advantage of fighting as one Army.
To meet this the Allies have, since the battle began, taken a most important decision.
With the cordial co-operation of the British and French Commanders-in-Chief, General
Foch has been charged by the British French and American Governments to co-ordinate
the action of the Allied Armies on the Western Front.’35  There were differences in
emphasis between papers.  On the 16 April The Times carried the official announcement
of the appointment ‘The widest powers have been given to General Foch by the French
and British Governments in order that he may act, and that his actions will not be
questioned, an absolute agreement on this subject having been come to between the two
Governments interested.  One united Anglo-French-American Army has thus been
constituted’.  While the Daily Express stated on the same date: ‘It is officially
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announced that the British and French Governments have agreed to confer upon General
Foch the title of Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies in France’.  What the
newspapers did not ask was: why had it taken so long?  Instead, they concentrated very
much on Foch’s co-ordination of Allied efforts on the Marne in 1914, the intervening
years were hardly mentioned.  The Illustrated London News related, in a short article
about the Marne, the following conversation between Foch and Sir John French.  ‘At the
end of October 1914 he wakened Marshal French at St. Omer.  It was one o’clock in the
morning.  “Marshal your line has broken,” he declared.  “ Yes”, replied the Commander-
in-Chief.  “Have you reinforcements?” “Not a thing.” “Then I will send you some.”’36
A most interesting conversation considering that neither spoke the others language!  Or,
was someone aware that Haig had spent the previous month trying to prise French
troops from Foch.  There was very little here for the newspapers to criticise had they
wished to, probably due to the agreement by all parties to Foch’s appointment.  An
editorial in the Daily Mail summed up the situation:
The appointment of General Foch to co-ordinate the manoeuvres of the
Allies in no sense supersedes Sir Douglas Haig, but has taken place at his
request.  It secures complete unity - a priceless asset - on the side of the
Allies, and means that the movements of Sir Douglas Haig and General
Pétain will be linked together ... . In General Foch, who is a great friend
and admirer of Sir Douglas Haig, our troops and the French have perfect
confidence.  He is not only a man of action, but a man of thought, his
military writings have long been famous.37
At the tactical level pictures were used to emphasise Anglo-French co-operation,
again with some journalistic licence.  For example, the Illustrated London News carried
a set of photographs of British tommies and French poilus under the caption ‘British and
French Divisions fighting shoulder to shoulder by regiment and battalion’.38
The word retreat was not used.  Instead the line was ‘pushed’ or ‘forced’ back,
under strong enemy pressure, usually with a comment on the high cost in casualties to
the Germans, British losses never being mentioned directly.  Headlines such as ‘Foe’s
400,000 Losses’39 and ‘Small Gains for Colossal Sacrifice’40 were used to emphasise
the price the Germans were paying for their success.  The estimated German casualties
varied considerably; 41 for example, The Globe reported the French Journal as saying:
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‘According to calculations at the British General Headquarters, 250,000 German bodies
lie on the ground recently taken by the Germans’.42  Reports from the USA alleged that
the Germans were willing to take enormous casualties to gain their ends: ‘According to
information which has filtered into Washington from Germany the price which
Hindenburg and his lieutenants are willing to pay for their attempts to achieve victory on
the Western Front amounts to a million and a half casualties.’43  The general impression
was of the BEF taking a huge toll of massed German infantry.  Pictorially, it was the
artillery that handed out this punishment; for example, on the 6 April the Illustrated
London News carried a double page picture of ‘gas masked gunners inflicting terrible
casualties’, with the sub-text ‘The German command has bought such success as it has
obtained on the Western Front at a huge sacrifice in men who have been sent forward in
masses with the usual disregard of life, in full view of our artillery’.  Again, in the
Illustrated London News, on the 27 April there was another two page picture of 18 pdrs
‘firing over open sights’ with the text; ‘There has never been such a killing of Germans
since the war began, ... artillery holding back reckless German onslaughts ... Our
gunners were firing hour after hour at large bodies of Germans’.
The RFC received credit for harassing the German lines of communication.  This
type of action is difficult to report but makes striking headlines.  For example, on the 29
March the Daily Mirror reported ‘26 tons of bombs dropped and 250,000 rounds fired
by our pilots’ on the previous day, under the headline ‘Marching Huns bombed and
riddled with fire’.44
The names of individual officers are rarely mentioned, it was almost as if the war
was being fought incognito.  Brigadier-General G G S Carey was an exception, his name
being mentioned in Parliament by Lloyd George on the 9 April: ‘At one point there was
a serious gap, which might have let the enemy into Calais.  He gathered together
signalmen, engineers, labour battalions, odds and ends of machine-gunners - every one,
and threw them into the line and closed up that gap.’45  In the same edition, in a column
‘By the Way’ which contained odd bits and pieces of news, the public were given details
of Carey’s career:  ‘Brigadier-General Carey, to whom the Prime Minister referred in his
speech last night as having held a gap in our line for six days with a scratch force of
labour men, signallers and mechanics is an old artilleryman.  He fought with great
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distinction in South Africa.  He has clearly proved himself to be a most resourceful
soldier, with a keen eye for the right thing to do in an emergency’.  Carey’s Force was
formed on the 26 March from various odds and ends, including ‘500 American railway
troops who had no military training’,46 and numbered about 3,000 men, to man a
rearward defence line about Amiens as the only reserve for XIX Corps (Lieut.-General
Sir H E Watts) and came into action the next day when this position became the front
line.  It remained in the line until the 5 April ‘when its troops were sent back to their
own formations’.47  His fame spread to the USA, perhaps due to the American troops
under his command, and the New York Times commented: ‘The more we hear about
Brigadier-General Sandeman Carey and the scratch force which he picked up from
nowhere to stop the German host, the more certain it appears that this is one of those
occurrences which happen once or twice in each great war and keep poets and painters
and orators busy for a good many years afterwards.’48
This band of amateurs was just what the papers wanted, with the added bonus
that its leader could be named.  However, this does show the danger of highlighting
individuals.  Carey’s Force held only a small part of the line but its contribution was
blown out of all proportion to its actual contribution.  Allowing the naming of
individual soldiers could have led to all sorts of problems, as shown by Carey’s case.  It
would have been easy for ambitious officers to make the authorities and the public
aware of their exploits and thus enhance their promotion prospects.  This had happened
in the South African War and hence the pendulum swung to the other extreme of  ‘no
advertising’.
The naming of individual soldiers could have caused suffering to their loved
ones at home.  Confirmation that a soldier was dead took months if his body was not
recovered immediately from the battlefield.  There was always a chance that he had been
taken prisoner and the lists of prisoners took some time to reach Britain via the Red
Cross in Geneva.  Referring to the reporting of the 4th Guards Brigade, there was hope
that Captain Pryce was a prisoner-of-war.  Private Jacotine came from Ceylon and it
would have been terrible for his parents to learn of his death from the newspaper rather
than official sources.
Another soldier who needed introducing to the public was Sir Henry Wilson,
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who replaced Sir William Robertson as CIGS on the 18 February.  Wilson had not been
a success as an operational commander; so, with little to write the newspapers made it
up.  Under the headline ‘An expert on the Western Front’ the Illustrated London News
told its readers that Wilson was ‘Professionally held in the highest regard at Army
Headquarters as a soldier of exceptionally brilliant talents and attainments’.49  A
fortnight later the same periodical published another picture of Wilson.  The caption
stated that he was an ‘Expert on the topography of the Western Front, a strategist of
exceptional skill’.  It went on: ‘he gained his topographical knowledge during cycling
tours before the war’.50
On the 27 March General Gough, commander of the ill-fated Fifth Army,  was
replaced by General Rawlinson and was sent home on the 3 April after Haig’s failure to
intercede on his behalf with Lloyd George.  By then rumours of Gough’s dismissal had
begun to circulate, because on that day the Daily Graphic carried a picture of Gough, in
civilian clothes wearing a bowler hat, with the caption ‘General Sir H Gough VC who
according to a widely circulated but unofficial report has relinquished the command of
the Fifth Army’.51  In the same publication there appeared a photograph of Rawlinson:
‘General Sir Henry Rawlinson said to have succeeded to the command of the Fifth
Army which stood the early shock of the battle’.  Lieut.-General Ivor Maxse, who
commanded XVIII Corps under Gough, has left us an example of how these rumours
start:  On the 29 March he wrote to his brother Leo, owner of the National Review: ‘I
have just said goodbye to Gough - much to my regret - and feel he has been made a
scapegoat’.  The letter goes on to praise Gough and ends up ‘Rawly has turned up’.52
On the 9 April Lloyd George made a statement in Parliament which was widely
reported:
Until the whole of the circumstances which led to the retirement of the
5th Army - its failure to hold the line on the Somme and perhaps the
failure to adequately destroy the bridges - are explained, it would be
unfair to censure the general in command, General Gough.  But until the
circumstances are cleared up it would be equally unfair to the British
Army to retain his services in the field.  The War Cabinet therefore
thought it necessary to recall him until the facts are fully explained and
laid before the Government by their military advisers.53
While the editorials remained silent - perhaps warned off - mischief could be
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made in the House.  On the 11 April, in answer to a question Bonar Law, standing in for
Lloyd George, refused to be drawn about who was in command, he made the point that
now was not the time for an enquiry.  Thus, with the attack on the Lys in full swing
Gough became yesterday’s news.
The one individual who could be named was Sir Douglas Haig.  Headlines such
as ‘Haig back to the Somme’54 or ‘Splendid Report from Haig’55 show that his name
was synonymous with the BEF, but there is no evidence of a ‘cult of personality’.
However, the main news about Haig concerned the appointment of Foch as
Generalissimo .
The bad news from France must have caused great concern, and so there were
many attempts to allay the public’s fears.  On the 22nd March Bonar Law stated in the
House of Commons that ‘Our outpost troops have withdrawn to the battle zone’ adding
that ‘this was what was intended on our part in the event of such an attack’, and that
enemy gains were expected ‘as many military writers had also pointed out’.56  Later, in
an open letter to Haig, Lloyd George promised everything the country could provide in
support:
At home we are prepared to do all in out power to help in the true spirit
of comradeship.  The men necessary to replace all casualties, and the
guns and machine-guns required to make good those lost are either now
in France or already on their way, and still further reinforcements of men
and guns are ready to be thrown into the battle.57
As the battle progressed the mood became more reflective:
Perhaps the tendency of the majority since the big German offensive
began has been to indulge in too pessimistic a view.  That is excusable.
The nation was not prepared for so serious a setback as has happened.
And because there has not been an encounter on a vast scale for a
considerable time, we were liable to imagine the adverse events of a few
days were of decisive importance.
The article concluded:
Words fail us, as they have failed Sir Douglas Haig, to express our
admiration for the men who have for nearly a month defied the Germans’
most determined efforts to pierce their line.58
Perhaps the greatest deflection from the bad news from the front was
unintentional.  For those at home life went on, but perhaps not as normal.  This is
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reflected in the contents of the newspapers.  Although we might expect there to be
nothing else but ‘the great battle in France’, in fact this was not so.  Indeed it is
surprising how little news from the Western Front the papers contained.  Other
campaigns were reported, notably Allenby’s recent success in Palestine.  There were
also continuous small naval actions off the Belgian and French Coasts and air raids on
Germany.  On the political front the ‘combing out’ of men for the army and various
strikes received prominence in both the news and leader sections.  Also, the Irish
question was not far away.  Domestic reports showed that nothing changes very much;
various society divorces and a bigamy trial gave some relief to the war news. Royal
visits around the country and to France always made good copy.  In addition, there
seems to have been a continuous stream of corruption trials.  The state had become a
large purchaser of goods, from blankets to shells; the control of this commerce by minor
officials led to the offering and passing of ‘considerations’ which in turn sometimes led
to the police courts.  Budget day on the 22 April was another source of depressing news.
Taxes were increased especially on luxuries and those little necessities like drink and
tobacco.59  This managed to push the Western Front into second place on the 23 April.
In the run-up to the Budget wholesalers received a bad press, being accused of holding
back supplies especially cigarettes, in anticipation of tax increases.
After a month of doom and gloom the situation was rescued by the Senior
Service.  On St George’s Day - 23 April - the famous Zeebrugge raid took place.  This
was a journalist’s dream, being both a success and a change from trench warfare.
Photographs of the battered assault ship, HMS Vindictive, vied with artists impressions
of the daring exploit, and continued to do so while the BEF finally held the German
advance.
We might consider all war news to contain some propaganda, especially when
disasters were being reported.  It was important to the government to maintain the
country’s faith in its leaders, and commitment to fighting on until Germany was
defeated.  One method of sustaining the public’s commitment to the war was anti-
German propaganda.  In general the Germans were made out to be inhuman beasts, this
being reinforced by the use of words like Hun or Boche, although GHQ always referred
to ‘the enemy’.  Occasionally the Germans handed the Allies a propaganda coup by the
mismanagement of their affairs; for example, the Nurse Cavell affair.  In 1918 it was
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maltreatment of prisoners-of-war.  In April 1918 the government published the report by
a committee under Mr Justice Younger on the German treatment of POWs.60  Under the
headline ‘Only a German could do it, British Prisoners Bayoneted by Sentry, Hut Fire
Tragedy’, the Daily Express reported the case of Able Seaman Genover at Brandenburg
Camp.  ‘He was bayoneted by a German sentry as he was trying to escape from a
burning building and fell back into the flames’.61  The main complaint against the
Germans’ conduct was that they used prisoners as labour in the battle area, as shown
when further details of the White Paper were given on the 12 April under the typical
heading ‘Prisoners as slaves:  British soldiers made to work under shellfire: Whipped
and kicked’.62  The Daily Mail reported:
The men were half starved.  They picked up potato peelings that had
been trampled under foot.  An Australian private who, starving had fallen
out to pick up a piece of bread left on the roadside by a Belgian woman,
was shot and killed by the guard.63
It is perhaps much more subtle to ridicule your opponent.  On the 16 April the
Exchange Telegraph circulated the story of the Congolese shoeblack in Brussels who
had disobeyed the regulations concerning the display of the Belgian colours.  He dressed
in red and painted his cart yellow.  With his black skin he made up the colours of the
Belgian Flag.  ‘He was denounced as a conspirator and ordered to be deported.’64
Some events could be turned into propaganda.  On the 23 March the Germans
began bombarding Paris from the St. Gobain forest some seventy-five miles away.  In all
the City would receive 367 rounds.65  At first the newspapers were more interested in
how this was being done; besides just a big gun there were suggestions that
electromagnetic force or rockets were involved.  It would seem that an electric gun had
been patented in America by a Swede, Professor Kristian Birkeland; this, and the
science of ballistics, were explained in long articles.66  At first the shelling of Paris was
a propaganda victory for the Germans.  On the 25 March they announced ‘We have
bombarded the fortress of Paris with long distance guns’.67 More worrying for the
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British was a report that ‘Austrian military circles are of the opinion that the
bombardment of the city of Paris is only a trial of the cannon, which are really to be
directed against London.’68  However, on Good Friday (29 March) a shell hit a Paris
church causing many casualties, which prompted an editorial in the Daily Express ‘The
Unspeakable Hun:  The German has achieved a further claim to universal execration by
the bombardment of a Paris church on Good Friday and the massacre of seventy-five
worshipers before the high alter of Christianity’.69
The British on the other hand were portrayed as heroes ‘playing the game’.
German prisoners were shown being cared for, with an almost obligatory mug or
cigarette in hand.  A picture in the Illustrated London News under the headline  ‘A
British Officer’s act of courtesy’, showed him handing his water bottle to a German
prisoner.70  Heroism sometimes cut both ways.  On the 21 April, the German air ace,
Baron von Richthofen, was shot down.  Instead of glee the papers were very respectful.
For example, the Daily Mirror carried a picture of the burial party with the front page
headline ‘Honour to a Brave Enemy’.71  Continuing in this vein, there were also
editorials with Homeric overtones.  For example:
The heroes of antiquity must be watching this war from their resting
places in the shades with a little natural jealousy.  No longer will men
prate of the deeds of Hector and Achilles.  The modern world has its own
heroes, until the past three years unknown and unsuspected, and their
deeds are more wonderful than poets ever dreamed for the heroes of
Greece and Troy.72
It has been shown that the public were accurately kept informed of the seriousness of the
situation in France, and the failure to hold the line was admitted.  On the other hand, the
German attempt to win the war was portrayed as being made at enormous cost.  As
might be expected, failures by Britain’s allies were dressed up as stands to the last man.
In general, the impression from the newspaper editorials was that the BEF knew what it
was doing, and expected the support of those at home.  This was reinforced by the war
correspondents’ dispatches, although these have been shown to contain many
fabrications.
Yet after the war there was a general feeling that the public had been poorly
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served by the Press, and that the ‘truth’ had been withheld.  Knightley quotes Lloyd
George as saying ‘If people really knew, the war would be stopped tomorrow’.73
Montague further argues that reports of actions were so unlike the reality that the
fighting men ‘found the Press out’.74  The troops also objected to being portrayed as
spoiling for a fight, ‘enjoying nothing better than going over the top’.75  Even though
Gibbs thought that the war correspondent’s task was a ‘job worth doing, and not badly
done’,76  there is some truth in these allegations, so what went wrong?
Kitchener’s refusal to allow correspondents to go to France, and the subsequent
use of ‘Eyewitness’ accounts, meant that war reporting got off to a bad start.  This state-
of-affairs was not helped by the army’s attitude to reporters.  Chaos at the beginning was
not confined to the Press, although by the second half of 1916 the BEF was becoming an
efficient organisation, while war reporting was at this time just starting to find its feet.
Unfortunately, the die was cast and war correspondents had no means of changing the
system.  The newspaper proprietors became part of the government machine, and so
were unable, or unwilling, to try to present the war as it was.
It would be easy to blame the censorship for the failure of the Press to present
the war as it was.  Certainly, in the early years there was an almost paranoid fear of
giving away any information to the Germans, but as time went on things became more
relaxed.  No doubt the strictness of the censorship can be blamed on the government’s
lack of experience, but again the pattern was set at the beginning.  Even relaxing the
censorship would not have given the public what they wanted - victories won by heroes.
What they got, and could not understand because it was not explained, was attrition
battles fought by heroes.  Even if we take away the censorship many of the problems of
reporting the war still exist.
To be effective the war correspondents had to be part of the GHQ team; Gibbs
admits that they existed between two worlds, the army and the civilians, while
belonging to neither.  Also, by being close to GHQ they became part of the great
charade, and together with many of the newspaper owners subjugated their campaigning
zeal for the good of King and Country.  However much they may have justified their
actions in memoirs after the war the fact remains that the Press, by remaining silent,
allowed the authorities to sweep many deficiencies under the carpet.
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Even though the correspondents won the ‘hearts and minds’ battle with GHQ
they did not change the style of writing which shows that they did not adapt to the
modern style of battle.  They were used to reporting small battles of a few days duration
at the most, perhaps looking down from some hill top, metaphorical or real.  Suddenly
the scale of warfare changed and huge numbers of men were involved. For example,
even an early battle such as Loos in 1915 involved six divisions in the initial assault,
some 100,000 men.  Because the battles went on for weeks the correspondents could
only write vignettes on small actions.  GHQ on the other hand chose a minimalist style
that both gave nothing away and said nothing - perhaps they wished to give the
impression that they were far too busy to write dispatches.  Thus between them GHQ
and the war correspondents were unable to give a clear account of what was happening
which surely is what the public wanted to know.
Yet the two parties could have produced much better copy.  If GHQ found it
difficult to write descriptive prose, they had the experts literally down the road, and
better communiqués would have given leader writers more to work with.  A day-by-day
official history would have been too much to ask for, but descriptions of important
actions written after the event when reports were to hand would have satisfied the
public’s need for information.  There are occasional glimpses of this.  On the 15 April
GHQ released a description of the defence of Givenchy by the 55th Division.  Consider
the following extract.
Throughout the early part of the morning of April 9 the 55th Division
beat off all attacks in its forward zone and maintained its line intact.
Later, when the German infantry had broken through the Portuguese
position on its left, the division formed a defensive flank facing north-
east on the line Givenchy - Festubert to the neighbourhood of Le Touret.
This line it maintained practically unchanged until relief, through six
days of almost continual fighting, in the course of which it beat off
repeated German attacks with the heaviest losses to the enemy and took
nearly 1000 prisoners.77
This rather wooden, but completely accurate, description may be compared with Gibbs’
version of the first day of the battle.
I have told in my previous message the first outline of what happened
yesterday, but there is more to tell.  The great achievement of the day on
the part of our troops engaged was the magnificent stand of the 55th
Division - all Lancashire troops - who held our right flank firm against
fierce, repeated attacks, some four times stronger than themselves in
numbers, and who, when the Portuguese troops on their left were broken,
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formed flank on their left, and so withstood the enemy’s hammer blows
that at the end of the day and this morning our line was unbroken there.
Givenchy was still ours, and the enemy’s waves of men lay shattered in
front of them, and 750 prisoners were in our hands.78
It is surely not a huge step to combine these two into a reasonable account.  Had
they wished, the army and the Press could have forced this style of reporting on the
authorities from the beginning, there being no precedent for reporting total war.
Unfortunately, relationships got in the way and the army probably felt this was a battle
they did not need to fight, so a great opportunity was missed.
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CONCLUSIONS
bsolute terms like winning and losing are difficult to apply to the attritional
battles of the Great War as they imply some sort of final result.  Even the war
itself ended in an armistice rather than a surrender which enabled the German
Army to claim that they had not been defeated in the field, therefore it is difficult to
apply terms such as this to the Great War battles.  They often went on for months and
were in themselves a series of battles.  After the war the War Office Battle
Nomenclature Committee used the concept of a main battle and subsidiary ones  in
awarding Battle Honours; for example, for the Lys there is the main honour and eight
subsidiary ones.1  Even then it can be difficult to define a winner.  The first two, Estaires
and Messines, were German victories as here they broke through the British front line
and captured the area defined by the battle area, but Bailleul where the Germans took
the town but were then stopped might be considered a draw, and a similar argument may
be used for Hazebrouck.  It may be better to look at who gained the advantage by
realising their objectives.
Using this criteria the Germans gained nothing.  They did not win the war, as the
BEF, although badly mauled, remained intact as a fighting force, and the territory they
captured was of no use to them; in fact, it was counter-productive as the line now took
more divisions to defend and they were forward of their prepared positions where the
troops could live in relative comfort.  On the Somme and in front of Ypres supplies to
the front had to cross devastated areas, which meant that further offensives would be
difficult to maintain.  On the other hand, the Allies had gained much.  Their main
objective, to buy time by holding the Germans until sufficient American troops had
arrived in France, had been achieved, together with the windfall of a co-ordinated
command.  The BEF had gained experience in mobile warfare, or at least warfare as
mobile as it was ever going to be on the Western Front, and the new organisation of
divisions and machine-guns had had a shakedown.  GDC Money made the point to
Edmonds that the machine-gun battalions had just been formed and were unpopular with
brigade and battalion commanders, who resented them being placed under divisional
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HQ command.2  This view changed after the Lys due to the excellent work which they
did.  Thus using the advantage criterion the Allies were the clear victors; however, this
still does not completely explain why the Germans lost.
One common factor in the German offensives against the BEF was the weather,
and consequently the foggy mornings of March and April 1918 have produced one of
the great ‘might have beens’ of the Great War.  Opinions varied about the relative
advantages and disadvantages the weather gave to each side, and allowed the army to
claim some sort of force majeure in mitigation.  For example, the BGRA of XV Corps,
Brigadier-General Kirwan, felt that the results would have been different without the fog
as after the divisional artillery was lost in the initial attack, the corps guns could only
fire by map and calculation.3  It is worth noting that the British seem to have made no
preparations for the Germans’ use of smoke shell.
Morning fog or mist is quite common in Europe, yet neither side seems to have
made any provision for effects of weather in their plans, even though visual observation
was important to both sides’ tactics.  The British were relying on the machine-gun as
their main defensive weapon, placing belts of wire so that the attackers were drawn into
their fields of fire.  With their machine-guns blinded they had little chance to open fire
before the Germans were upon them.  Where the telephone failed due to the preliminary
bombardment, cutting unburied cables, the SOS rockets sent up by the front-line
infantry to call up an artillery barrage on the German positions in the event of an attack
could not be seen.  On the German side, after the first two hours of the bombardment
there were to be three periods of ten minutes each when the range of specific targets was
to be visually checked ready for the final two hours.  They were unable to do this and
had to rely on predictions made before the battle.  However, on the day the sheer
intensity of the bombardment probably made little difference.  There is no evidence of
them using large amounts of smoke shell in their bombardment to create an artificial fog
to cover the initial assault.  They were content to knock out the command and artillery,
which together with the sheer force of the final stage, to paralysed the defenders.  The
Germans were also using rockets or flares, the leading squads were to show the way by
firing flares as they found the gaps in the  British defences. Also, neither side was able
to make any use of aerial observation.
We tend to look at who received an advantage from the fog, whereas, as has been
                                                
2 PRO CAB 45/124: GDC Money (55th Machine-gun Battalion) to Edmonds.
3 PRO CAB 45/124: BRK Kirwan (BGRA XV Corps) to Edmonds.
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shown above, it was really a hindrance and the degree to which it disadvantaged each
side changed as time went on.  Early on the fog disadvantaged the British by blinding
the defenders, so that the first Germans to be seen often came from the rear.  Once they
were past the front positions the situation changed and the fog caused the Germans
considerable difficulties.  No landmarks could be seen and the leading troops had to feel
their way which had two effects: they lost the creeping barrage and, moving slower than
expected, the infantry behind began to bunch.  When the fog lifted these often battalion
sized groups made excellent targets for the any British artillery that had survived.  The
fog disadvantaged both sides, but was used by the BEF as an excuse to cover poor
defensive tactics.
It is a natural step to use the German experience as a benchmark against which to judge
the BEF’s efforts.  However, it must be remembered that this is a comparison of two
quite different armies.  The German started the war with a large conscript army whereas
the British had to spend the first two years of the war building a citizen army.  Thus the
British has to fight the whole war with no NCO or junior officer cadre, and a chronic
shortage of experienced staff officers.  It was only in 1917 that the BEF became an
effective force in the offensive having learned the necessary lessons in the hard school
of 1915 and 1916.
The view that when faced with the need to go on the defensive all the BEF had
to do was apply the German manuals is far too simple.  The captured manuals did not
contain a magic formula which, if followed, produced a defensive scheme.  Rather they
were a set of principles to be applied when producing a defensive scheme for a
particular area or position.  The user was assumed to have knowledge of the defensive
battle and was expected to apply this experience.  Without this basic ingredient of
experience GHQ was bound to fail.  When the manuals were first issued to the German
Army it took seven months to train an army in their use that had been on the defensive
for two years.  The BEF had two months to introduce a doctrine into four Armies
containing 47 divisions with a wide range of ability in their commanders.  The defensive
doctrine proposed by the committee of three officers, which was based on a lightly held
front line with a main line of defence behind, could have been achieved in time.  In fact,
it is what De Lisle and Haking constructed.  This lack of experience meant that often too
many men were put in to the front line which was then subjected to the full force of the
German bombardment.  When the German storm-troops attacked, the front-line
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defenders were overwhelmed and consequently much of the garrison lost.
The BEF made the same two fundamental mistakes in their defence of the Lys
front as they did in Picardy: the order to stand and fight and the placing of too many
men too far forward.  It has been shown in chapter 1 that these two concepts were part
of the German defensive doctrine early in the war and were changed in the light of
experience.  The Allies now had to learn the same lesson.  They had missed the point of
the use of the machine-gun in defence: ‘In the German conception the machine-gun
defence replaced manpower sufficiently to allow two-thirds of the garrison to be mobile
for immediate counter-attack, the British copy placed two-thirds or more in the defended
localities.’4  The shortage of infantry in the Fifth Army area led to them trying to defend
a series of positions, rather than one continuous front line, the so-called ‘blob’ defence.
Forward defended localities were made by combining sectors of the front
and support trenches, about 200 yards apart, into centres of resistance and
grouping 150 - 300 men into each with one or more machine-guns as
support weapons.  The second row was made by treating the reserve
trench, 2500 yards behind in the same way.  To satisfy the German
instruction that machine-guns were the backbone of the defence, an
intermediate row of single machine-guns was added, but without any
special cover of infantry protection.5
 Edmonds excused the packing of the front line on account of the shortage of
manpower: ‘... the length of front line was so great in proportion to the number of men
available, and absorbed so may battalions, that the garrisons of the two rearward zones
had of necessity to be smaller than they should have been, even had the defences been
complete.’6  For some reason the British command did not take into account the power
of  artillery fire, something it had used to great effect during the previous two years.
Positioning most of the defenders in the second line, be it trenches or blobs, would have
put them out of range of the German field artillery and trench mortars and more would
have survived the bombardment.  We have seen that this concept was used successfully
by XIII Corps and 55th Division, but GHQ was unwilling to give up the front line, often
won at great cost, without a fight, as it was considered the jumping-off point for the next
offensive.
Most of the defensive schemes produced during the winter had to be abandoned
because there were insufficient divisions to fulfil them.  For example, the 40th Division
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south of Armentières was defending a sector designed for two divisions.  Also, many of
the divisions which had already been engaged in Picardy had battalions that were either
depleted in numbers or contained many draftees rushed over from the UK.  For
example, the 51st Division had lost 219 officers and 4696 other ranks in March,
subsequently receiving a draft of 3000 men but few officers.7 In general regimental
officers were pleased with the quality of these reinforcements; the 10th Royal Waricks
received a draft early in the battle and the CO wrote ‘I remember this because I was so
delighted that the new draft, consisting mainly of young experienced soldiers, held their
ground’.8  This may have influenced the dispositions, but whatever the reason the idea
of ‘to the last man and the last bullet’ meant that the casualties from the German
bombardment were heavy.
In his memoirs Lord Chandos described the action of the 4th Guards Brigade as
a soldier’s battle,9 and this may be said to be true of all the Spring Offensives.  Divisions
and brigades were the formations on the spot and events moved so fast that corps and
army commanders could do little in a tactical sense except ‘rubber stamp’ the actions of
their subordinates.  This was not a failure but a hard fact of life.  The function of the
higher staffs in this situation was to keep the supplies moving, which may sound a
mundane job, but it was essential for the men at the front.  Besides rations, which could
be gone without or extemporised, the infantry and artillery required ammunition.  The
5th Division fired two and a half million rounds of SAA on the 13th,10 and de Lisle
recorded that the artillery within XV Corps used on average 450 tons of shells per day.11
The BEF’s stockpile of ammunition was prodigious, Edmonds giving the figure of a
half-million tons being available in army dumps.  As a consequence of the retreat all
kinds of military equipment had to be replaced and again army stocks were able to meet
requirements.
In many ways the Lys battle is similar to the Somme but two of the reasons, or
excuses, for poor performance are missing: the dilution of the defenders by the
extension of the Fifth Army line and poor performance by the neighbouring French.
Significantly, there was no repeat of the retreat by the Fifth Army.  The gap left by the
Portuguese retreat and the pushing aside of the 40th Division was soon plugged.  For the
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next three days the Germans had their best chance of success while the front remained
fluid between Merville and Messines.  The Germans were unable to exploit this
weakness due to difficulties of supply and the tenacity of the defenders.  When the BEF
had effective infantry/artillery co-operation working the Germans had the utmost
difficulty in getting the battle moving again.  The best example of this is the five days it
took to complete the preparations for the second attack on Kemmel Hill.
The British use of reserves in the battle is interesting.  Instead of putting
relieving divisions into the line, they were formed up in a good position behind and the
front was allowed to come to them.  Small units and groups of stragglers were formed
into composite battalions or brigades and used to augment depleted divisions.  The BEF
had the opportunity to apply lessons recently learned on the Somme because of the 26
divisions involved in the battle 18 had already been engaged in the March battles.
Some commanders learned the lessons of battle very quickly. On taking up the
command of XI Corps north of the La Bassée canal Lieut.-General Haking re-organised
the defences of his area using the lessons learned in Italy where the Germans had tried
out their new tactics at Caporetto.  It was these defences that enabled the 55th Division
to be the only one to withstand the German onslaught on the Lys.  It is surely not a
coincidence that the GOC of this division was one of the committee who had advised
GHQ four months before.  Lieut.-General de Lisle made a similar re-organisation when
he took over XIII Corps a few days before the Arras attack on the 28 March.  Both these
corps had used the suggestion of the committee for a linear defence. Thus, it took
experience, rather than manuals, before the Allied commanders could get it right.
As we might expect the BEF did well in the one subject they understood –
logistics.  Detailed arrangements for the supply of each army were made and a new
railway was built behind the front to facilitate movements between them.
Previous studies have shown that the German Army had a system which allowed them
to devise and disseminate doctrine and also a specialist, Colonel von Lossberg, to apply
it.  This thesis has shown that the key to the German success was their willingness to use
the experience of this one officer to counter all the British offensives of 1916 and 17.  In
addition, the German experience of the defensive battle led them to reverse many of the
pre-war maxims that were ingrained in the army’s culture.  The most important of these
were abandoning the use of forward slopes, stopping the ‘waste’ entailed in retaking of
lost ground of no tactical importance and introducing the distribution of the defenders in
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depth (light holding of the front line - the bulk of the defenders in the rear).
It has been shown in the preceding chapters that the Germans never matched
their advance on the 9 April and in fact were easily stopped or slowed, as shown by the
action of the King Edward’s Horse and the XV Corps Cyclists in the first hours of the
battle.  The subsequent retreat had more to do with the weight of numbers than new
tactics, but on the face of it the new German tactics look unbeatable.  Both the intense
bombardment and infiltration tactics had been tried already at Riga and Cambrai and
found to work.
At first sight the German preparations for the Spring Offensives seem
impeccable.  An analysis of the tactical problems, the use of tactics new to the Western
Front but proved elsewhere, and a return to the use of surprise would seem to guarantee
success.  However, a more careful analysis shows gaps in their strategic and tactical
thinking.
The Germans identified three possible areas for an attack – Verdun, the Somme
and the Lys Valley – which had to commence before the Allies could start an offensive.
While the terrain allowed an attack to be started at any time on the Somme or either side
of Verdun, since the ground in the Lys Valley would be wet until April, no northern
attack could have been opened earlier.12  Ideally there should have been two
simultaneous attacks to draw in the British reserves but Ludendorff considered he had
insufficient forces for this.  It would seem that the idea of pinching out the Verdun
salient was disregarded for fear of the British starting a counter-offensive in Flanders.
While Ludendorff’s reasoning is valid, attacking the French offered an option
which might have made it difficult for Britain to continue the war in France.  Any attack
between the Oise and Verdun would threaten Paris and the loss of Verdun, as Wetzell
pointed out, might break the French Army and cause a political collapse.  The British
might be forced to form a box round the Channel Ports.  Even if the Germans were able
to defeat the BEF they still had to deal with the French.  There was surely every chance
that the defeat of the French would make a British presence on the continent extremely
difficult.
Wetzell pointed out in his analysis, that a decisive result was unlikely from one
large battle.  Instead, a series of attacks would be required, these continuous attacks
ending on a good defensive line would paralyse the enemy’s reserves.  In fact, this was
really the only option open to the Germans as they had no way of exploiting any
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breakthrough, and who had to overcome the logistical difficulty presented by crossing
the front line area, and in Picardy the additional obstacle of the old Somme battlefield.
A series of attacks would also keep the initiative with the Germans.  Ludendorff ignored
this advice and prepared to break through on a grand scale and roll up the British front
from the south.  Coincidentally, on both sides of the line the views of experts were being
ignored.  In both cases the reports did not coincide with the views of the commander and
so were pushed aside, although subsequently the experts were proved to be right.
Ludendorff’s wish for a decision from the Michael attack, inspired by political
considerations as much as military, meant that he kept the battle going too long.  By 26
March the German troops were tiring and French reinforcements were beginning to
arrive; now was the time to turn the attention elsewhere.  However, is it realistic to
expect a commander to stop a battle when all is going well?  Ludendorff succumbed to
the temptation and continued the battle with no means to exploit the breakdown of the
British front that might occur at anytime. If Ludendorff had stopped the battle he would
still have had the option of attacking the Allies elsewhere or restarting the battle on the
Somme.  With hindsight we may say that now was surely the time to attack the French.
After a few days rest and re-supply von Hutier’s army was in an excellent position to
wheel south.  To cover this time any of the prepared attacks on the French could be
opened.  However, the German concentration on defeating the British meant that an
attack in Flanders was still necessary.
The series of consecutive co-ordinated attacks proposed by Colonel Wetzell may
not have had the desired effect, even though this was the method used by the Allies to
force the Germans to an armistice later in the year.  The crisis would have created the
unified command, the only way of utilising the French reserves, and the British reserves
held in the UK would have had time to cross the Channel.  We have seen how quickly
many commanders learned the art of defence.  With a number of attacks this process
may have accelerated making the Germans’ task more difficult.
We might conclude that the Germans had set themselves an impossible task, and
that a military decision on the Western Front was not possible until a situation was
reached where one side had insufficient forces to continue the fight and thus the political
will to continue the war would evaporate.  From the German perspective the Allies were
not going to run out of men – the Americans were coming and so one last gamble was
worth it.  The Battles of the Lys shows that even against a weakened defender, the
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resilience of a defensive line was such that a complete break through was not possible.
In fact, lines of trenches were not stone castle walls, and defenders could create a
position anywhere.  What was required was the determination to hold on.
As in the March offensive Ludendorff kept the battle going far too long.  He
should have moved elsewhere after the 16 or 17 April.  Remembering Haig’s reluctance
to stop the British offensives of 1916 and 1917 this may have been a fault of all
commanders on the Western Front.  One can imagine the temptation, victory required
just one more push, and in Ludendorff’s case the prize was almost within his grasp
twice in one month.  Amiens was almost taken; had he been able to put in a few more
fresh divisions, and the Flanders hills, with their wonderful observation, would have
been his.  In reality this was an illusion, since after the initial shock the defenders were
always able to gather themselves together.
It is difficult to see why the Germans decided to implement the Mars attack,
rather than go straight to Flanders, it only widened the existing front.  Also Ludendorff
knew Mars/Valkerie was difficult.13  Surely it was better to attack in the north as soon as
Michael had started and keep the pressure on the British.  An attack in Flanders had
much going for it, as there was little room for manoeuvre behind the British front and
the Channel Ports could be threatened if not captured.  The concern about a wet spring,
which would make the going soft for the transport, was unfounded as the early months
of 1918 were unusually dry.  If Ludendorff had followed the advice of his chief
strategist, Colonel Wetzell, the attack in Flanders could have started on the 1 April at the
latest.  This would have made the situation for the BEF much more serious.  Divisions
that had been moved south had yet to be replaced by reconstituted divisions from the
Third and Fifth Armies.  The flow of reinforcements from Britain had yet to become a
flood as the new shipping arrangements did not begin to be effective until the beginning
of April.  The Germans may also have been able to attack on a wider front, and an attack
on either side of Ypres as well as against the Portuguese might have caused the
weakened British front to collapse.  This had a better chance of success than the series
of attacks they were forced to mount and given greater opportunities for exploitation.
The Germans were reacting to events rather than forcing them which does not work with
mass armies as the logistics and planning takes too long to organise.
The Germans’ logistical problems extended to moving their ‘siege train’ from
one battle area to another.  This meant that they could not start offensives at will.  Also,
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even with their eastern bonus, there were still only sufficient troops to carry out one
main attack.  The original George attack had been planned to be the main thrust, but this
was changed to Michael which could be undertaken earlier as the soil in Flanders was
expected to be wet after the winter rains.  Thus the original George, which extended
from the La Bassée canal to the sea had to be scaled down and became Georgette.  After
Michael, Bruchmüller’s battering train moved to the Arras front to make ready for Mars
and Valkyrie.  When the Mars attack did not succeed on the 28 March, Valkerie which
was due to be launched the next day was cancelled as it was not considered viable.14
Orders were given for Georgette to be implemented as soon as possible.  Unfortunately
for the Germans it took ten days to move all the heavy guns an put the ammunition in
place.
Thus it was not tactics that defeated the Germans but logistics and time.  Any
serious advance on the Western Front required guns and supply wagons to be moved
across no-man’s-land and the enemy trench system.  Although they laid in stocks of road
making material, and used Portuguese prisoners to lay it, they were never able to supply
a sufficiency of material.  The problem increased as time went on and more men and
material were fed into the battle.  Thus the Germans had to pause for five days (20 - 24
April) while they amassed sufficient artillery ammunition for the second attack on
Kemmel.  An added frustration for the Germans on the Lys was that the main roads did
not coincide with the direction of their proposed advance.  The Germans were aware
that the Allies had the ability to move reinforcements quickly by road and rail and so
were far too optimistic about the speed at which the advance could take place.  In fact,
part of the British defensive preparations had been the construction of a railway running
parallel to their front for just this purpose.15  After the first week of the battle the
advance came almost to a halt and their only important gain in the next two weeks was
Kemmel Hill.
The preliminary bombardment would always be successful against an enemy
with rigid defensive tactics.  The command infrastructure was destroyed or at the least
severely disabled, artillery and machine-gun positions were neutralised and the infantry
were sufficiently dazed to allow the passage of the assault troops.  Unfortunately, even
with a bombardment of this intensity it was not possible to knock out every artillery
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14 Official History, 1918, Vol. II, p. 74.
15 Official History, 1918, Vol. II, p. 54.
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battery or machine-gun nest and so, as always happens in desperate times, a few men
were able to hold up the advance of whole divisions.  Where the defence was more
flexible, especially when the front line was vacated, ‘Bruchmüller’s Orchestra’ was
reduced to a fireworks display.  However, it must be said that due to poor Allied
defensive tactics it succeeded many more times than it failed.
The effectiveness of storm-troops has perhaps had a better press than it deserves.
John Terraine has pointed out that the storm-troops were an expedient and not
representative of the whole German Army,16 while  Ludendorff complained that the
irreplaceable losses of so many of the old pre-war officer and NCO cadre had turned the
army into a militia.  Taking out the best men to form elite units in storm divisions meant
that the remaining ‘trench divisions’, which were the German reserve, were of dubious
quality.
Once through the enemy’s defensive system the Germans had very little that was
new to offer.  It is true that the skid-mounted mortars and machine-guns together with
the light field-guns enabled their infantry to take some fire-power with them, but it was
small compared with what the British could muster once they had recovered from the
initial shock.  In might be said that the Germans had given little thought to the breakout
phase of the battle. Ludendorff famously said: ‘We chop a hole.  The rest follows.  We
did it that way in Russia.’17  The traditional way of exploiting a breakthrough was with
the arme blanche, but at this point of the war the German cavalry was policing their
eastern conquests.  Although we may question the wisdom of using cavalry against
troops armed with rifles and machine-guns supported by artillery, mounted infantry
would have given them a method of exploiting gaps or bringing up reinforcements
quickly.  As it was they limited the speed of their advance to walking pace while the
Allies were able to bring up troops in lorries or by train.
While the results of the Spring Offensives were all negative for the Germans, there was
a positive outcome for the Allies in the higher direction of the war.  At last, there was a
unified command, even if it was only Foch and his small staff.  While the main dividend
of this move was to be had in the future when the Allies went on the offensive, the Lys
may be considered its first test, and gave the individual commanders-in-chief a period to
settle into their new roles.  It is questionable whether Haig would have received the
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French divisions in Flanders and reserves behind the rest of his front without the
intervention of Foch.  The French failure at Kemmel was hardly Foch’s fault.  It might
even be argued that the appointment of Foch gave the generals complete control of
operations on the Western Front for the first time.  The Beauvais Agreement handed
over to Foch ‘The strategic direction of military operations’.  While the politicians
looked at how to win the war in 1919 the winning team would finish the war in 1918.
There is some credit due to Sir Henry Wilson for bringing this about.  Whatever
else he did, his meeting with Foch on the evening of 24 March speeded up the process
of Foch’s appointment, at a time when quick action was required.  While it may be too
much to say that Wilson saved the day he certainly acted as a catalyst.
The new command structure also made Haig’s position more secure.  While
Lloyd George would have liked to have sacked Haig he was prevented from doing so by
the lack of a suitable replacement and fear of the repercussions.  This is probably why he
tried the next best thing of reducing his power.  Haig’s supporters in the establishment
could have made political difficulties for Lloyd George, and there was the problem of
hostile public reaction if Haig was sacked.  A study of the newspapers of the time shows
that Haig was synonymous with the BEF.  In fact, there is hardly a day when his name
was not mentioned in the Press.  It is hard to imagine the Morning Post keeping quite
about the dismissal of Haig (or even a forced resignation).
The reaction of the Home Front to the war became more important as it moved
into its fourth year with seemingly no end in sight.  The government’s control of the
Press allowed public opinion to be manipulated which meant that the opening days of
British offensives were often reported along the lines of ‘a splendid day for England’.
An enemy offensive presented a different challenge to war reporting, especially when
German territorial gains were so large.  Thus the attack was reported as the last throw of
a desperate enemy, who was paying a huge price in casualties for his success, while
British troops remained in good heart.  The extent of the British retreat was accurately
reported, the loss of major towns was made known to the public within 48 hours.  Even
the question of why this had happened was asked, in rather a small voice perhaps; while
the newspapers answered their own question with the view that this was now the time to
rally round and not to bicker, the government and the king voiced their support for the
BEF.
The Lys presented the additional problem of how to report the failure of the
Portuguese and French.  Instead of excuses they were depicted as gallant allies doing
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their best in trying circumstances.  Given the British failure to hold the line this poor
performance was not difficult to disguise.  This is another example of the British
learning to manage total war.  In contrast to Kitchener’s refusal to allow any war
reporting the army had realised that war correspondents would not give the game away.
The ‘truth’ was now to some extent being told.
The Spring Offensives gave the BEF a foretaste of the last 100 days.  During the
battle higher formations became suppliers of reinforcements and supplies rather than the
givers of tactical orders.  Battles were to be fought by divisions who, once committed
had to act on their own initiative.  This was also true for brigades and battalions.  We
have seen on the Lys that some commanders were quite capable of thinking for
themselves.  By 1918 the BEF had a weapon system that gave them the confidence and
flexibility which made them overall the most effective force on the Western Front.  On
the Lys it has been shown that once everything was working the Germans were unable to
make any appreciable headway.
However, regardless of the skill of commanders, the available firepower or the
vagaries of various Allies, the battle of the Lys was won by the bravery and stoicism of
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